Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

174. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State⁰

Bonn, February 14, 1963, noon.

2093.¹ Eyes only for Secretary and Amb. Dowling. During course of Under Secretary Gilpatric’s discussion with Chancellor yesterday, which lasted almost two hours, Adenauer charged that US had gone back on agreement reached between him and President, to effect that we would take no initiative with Soviets over Berlin and Germany.

In his opening statement, Gilpatric said that President has been concerned over recent signs of greater Soviet intransigence since De Gaulle’s January 14 press conference,² citing as examples both nuclear test negotiations and Soviet attitude on removal of troops from Cuba. Chancellor said that he also felt that during month of January Soviets had become tougher. However, he thought there were two reasons for this, and that in addition to French-UK-US differences over Brussels negotiations and Nassau, Khrushchev had also been encouraged by Kohler’s initiative. In this connection, Adenauer referred to his agreement with President last November, in view of which he had been “amazed” to learn that before Kohler left Moscow, he had asked Gromyko if he had any message for President, which led Gromyko only two days later to say that Soviets wished to resume discussions over Berlin and Germany.

Gilpatric replied that he did not agree with Chancellor’s interpretation and that what actually happened was clearly initiative by Gromyko and not by Kohler, who had merely made usual routine inquiry, as any other Ambassador, leaving for consultations at home.

Most of meeting with Adenauer taken up by lengthy and frequently emotional discourse by Chancellor on long history of Franco-German relations, including strong defense of recent reconciliation and treaty. As result, there was virtually no discussion of defense problems, apart from Gilpatric’s opening statement and Chancellor’s concluding comment. After emphasizing how “flabbergasted” he was at reaction in U.S. to Franco-German Treaty, Adenauer asked that President be assured that treaty in no way affects Germany’s support of NATO or recognition of U.S. free world leadership.³

Gilpatric will report fully on discussions upon arrival Friday.

Morris

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 Berlin. Secret; Priority.
1. On the source text 2095 is crossed out and 2093 written above it.
2. For a transcript of De Gaulle’s January 14 press conference, see Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle, May 19, 1958–January 31, 1964, pp. 208–222.
3. Later in the day the Department of State informed Morris that he should see Carstens, express U.S. surprise at the Chancellor’s accusation, and repeat to him that Gromyko had made the initiative, not Kohler. (Telegram 1891 to Bonn; Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 Berlin)