Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

169. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State⁰

Berlin, January 17, 1963, 16 p.m.

790. Paris also for USRO; USAREUR for POLAD; SHAPE for US Element Live Oak and Stoessel; CINCEUR for McGuire. Ref Deptel 1612 Bonn, 3443 Paris, 3713 London, 1478 Moscow.¹

British (Chairman) Deputy Commandant called on Mayor Brandt 1200 hours to give Allied reaction to Soviet suggestion Khrushchev-Brandt meeting East Berlin evening Jan 17 or 18. Tripartitely agreed Allied formula was along following lines: That we knew that Brandt was aware, as were we, of certain disadvantages in making such visit; nevertheless we left it up to Brandt to decide whether or not to go. This formula arrived at after unilateral consultations with Ambassadors in Bonn and based on strong views here that Allies should put decision squarely up to Brandt. Allied lack of enthusiasm for adventure has indeed been unilaterally expressed previously to Brandt by French Ambassador (via Foreign Office) in Bonn, British Ambassador in Berlin and by three Deputy Commandants.

It was also agreed that Rouse would tell Brandt that if he decided go ahead with visit, conditions he mentioned to Rouse yesterday were satisfactory: that meeting would not be in Sov Embassy; no GDR or SED representatives should attend; and Brandt would avoid giving impression he was spokesman for Allies.

Brandt told Rouse that Chancellor’s reaction was very similar to Allies, that is, that he had some reservations but decision was up to Brandt. At Brandt’s request, Rouse mentioned several of the disadvantages from the Allied point of view but reiterated no pressure intended and decision was for Brandt to make. He also specifically stated on behalf of Allies that replies to press inquiries re Allied involvement would follow closely formula outlined above.

Brandt said he had not made up his mind but would inform Rouse his decision later in afternoon. Rouse informed me 1500 hours Brandt decided accept and is proposing meeting 1930 this evening. He is laying down certain conditions based on those mentioned above. If meeting arranged, Senat plans issue brief press announcement. Interpreter from Bonn now on way to Berlin to assist Brandt, who would also be accompanied by Barr and Klein.

According Albertz² Brandt’s decision heavily influenced by last-minute telephone message from Chancellor that refusal would be detrimental to German/Soviet relations; hence Chancellor advised Brandt “to make personal sacrifice of agreeing to see Khrushchev.”³

Lightner

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.62A/1–1763. Secret; Niact. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, SHAPE, and CINCEUR.
1. Dated January 16, this telegram informed the Mission that a meeting between Brandt and Khrushchev in East Berlin would undercut Four-Power responsibility in Berlin, and so acceptance of the Soviet offer of a meeting would be disadvantageous. If Brandt insisted, the Allies should avoid a public debate, since an open rift with the Mayor would be worse. (Ibid., 661.62A/1–1462)
2. Heinrich Albertz, Berlin Senator for the Interior.
3. Later in the day the Mission at Berlin reported that the meeting had been “abruptly” cancelled after the Berlin CDU threatened to leave the city’s governing coalition. (Telegram 796 from Berlin; Department of State, Central Files, 661.62A/1–1763) For Brandt’s account of these events, see Begegnungen und Einsichten, pp. 112–113.