Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

16. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Geneva, March 18, 1962, 12:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • Mr. Kohler
  • Ambassador Thompson
  • Mr. Bohlen
• U.S.S.R.
  • Mr. Semenov
  • Mr. Kovalev
  • Mr. Suslov (Gromyko’s personal assistant)

SUBJECT

• Berlin

SecDel MC/33

The following points of some interest in regard to the Soviet position emerged. I shall not set down the repetition of past positions which Semenov, who did all the talking for the Soviets, covered. The chief points stressed by Mr. Semenov in reply to our questions seemed to be the following:

1. The real reason why the Soviets desire to change the existing situation in Berlin is to do away with the Allied control represented by the occupation regime in order to eliminate certain types of activity in the city, i.e., RIAS, intelligence operations and comparable matters. In discussing RIAS, for example, Mr. Semenov mentioned that they “knew” that this was used as a source of operational instructions to agents in the GDR. He mentioned that Berlin, in its present state, created a constant source of friction with the Soviet Union and implied that this was one of the major reasons why they desired a change in its status.

2. The free city concept seemed to be a means of bringing about an end to what he referred to as “organic links” with the FRG. He mentioned that in the Soviet concept all private as against state ties could be maintained, citing as an example the case of Austria. He emphasized the fact that despite the Allied veto of the incorporation of West Berlin into the Federal Republic this was merely a paper veto and the relationship in fact is as though West Berlin were a Land of the Federal Republic. He referred again to the fact that this had not always been the case and mentioned specifically the B-mark question of the late 40’s. He admitted on this point that one of the main purposes of the Soviet Union was to prevent the extension of what he termed German revanchist and militaristic activities in West Berlin. He compared these activities in West Berlin as the end of a cable whose source was West Germany. Semenov laid great stress on the danger that the German militarist sentiment and activity would succeed in bringing the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. into conflict and that it was to avoid this possibility that the Soviet proposals were directed.

3. Semenov laid considerable stress on the allegation that Western Berlin as now constituted is, in effect, a “NATO base”, largely, it appeared, because of the NATO declaration to the effect that an attack on the forces in Western Berlin would bring NATO into action.¹ He said that this NATO connection was incompatible with the solution of the Berlin situation that they envisaged.

4. Originally, Mr. Semenov stated that the question of the presence of Allied forces in the city was one that should be left for the ministers to discuss, but later on in discussing our objections to the concept of a free and neutral city, he said that this might be reconciled with the presence of Western forces.

5. On the subject of access he was evasive and did not answer a number of questions which we put to him as to what the Soviets really meant by this reiterated statement; i.e., whether this would involve GDR control over the traffic of persons and goods to and from West Berlin.

Mr. Semenov throughout stressed the dangers of German militarism as a source of U.S./U.S.S.R. conflict and asserted several times that the Soviets had no intention of harming U.S. interest. He was, however, impressed by our statement that whatever might be the Soviet intentions, the objective results of the course of action which they proposed would inevitably result in a loss of Western influence and position in regard to Berlin. He had no particular answer to our statements that the East Berlin leaders have frequently made specific what their intentions in this regard were, and said we should not pay too much attention to statements of others, mentioning alleged statements of some of our military in Berlin. He stressed throughout the importance of reaching some understanding while admitting the great difficulties which stood in the way of its achievement, and his outline of Soviet objectives in regard to Berlin was somewhat more precise than in previous discussions with the Soviets although containing nothing exceptionally new.

It seems clear that Soviet objectives are: (i) to eliminate Berlin as an Allied control center, (ii) to bring to an end what he claimed to be the organic links to the FRG which, in their version makes it a hot bed of “revanchist and militaristic” propaganda and activities incompatible with the establishment of “normal” relationships between our two countries and the general purpose of stabilization of the German situation on the basis of two Germanies. The Soviet insistence that Eastern Berlin and what went on there was “not a question” but a situation in fact which was definitely set forth. The only time he reacted sharply was when reference was made to our right, in view of the Soviet actions in East Berlin, to the incorporation of West Berlin into the Federal Republic, and he remarked “You just try that!”

The general impression of the conversation was that the Soviets are anxious to explore possibilities of a mutually acceptable solution. Semenov gave a somewhat clearer outline of Soviet reasons in the various suggestions they had put forward. There was no give, however, nor clarification of the phrase “respect for the sovereignty of the GDR in respect to access rights.” He referred on a number of occasions to unrestricted access but declined to be specific as to how this would relate to East German sovereignty.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–1862. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Bohlen on March 19. The meeting was held at the Hotel du Lac.
1. For text of this declaration, December 16, 1958, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, p. 560, or Department of State Bulletin, January 5, 1959, p. 4.