133. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State0
981. Policy. Khrushchev-Kohler—Part V.1 Berlin and Khrushchev trip to UN. Khrushchev then said that perhaps after elections he would meet President in New York and they would reach agreement on nuclear test ban. Soviets sincerely wanted agreement. He had understood in Vienna that President also wanted agreement and believes he has not lost interest since then. Soviets, too, think this is one of matters that is ripe for solution.
After this problem, he said, most important is question of Germany-Berlin. President has been heating up atmosphere and has called up 150,000 reserves.2 Soviets did not intend to follow US example in this. Some people say that he has told foreign delegations that President did not dare to start a war, but they interpret him wrongly. He does not [Page 360] want to say something offensive to President and his remarks have been distorted. When he talks with foreigners, he says Soviets will sign a peace treaty, with all the consequences that would follow, and he also says that any war would inevitably grow into nuclear war. Consequently, anyone who would start a war would be either a lunatic or a coward. In the last couple of days, he read a statement by some US military officer who said US would unilaterally start a war if USSR signed separate peace treaty. This was silly statement. This officer perhaps knows how to talk to his wife, but he does not know how to talk to the press. “We will sign a peace treaty, but no one who is sane will start a war.” Peace treaty does not threaten anyone. People who lose their self-control and talk like that officer are either cowards or lunatics. But if agreement is not reached with US, Soviets cannot postpone signature of peace treaty indefinitely.
Adenauer says, Khrushchev continued, that if USSR signs peace treaty, US must do its duty and start war. Adenauer is too old and is losing his mind. He is stupid old man (glupy starik). But West Germany would be first country to be burned up, within first hour of war. Adenauer is 86 and perhaps he doesn’t care. But German people want their children to live. However, Americans listen very carefully to Adenauer and he is leading Americans. Khrushchev said he would give his reply to Adenauer about time latter goes to US, and it would be published then.
US elections will take place, he said, and then we’ll try to renew dialogue and reach agreement. Soviets won’t sign peace treaty immediately; they know unilateral signing would be aggravation.
He asked what problem still remained. Only stationing of troops; there is no problem on access. Soviets believe access, both by land and by air, should be guaranteed with or without treaty. They have made still another concession by agreeing to presence of troops in West Berlin under UN flag. So only problem is composition of troops, which may include US troops, but must also include others, so that not only NATO military bloc would have troops there. If US doesn’t agree, that would force Soviets to sign peace treaty despite fact US is threatening to start war. Must be recognized that, in our electronic age, when one button is pressed, other button is pressed automatically. There is no sense in dialogue of threats. This is silly policy. So US should take position of reason.
Khrushchev asked why US needs West Berlin. US, Britain and De Gaulle are sticking to West Berlin because Adenauer interested in it. Adenauer’s interest is natural. But why is America interested? No one threatens West Berlin. US says it is for freedom of West Berlin. Soviets are also for that freedom. But we must liquidate state of war and military base in West Berlin, which is a remnant of war.
[Page 361]If agreement can be reached on stopping tests and West Berlin, this would help us to solve problem of disarmament. Khrushchev said he thought US not ready for disarmament agreement; Congress is not ready and President’s hands are tied, so let us solve some other questions. Let’s do away with bases and disband our troops. US can send rockets from its own territory. These are not old times when infantry was used, so he was surprised when President called 150,000 reserves. These are not times of Kutuzoy or Suvorov, when battles were fought with bayonets.
He said probably he would travel to UNGA at end November. early in November, he would be busy with domestic problems. If situation were favorable then, he would be glad to meet with President. He had good recollections meeting with President. Then perhaps they could: (1) agree on test ban, which he would like to do; (2) exchange views on disarmament; and (3) he would also alike to agree on West Berlin and create a calmer atmosphere for disarmament. For time being, Soviets would do nothing and make no statements until elections. He had given his word on that.
I said I thought President would find his statement interesting and, referring to President’s press-conference comment on readiness to meet, said I would hope meanwhile there would be no developments which would make a meeting difficult. Perhaps progress could be made at a lower level in preparation for such a meeting. Gromyko was to see President day after tomorrow and then have working dinner with Secretary. Berlin would probably be discussed. I should therefore withhold my own comment on his remarks on Berlin.
Khrushchev repeated that they would not undertake anything to worsen relations. He regretted that things had not worked out in accordance with his discussion with Ambassador Thompson. It was regrettable that Cuban question had blown up right in middle of election campaign. He had read accounts of Gromyko’s talks with Rusk and Home and there was nothing new on West Berlin problem there. Home had raised question of control of flights, but this was trifle. If, as result President’s meeting with Gromyko, Rusk and Gromyko could agree on something, that would be good, but he doubted they could.
Khrushchev then noted he had not known earlier that appointment was fixed for Gromyko with President. I said we had just learned this today. Khrushchev said he was glad and thanked President for finding time to receive Gromyko.
Khrushchev said he wanted to review these questions today and had not raised any new problems since we had to settle old ones. He wished me good health in Russian climate and hoped political climate would also be good. He said great countries like ours had special responsibilities. For themselves, they wanted peace and peaceful competition. [Page 362] Great ships had to sail in high seas and he hoped they would sail without interference. I said I took good note of what he had said and would report to President his statements on Germany and Berlin. Perhaps Secretary would be discussing this with Gromyko, but I thought I should add that we had gone as far as we could, short of our vital interests, that is, stationing of our forces. We are for co-existing in this situation. I was very glad to hear Chairman say he wanted to talk further about it and was sure President would, too.
Khrushchev asked me to convey best wishes to President and hope that he would have success in election campaign, as well as wishes for good health and success to his family, his wife and mother.
Meeting ended at 1250 hours Moscow time.
- Source: Department of State, S/S Files, eyes Only Telegrams Microfilm. Secret; Priority.↩
- Parts I–IV summarized the introductory remarks and discussion of harassment of shipping, Cuba, U-2 flights, the nuclear test ban, and U.S. elections. Copies of all these telegrams, 973, 974, 978, and 979, are ibid. Further documentation on this first meeting between Ambassador Kohler and Khrushchev is in volume V.↩
- Presumably Khrushchev is referring to President Kennedy’s approval on October 3 of P.L. 87–736, authorizing mobilization of the Ready Reserve.↩