Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

119. Memorandum From the Vice President’s Military Aide (Burris) to Vice President Johnson⁰

Washington, September 18, 1962.

RE

• Khrushchev Moves Towards Berlin Showdown

Information from several sources suggests that Khrushchev has conceived a schedule for a resolution on his own terms of the Berlin problem. His discussions with U Thant and with the departing German Ambassador Kroll are especially significant.¹ Reports in the press to the effect that nothing is contemplated until after the November elections is simply a notation of the culmination of the period of build up and preparation for the event. U Thant reported to Mr. Stevenson that he counseled Khrushchev not to bring the Berlin question before the U.N., but urged him to continue negotiations within the four-power framework. He conceded that it might be desirable to bring the Berlin question before the U.N. at some later date. In this connection Khrushchev repeated the Soviet desire to establish U.N. presence in Berlin.

In recent years the Soviets have been known to grossly misinterpret Western intentions. Khrushchev’s statement to U Thant that President Kennedy and Macmillan understand the Soviet position on Berlin but are inhibited from taking action by the necessity to accommodate Adenauer seems typical of Soviet misinterpretation. On the other hand, the statement could well be a crude effort to alienate the Allies. U Thant came away convinced that Khrushchev will proceed with the peace treaty, but gained no impression as to timing.

Khrushchev stated quite emphatically to Kroll just before he left Moscow that Soviet actions leading to the separate peace treaty will begin soon and in time to permit recourse to the U.N. if such action appears appropriate or necessary. He stated that action would be initiated soon to prepare public opinion for the separate treaty, the plan for which is complete. Khrushchev noted that the treaty which has been drawn up will render continued Western occupation of Berlin impossible.

In what might be another Soviet misinterpretation, Khrushchev has come to the conclusion that Western leaders have proven themselves so anxious to avoid conflict that they will accept the treaty and accommodate themselves to it. Nevertheless, he has made the observation that he will take the matter to the United Nations if Western actions present to him an unacceptable risk of war. In any case, Khrushchev appears to have concluded after years of talking and pressuring the Allies, coupled with often brazen threats of force, that he can now, with impunity, achieve his avowed purpose and seal another country, including the City of Berlin, within the Communist Bloc. Whether or not the West intends basically to permit this to occur, it has at least permitted Khrushchev to come to the conclusion that he can now proceed with his plan. More resolute actions all along the line—often avoided out of ostensible fear of precipitating conflict or even angry reaction—would certainly have avoided that which appears inevitable. Our diplomats and certain political appointees seem unable or unwilling to accept the fact that it is impossible to negotiate politely with the Soviets on an issue like Berlin. The Russians traditionally, and especially the Communists more recently, understand and respond only to recognized strength and willingness to apply it, and to firmly and clearly stated intentions to do so in support of national policy or position.

0. Source: Johnson Library, Vice President’s Security Files, Col. Burris’ Reports. Secret.
1. U Thant had visited Moscow at the end of August. Thompson reported on September 14 that following a lengthy conversation with Khrushchev, Kroll was convinced that the Soviet Union planned to sign a peace treaty with East Germany shortly after the U.S. elections. Kroll told Thompson that Khrushchev did not seem to believe Western assertions that it would defend its position in West Berlin even at the risk of war. (Telegram 672 from Moscow, September 14; Department of State, Central Files, 601.62A61/9–1462) For Kroll’s account of this final meeting with Khrushchev, see Lebenserinnerungen eines Botschafters, pp. 571–575.