116. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State0
412. Policy. Paris also for USRO and McGuire. USAREUR for POLAD. SHAPE for Stoessel and US Element Live Oak. Sov shift Sept 4 to Sandkrug Bridge for Memorial guard transit and return to buses Sept [Page 321] 14 have for time being corrected troublesome situation which contained constant danger of incident. At same time Sov attempt to exploit use of armor for political-psychological reasons in West Berlin has been halted.
More important perhaps is that Allies have regulated a significant element of Sov activity in West Berlin. On their face the actions the Sovs have been induced to take have been minor. However, that Allies have required Sovs to change place of entry and mode of transport for War Memorial guard is significant. It could put allies in better position to deal with anticipated period of Sov efforts exports exploit presence in West Berlin.
Furthermore, Allies’ moves presumably have somewhat improved West Berlin confidence. This regard, difficult to evaluate importance of these moves, but it is not likely that of themselves they will do more than reduce the generally negative balance that now exists, or that their effect will be durable in the face of any further Sov encroachments that West is unable or unwilling to rebuff.
Return to buses by Sovs puts heavy responsibility on Allies for preventing even minor attacks by West Berliners on these vehicles. British have taken elaborate police precautions on route to Memorial for initial days, and Brandt issued good statement Sept 14 to effect West Berliners should not make task of Allies difficult by untoward behavior in this respect. Acid test efficacy of these measures will be next emotion-laden (Fechter-type) incident.
Explanation for Sov decisions to change crossing point and return to buses is probably simplest one, namely that issues were not considered by Sovs as propitious, or as important enough, for making stand which could clearly have escalated and might even have resulted in their being denied access to West Berlin entirely. To this degree Sov acquiescence evidence that they value their presence in West Berlin. In addition, by insisting that Allied messages re changes be conveyed via CINC channel, and by emphasizing this aspect in press treatment on crossing point shift, Sovs undoubtedly hoped drive home point that Allies were forced to comply practically with recent abolition of office of Sov Commandant in East Berlin. (That there was no East German publicity about UKMLM call on HQGSFG re APC’s may be due to non-involvement East Germans and some Sov loss of face over issue.)
It must be anticipated that Sovs will exploit these events in future, perhaps to provide justification for demands of their own re Allied access to West Berlin. They may furthermore have plans for sector/sector retaliatory action, such as further limitation in number of crossing points as rumored here in last few days.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9–1762. Secret. Repeated to London, Bonn, Moscow, Paris, USAREUR, and SHAPE.↩