Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

113. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, September 7, 1962, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• De Gaulle Visit to Germany and Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Ambassador Hervé Alphand, French Embassy
• Mr. Jean-Claude Winckler, Counselor, French Embassy
• Mr. Francis E. Meloy, Jr., WE

The French Ambassador called on the Secretary at his own request following his return from Paris for a general discussion.

The Secretary, who had not yet seen the De Gaulle-Adenauer communique,¹ inquired of Ambassador Alphand as to its contents. The Ambassador, who had just seen the communique, outlined very briefly its major points. The Secretary commented that it would appear that the communique contained a good deal more than such documents usually do.

Ambassador Alphand repeated that the De Gaulle visit had gone very well especially in its public relations aspects. The fact that De Gaulle speaks some German had been helpful. The Ambassador said that the press had played up the dramatic aspects of the visit, noting that this was the first time a French Chief of State had paid a state visit to Germany since 921 A.D.

Ambassador Alphand said he hoped that the United States would not consider the De Gaulle-Adenauer understandings and the Franco-German rapprochement to be against U.S. interests. The Secretary said certainly not. At the expense of appearing somewhat naive he still felt he should point out that the United States had been engaged in two major world conflicts in which France and Germany were on opposite sides. An understanding between France and Germany for the drawing together of those two countries was therefore very much to be desired. On the other hand, however, if it should develop that there was contemplated a French-German axis or understanding at the expense of NATO and the Atlantic Community, the United States would very definitely be disturbed. Ambassador Alphand emphasized that such intent had been expressly denied.

The Ambassador inquired as to how the Secretary saw events developing with regard to Berlin. The Secretary said that he had asked our intelligence people to prepare an assessment of the current situation and future probabilities and that we would share this assessment with the French and our other allies in the next meeting on Berlin. The Secretary had a hunch that we are in for a serious time. The Soviets might withdraw from the air security center and attempt to insist that we fly from Schoenfeld. There may also be harassment in the air corridor to Berlin and indications of a Soviet build up of antiaircraft weapons in the corridor pointed this way. The Secretary said he could tell the Ambassador very privately that we may need to ask further congressional authority for calling up reserve troops.²

The Secretary went on to say that we are concerned by the German defense budget reduction which may signal to Moscow a lack of sense of urgency, determination and firm common purpose.

The Secretary asked if there were any possibility that an additional French division might be assigned to NATO. The Ambassador replied that French troops returning from Algeria are being modernized and re-equipped. He was not in a position to say if any additional forces could be committed to NATO. The Secretary asked if the modernization of the French troops is something the Soviets could pick up. The Ambassador thought that the Soviets were well aware of this.

Ambassador Alphand asked if the Secretary anticipated a separate peace treaty between the Soviets and East Germany. The Secretary said that he did not think this likely within the next few weeks but that it could possibly happen before the end of the year. Ambassador Alphand said that the French Foreign Minister shares this view.

The Secretary said he would like to comment on the Cuban situation in connection with possible Soviet moves regarding Berlin. It appears that the Soviets are making a hurried crash effort at antiaircraft installations in Cuba. While there have been some tanks and other arms sent to Cuba, by far the greatest part of recent Soviet military shipments to Cuba has been antiaircraft materiel. The Soviets are training Cubans in the operation of this equipment which they have never done before. This may be a sign that the Soviets expect a serious crisis in Berlin and want to put Cuba in the best possible position to resist any U.S. move which we might be tempted to make as a result of an emergency in Berlin. The Soviets may be trying to anticipate and get braced for a Berlin crisis. We should not link Soviet actions in Cuba too closely to Berlin but they may be an indicator.

The Secretary said of course the United States would not trade an easing of the Cuban situation for concessions in Berlin. He commented in passing that we do not understand the recurring waves of alerts in Cuba.

The Secretary expressed appreciation to Ambassador Alphand for information being passed to us by the French regarding Cuba.

Ambassador Alphand said the French are concerned for the entire Caribbean area, and for the effects on the rest of Latin America if the Soviets are successful in Cuba.³

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.5162A/9–762. Secret. Drafted by Meloy and approved in S on September 18. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk’s office.
1. For text of the September 7 communiqué, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1962, pp. 1045–1046.
2. Later in the day President Kennedy sent identical letters to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House seeking authorization to activate units of the Ready Reserve. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, p. 665. The necessary authority was passed by both Houses and approved by the President on October 3.
3. Ambassador Alphand also asked whether the United States was considering bringing the Berlin question before the United Nations, expressing the French view that the United Nations was not competent on the issue. Rusk replied that the United States would not take such an initiative unless there were a direct threat to the peace. (Memorandum of conversation, September 7; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9–762) A memorandum of the conversation on the Common Market is ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.