Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

70. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington,July 15, 1961.

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Menshikov
• Assistant Secretary Nitze

Ambassador Menshikov began the conversation by saying that he was returning to Russia for a vacation. He would have four weeks net not including travel time. I said I envied him. It looked to me as though people worked less hard in the Communists’ world than here. He said that I would see from their twenty-year plan that fifteen years from now, the Communists would have to work very little indeed, but they would have to do some work.

The conversation then turned to the question of relative loyalties to the nation or to the party. He said his responsibilities were almost entirely to the state; and, though a member of the party, that he did not even invite members of the American Communist party to his receptions. I said I could well understand that this might present no conflict with his instructions. He then said that there was much disagreement and arguing within the Communist system between factory managers, Government officials, etc., and that in most of these arguments the question of whether or not one was a member of the party did not enter in. He agreed, however, that the general line was set by the party and governed policies in other areas such as the Government.

He then turned the subject to Berlin and said he hoped we did not misunderstand his Government’s position on Berlin. In reply, I said I thought Mr. Khrushchev had made himself eminently clear. My concern was that a basic miscalculation had already been made by him.

Menshikov said that the important thing was for the USSR and the U.S. to understand each other and to agree. In the Geneva negotiations about a test ban, we were proposing an administrator who would impose our will upon the Soviet Union. This they couldn’t agree to. Now we were proposing to veto any proposal in the UN to adapt the UN administration to the Troika principle. I said I thought our differences went back to a basic philosophical point—it was our belief that one could find people who could objectively interpret facts and the provisions of a treaty or agreement. We thought people could be found who would place this obligation above loyalty to the interests of a particular nation or a particular party. Evidently, Mr. Khrushchev did not believe this possible.

The Ambassador referred to Hammarskjold and the Congo as an example of a so-called neutral administrator who had gone beyond the terms of his authority. I said we did not consider that Hammarskjold had gone beyond the terms of his authority. We had been cross with Hammarskjold because he had not more forcefully executed the authority which he had. Any objective administrator would undoubtedly cause both of us to be unhappy with him, but we were prepared for neutral administrators to be in control of agreed functions. Evidently the Soviet Union did not agree to this. If so, it was hard to see how one could get away from what would amount to self-inspection.

I then asked the Ambassador what he thought it was we didn’t understand about their Berlin proposal. The Ambassador said that Mr. Khrushchev had offered to discuss with us a German peace treaty. He had said that they had their proposals for a treaty, we should present ours. It was only if we refused negotiations or could not agree upon a treaty that they would be forced to go ahead with theirs. I said that I had carefully read the Soviet proposal and was aware of these provisions, but what in effect they were proposing was that we sit down and negotiate under threat that if we could not agree with the Soviet Union, they would sign a unilateral treaty with their puppet Ulbricht and then cut off our rights in Berlin. This threat had now been coupled with threats of nuclear destruction if we attempted thereafter to exercise those rights. Mr. Khrushchev had pointed out to Ambassador Roberts that six nuclear weapons could destroy the U.K. and eight could destroy France.² We can’t agree to negotiating under such threats. The similarity to Hitler’s actions in 1938 has been drawn by some.

I went on to say that I had supervised 500 engineers and technicians in assessing the effects of the atomic weapons dropped at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I had followed studies on nuclear effects since that time. The computations were not difficult to make of what would happen to Russia if a thousand megatons were dropped, if 7,000 megatons were dropped, if 10,000 megatons, or even if 20,000 megatons were dropped. It was easy to refer to such facts, but dangerous. It could lead to a point of no return in our relations.

The Ambassador said that he believed we misinterpreted what they have said about Berlin. They propose no action against a free city of Berlin. I said this is not what Mr. Khrushchev has indicated and certainly not what Ulbricht has said. We quite recognize that they may delay such action but the threat would still be there. The Ambassador then said that we must realize that they firmly intend to sign the peace treaty. I said I fully understood that this was their intention, but they should realize what this may mean before they do it.

The Ambassador said the reason they thought a peace treaty now was essential because things were going on in Germany which must be stopped. There was a revanchist group in Germany which was arming Germany and seeking thermonuclear weapons. I said that the Germans were by and large interested in their tremendous economic prosperity, and that there was little drive to build up military strength in Germany. It was Soviet recurrent threats to Berlin which was forcing German rearmament. If they signed a peace treaty, this would push the NATO alliance closer together and would have the effect of increasing the pace of German armament. They would be forcing the U.S. and Germany closer together and, not only the U.S. and Germany, but also all other NATO allies. The similarity of Khrushchev’s threats to those of Hitler would not be lost. I pointed out that it was the Soviet Union that was responsible for having taken the initiative in the Berlin situation. I recalled that I had already said that I believed they had miscalculated. There was, however, still time for them to change. It is they who have increased their defense budget by one-third. They talk of countering de Gaulle’s one division being returned from Algeria with ten divisions of tanks deployed across the Autobahn. Certainly this can be done but it won’t protect the heart land of Russia.

I recalled that Mr. Khrushchev in his speech of denunciation of Stalin³ had accused Stalin in the later thirties of having mishandled the German problem so as to bring a threat to the physical base of Communism. I said I should think Mr. Khrushchev would worry about similarities to today’s situation.

The Ambassador said he was present when Mr. Khrushchev made his speech. He did not remember that Mr. Khrushchev had emphasized the points I was making. In any case, the situation was now different than that which existed in the late thirties.

I went back to the point that the initiative on Berlin was theirs, and it was time for their side to reconsider. They know what our requirements are in regard to Berlin and Germany, if they want to negotiate seriously about Germany, they could withdraw their threat of unilateral action to terminate our rights and send a special emissary to negotiate with us. It is hard to see how we could very well negotiate under Hitler-like threats of nuclear destruction. The Ambassador said that we would have to shoot first in a Berlin crisis. I said, no, we will exercise our rights. If you shoot to prevent that, we will have to shoot back.

The Ambassador said what is it you want in Germany. I said we want an all German solution based on the right of self-determination. The Ambassador said there are many ways of exercising self-determination. Popular support can be shown in other ways than by free elections. He said, “Did Syngman Rhee really have popular support?” I said, yes, in my opinion, he did for a long period have popular support. I said I thought President Ayub in Pakistan had popular support despite the fact Mr. Khrushchev had called him and the Shah “rotten”. I said Ayub is not rotten; on the other hand, Ulbricht is rotten. He has the support of hardly 15% of his people.

The Ambassador said that this was all very pessimistic with my talk of miscalculation and points of no return. I said to the contrary, it is you who have taken the initiative with respect to Berlin and there is still time for Mr. Khrushchev to change his course. I had always thought the Communists made a virtue of being realists. If, as you say, Mr. Khrushchev is worried about Germany, he must see that what he is doing is driving the West together including Germany. If he signs a unilateral peace treaty with his puppet, he will merely accelerate that process. By that time he may have started a process that neither he nor we will subsequently be able fully to control. His initiative is obviously not working out the way you say he hoped it would. Now is the time to change. When you go back to Moscow, I hope you do all you can to get this straightened out.

At one point I said that one of the principal lines of policy in the early months of the Kennedy Administration had been to cool down East-West tensions and to create a situation in which meaningful talks with the Soviet Union would be possible. Menshikov said he recognized that this had been true and noted that the proposal for a meeting between President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev had been Mr. Kennedy’s initiative. He said he thought that talk had been useful but that further talks were necessary. One could not accomplish everything in one or two days. I reiterated the point that it was Mr. Khrushchev who had taken the initiative in renewing the crisis over Berlin, and that this had not been our initiative. Menshikov replied that there had been various developments, including our mistake over Cuba, but that the principal factor which had caused Mr. Khrushchev to take the position that he had taken on Berlin was our indication of an unwillingness to negotiate a German peace treaty with them.

At another point in the discussion, Mr. Menshikov discussed their ideas of a free city of Berlin. He said that the East Germans would guarantee rights of access to Berlin and that the Russians would also guarantee them. They would not object to the presence of token Western military forces in Berlin. The question at issue was what the purpose of these forces in Berlin was to be. If they were to be the symbol of a continuation of occupation rights, the Soviet Union could not agree. The occupation had lasted for 16 years and must be terminated. If the purpose of the continued presence of the troops was to symbolize the guarantees that Berlin would remain a free city, that would be alright, but under those circumstances Russian troops should participate. I pointed out that there originally had been a special regime for the entire city of Berlin; that the Soviet Union having turned over its sector to the East Germans now proposed a regime to be applicable only to the Western sectors similar to the one which they had violated for the whole city. I said that we could not agree to this.

Mr. Menshikov referred to the subversive activities which were being conducted from West Berlin. I pointed out that subversive activities were being conducted by the Communists in many areas of the world. If they wanted to negotiate about the general problem, this would be possible, but they had made it clear in previous discussions how difficult it would be for them to put a general halt to such activities.

Mr. Menshikov also referred to the importance of settling boundary questions once and for all. I indicated that the problem of the Oder-Neisse line might be soluble if part of a more general settlement. Menshikov indicated that more was involved than that.

Menshikov said the East Germans should talk with the West Germans. Two regimes existed. The problem of a German settlement was their problem. I replied that I had read Ulbricht’s proposals for a settlement some two years ago, and that it was evident that what he wished to negotiate was a division of East and West Germany, not a reunification.

Menshikov repeatedly drew the analogy between our having signed a Japanese peace treaty without Soviet agreement and their proposal for a German peace treaty without our agreement. He said that at that time we had felt a Japanese peace treaty to be necessary. Now they felt a German peace treaty to be necessary. He said we had gotten away with our unilateral Japanese peace treaty because we then had a monopoly of atomic weapons. I pointed out that the two situations were not analagous, and furthermore that even though they now had atomic weapons, they did not have a monopoly—there were now all the dangers of a two-sided situation.

The Ambassador thanked me for having invited him to lunch. I wished him success on his mission.

Paul H. Nitze⁴

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Confidential. Drafted by Nitze on July 17. The meeting was held at the Metropolitan Club. On July 12 and 17 Menshikov had similar conversations with Bowles and Rostow. A memorandum of his conversation with Rostow is ibid., and is summarized in The Diffusion of Power, p. 230; a memorandum of his conversation with Bowles is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/7-1261.
2. This exchange had taken place at a performance of the Royal Ballet at the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow on July 2.
3. For documentation on Khrushchev’s speech, February 25, 1956, attacking Stalin, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XXIV, pp. 72 ff.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.