Office of the Historian

71. Paper Prepared by Secretary of State Rusk1

Washington,July 17, 1961.

OUTLINE ON GERMANY AND BERLIN

I. U.S. Interests

A.
The vital interests of the U.S. (i.e. interests which involve decisions as to war) are engaged in the German-Berlin problem at the following points:
1.
Presence and security of Western forces in West Berlin
2.
The security and viability of West Berlin
3.
Physical access to West Berlin
4.
The security of the Federal Republic of Germany against attacks from the East
B.
The U.S. also has important political interests and aims in Germany which have not yet been realized. These may be summarized as the application to all of Germany of the principle of self-determination [Page 208] and the intimate association of a unified Germany with the West. If there must be, on practical grounds, a choice between a unified Germany and a Western Germany integrated into Western Europe, the U.S. interests lie with the latter choice.
C.
There are aspects of the German-Berlin situation which are not politically acceptable and are not likely to be changed in the near future, aspects which are not the occasion for a resort to force by the West. Among these are: (a) the de facto division of Germany, and (b) the de facto absorption of East Berlin into East Germany.
D.
Certain elements of the German-Berlin problem are of little national interest to the U.S. and could be conceded if it becomes valuable to do so, for example, the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as a German-Polish frontier.

II. Soviet Objectives

While precise Soviet objectives within any specific time period must be somewhat speculative, the resumption of Soviet pressures against the status quo in Germany and Berlin appear to be aimed at:

A.
The actual and formal consolidation of the Communist position in Eastern Europe and East Germany: Khrushchev has reason to be anxious about his situation in East Germany and the longer run prospect in such countries as Poland.
B.
A permanent freezing of the division of Germany.
C.
Political steps to meet what might be a growing Russian concern about the revival and rearming of the Federal Republic of Germany.
D.
A significant dilution of the Western position in West Berlin, looking toward its absorption into a Communist East Germany.
E.
The weakening or dissolution of NATO.
F.
A blow to Western, and, more particularly, U.S. prestige as a part of the general strategy of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

Note: The priorities Khrushchev might attach to the above are also related to factors of timing, for example, he may be seriously concerned with A., B., C. and D. as matters for immediate attention, but may look upon E. and F. as useful by-products if they could be achieved.

III. The Political Problem

The central political problem is to protect U.S. vital interests, I. A. above, without war if possible and to put the U.S. and the West in the best possible position if war should become necessary. This will require:

A.
Action on a broad front to convince Khrushchev of U.S. and Western determination to defend these vital interests at all costs.
B.
National unity based not only upon a clear public recognition of the issues involved but also upon confidence that every reasonable step has been taken to defend vital interests by measures short of war.
C.
Allied unity, based upon allied recognition of their own vital interests—reaching beyond a readiness to follow the leader. Further, allied unity must also rest upon confidence that the allied position is reasonable and that the aggressor is forcing the issue beyond a tolerable point.
D.
Maximum support of world public opinion to make aggressive moves by Khrushchev as costly as possible in other areas in which he is interested.

  1. Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Chron. Secret. Attached to the source text but not printed is a 2-page paper, also dated July 17, on the military buildup. The paper favored a “low key” approach and noted that the psychology of a mobilization was not desirable at the present time.↩