Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

69. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington,July 14, 1961.²

SUBJECT

• Meeting of the Inter-Departmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin to Discuss Compliance with NSC Directive No. 59³

[Here follows an extensive list of participants.]

Mr. Johnson said that the group should decide on the papers to be prepared for the President by the afternoon of Tuesday, July 18, for perusal before the NSC meeting called for July 19, in line with NSC Directive No. 59. He suggested that the economic papers be prepared under a few general divisions, showing:

(1) What we propose ourselves.

(2) The effects on our economy.

(3) The effects of economic sanctions on:

(a) The GDR.

(b) The Soviet Bloc.

(c) The Sino-Soviet Bloc.

(4) What we expect our Allies to do, in specific terms.

(5) The limitations and conditions which our Allies might impose, and what they will probably ask in return.

Finally, the CIA should estimate the results of the foregoing actions on the Bloc in terms of:

(1) Economic effects.

(2) Strategic effects.

(3) Probable reactions.

Mr. Amory⁴ felt that the economic papers might include the following sections:

(1) Unilateral actions by the United States.

(2) Actions by NATO and Japan.

(3) The effects if there was total agreement by NATO and Japan. He suggested that perhaps on July 18 the group could discuss the effects if there was only partial success with NATO and Japan.

Mr. Johnson said that the Departments of State and the Treasury would work jointly on the paper called for in paragraph 2. There was much material available which would be useful. He understood that the actions contemplated were to take place after the stoppage of access, and hence were to be the strongest possible measures. The actions considered were to be those handled by the civilian agencies of our government—that is, they were to stop short of a total blockade. He hoped that the economic paper could be a maximum of 7 or 8 pages, and be a qualitative statement rather than statistical tables.

Mr. Fowler raised the point whether the measures were being thought of in terms of short or long duration. It was the consensus of the group that some effort should be made to estimate the results in terms of time, and that we should be prepared to continue the measures for some time. Mr. Fowler added that he thought we should also look into the possibilities of alternative sources of supplies for our Allies.

Mr. Johnson asked that the Department of Defense prepare an evaluation of the courses of action under paragraphs 3(a) and (b) in Directive 59. This should include an estimate of the military capabilities of our Allies.

Mr. Fowler wondered about spelling out the tax and stand-by controls program of paragraph 1 (a) of the Directive. It was felt that this was within the purview of Mr. Sorensen, under paragraph 5, and that if he prepared a paper on the matter a copy would be supplied to State.

There was discussion of the term “military operations” as used in the Directive. Those who had been present at the NSC meeting⁵ agreed that it meant “concept of operations”, and should include consideration of such things as the nature of the probe to be undertaken, the possibility of escalation, reactions to interference with ground access and air access, the possibility of access after stoppage, and the quality or our maximum readiness by January 15, 1962, and of troops being deployed by January 1, 1962, with and without a declaration of national emergency.

Mr. Johnson said that target dates should not become fixed, but should rather be used as points of reference since our actions must be related to Soviet moves.

Mr. Nitze raised several exemplary questions which he felt had to be posed to the President: If access to Berlin is blocked, do we undertake an airlift? Do we immediately probe? What if the probe is turned back? What is the capability of the military force available? In that connection, if our Allies contribute all they are supposed to, our capabilities will be increased accordingly. There was discussion of the help we could expect from the Allies. It was agreed that we should endeavor to have them make efforts at least comparable to ours, and that their contributions would be greater as our efforts increased. Mr. Hillenbrand pointed out that the German contribution might vary depending on the election results. General Gray⁶ noted that it was not clear whether the Allied contributions would be scheduled for January 1, 1962, or for March 1, 1962. It was agreed that there was a difference between what the military needed, and what it might be possible to get from our Allies. Mr. Johnson felt it best to establish our needs, and use that as a point of departure. “Needs” was perhaps not the best word. It should be the expected effort on the part of our Allies comparable to our own. There was considerable, though preliminary and inconclusive, discussion of the size and efficiency of the military forces which we might realistically expect from our Allies by January 1, 1962 and by March 1, 1962, and of the objectives which might be assigned to those forces.

Mr. Hillenbrand raised the question whether the Allied contribution was related directly to the operation under paragraph 3(a). Mr. Nitze said he understood Mr. Acheson’s view to be that a probe should be undertaken consisting of 2 American divisions moving down the Autobahn to a location a few miles inside the East German border, and there establishing a defensive position and waiting to determine the Soviet reaction. If negotiations were not forthcoming, and they were not attacked, they should proceed further. If attacked, war would result. The immediate ground actions would depend on the forces available at the time. Others felt that the existing probe plan, envisaging a tripartite combat team of the three Allied powers, should be adhered to. The inclusion of West German forces would pose a legal problem. It was felt that anything more than a probe along the Autobahn by forces legally entitled to use it would be an act of war. But if the probing forces were so constituted, the action of the Soviets and East Germans in throwing it back would be the act of war, since we have the right to use the road within certain procedural limitations.

General Gray said the effort has to be related to timing. Obviously one could not commit all of NATO to the Berlin probe. This had to be readjusted in Europe within NATO’s strategic planning. NATO powers were very far behind in fulfillment of their commitments. The picture was that in the case of all-out war we were only expecting to hold out for a few days East of the Rhine, with nuclear weapons. Without nuclear use, our capability was even lower.

Mr. Johnson underscored that all this needed saying.

The political timetable called for in paragraph 4 of the Directive would be supplied by State.

Mr. Johnson then asked the agencies to contribute their papers in 40 copies in time so that the whole package could be presented to the President by 4:30 Tuesday afternoon, the 18th. The Secretary would be at work on Sunday, July 16th, and would appreciate seeing rough drafts of the contributions.

At the conclusion of the meeting, General Gray distributed copies of a draft outline for a “United States Operational Plan on Berlin”⁷ which officers of the Department of Defense concerned with the problem felt it might be desirable to prepare.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/7-1861. Top Secret. Drafted by Topping on July 18 and approved by Johnson on July 31.
2. The source text does not give a date for this meeting of the Coordinating Group, but internal evidence suggests that it took place on July 14.
3. Document 68.
4. Robert Amory of the Central Intelligence Agency.
5. See Documents 66 and 67.
6. Major General David W. Gray of the Joint Strategic Survey Council.
7. Not found.