Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

67. Notes on the National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, July 13, 1961, 4:10 p.m.

1. Rusk reviewed actions to date & described timetable—1st phase now to 17 Sept. We have no control over timetable. Sobolof indicated if our reply to aide-mémoire is negative—might move it up.

No chance of successful neg. with K on Berlin. K is too far out on limb.

Any neg would depend on actions of US & allies.

Explained rationale of program, pol, mil, ec, etc.

Consultation with Allies ASAP. Should begin on ec sanctions.

P[resident]—Question is how we should present it. We should present to Allies in strongest terms. What could kick it off?

Rusk—Link it to political paper proposed actions.

P—Do we have any idea of magnitude of Soviet ec. trade? How we approach Italians?

R—Time schedule—Mon or Tues next week? Later NATO.

P—We should put up specifics to them.

R—I propose I go to NATO to discuss it with them.

P—I would like a report at next NSC.

Dillon—Consultation must be done at a high level. Rush discussion on approach re EC, sanctions.

P—Who will head up this effort?

R—Kohler about mid August.

P—We must put it to them as strong as possible.

Dulles—notes ec. measures vs entire Bloc. Is this possible? Poland for example.

Dillon—All, incl China. Initially perhaps vs USSR—later against others shipping to USSR.

P—What would be impact on other European countries?

Rostow—2 effects—Balance of payments and products.

P—It will be a complicated negotiation.

SecDef went over his paper.² Stop deactivation now. CVA, CVS; 6B-47 Wings. Assumptions are available for 1 Jan 62.

P—How about earlier?

Rusk—How About a cong res auth Pres to declare emergency.

VP—Pres should do it followed by cong endorsement. (Believes we should declare nat emergency) Adm & Cong should close ranks and

AG (Bolton?)—Pres has auth from Korea. Pres can call 1 million.

P—Get Counsel of Def and AG together & look into emergency laws.

I explained par 10 of JCS paper.³

P—to Acheson—what do you think?

[A?]—If we wait until last minute—it will not influence K. Sometime in August we should begin training.

Sec Def rec. auth supplement appropriation.

BOB—Haven’t seen program.

Acheson—Make decision to go ahead with program or not. If go ahead—next step refine program. Who is going to do it. Hope by week after next. Speech to nation.

JCS will meet with P. next week.

?—Do not go to allies piecemeal. Call Amb. back & acquaint them with program. Decide and do what we need to do. Then go to our allies—not before. General talks with allies not good. They must know we are moving. Then I feel they will come along.

P—We will have to review our other req on the hill.

VP—Rumor on hill is $6.7b.

P—How about our debt limit?

Need for security on figure.

Sec Def—We need to cancel deactivation etc if 7/15 activations.

Legislative probs discussed.

Acheson—As far as troops concerned only 2 weeks difference. Method—early next week decide are we going forward with a program. Indicate points to cabinet. Then prepare finished program. Then authorize carrying out program. Get in touch with allies at a real high level. Amb called back and informed. Consultations with cong leaders. Speech week after next. Then proceed with various steps. This only gives a month before call up. Shows US is moving.JCS will have to prepare by Wed a timetable of mil actions. P will talk about pressing other bills ASAP.

Dillon—P should mention Civil Defense.

Ellis⁴ explained status of CD legislation.

Get an estimate of what.

P—We must avoid scaring off our allies.

Dulles—We may be in for a long siege.

I made point that decision should not be taken on basis K will back down—We must be prepared to move on.

NSC Wed or Thurs next week.

Check latest NIE⁵ on statements re USSR reactions to our increase in strength.

1. Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, Box 29. Top Secret. These handwritten notes were presumably made by Lemnitzer. For another account of this meeting, see Document 66.
2. Presumably this is the 3-page paper with attachments entitled “The Defense Department Recommended Program Force Increases and Related Actions.” For text, see Declassified Documents, 1978, 348B.
3. Presumably a reference to JCSM-467-61, “Partial Mobilization,” July 12. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records)
4. Frank B. Ellis, Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.
5. SNIE 2-2-61, “Soviet and Other Reactions to Possible US Courses of Action With Respect to Berlin,” July 11. (Department of State, INR-NIE Files)