Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

312. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the President’s Special Representative in Berlin (Clay)¹

Washington, March 4, 1962.

Dear Lucius: This is the letter I spoke about on the phone today.² Incidentally, I shudder to think we might have to rely on such technically fragile communications as that “green” phone if something really important comes up.

I have not taken up your letter of January 30,³ the receipt of which I acknowledged to you by phone, for several reasons.

• First, we have been involved in a touchy air corridor situation, in which you played a most important and helpful role.
• Second, I was aware that a nuclear test decision was in the offing (the nature of which was known only to about five people) and the possibility of a sudden increase in tension made it especially important for you to be where you are. Mr. K. has just today replied—and you will have the text by the time you get this letter.⁴
• Third, was the Attorney General’s visit.
• Fourth, the Central Committee is meeting in Moscow on March 5 and it is entirely possible that some far-reaching decisions may be taken. Against the background of Ulbricht’s visit to Moscow,⁵ this could be a period of increased pressures on Berlin. Mr. K’s reply about the Geneva meeting and the possibility of a somewhat later “summit” seems to indicate (for what it’s worth) that no red-hot crisis is in the making for the immediate future. But we can’t be sure.

Meanwhile I have asked my colleagues to work out with the Pentagon better answers about the command situation in Berlin. One of our difficulties has been that our policy directives are translated, through the several echelons, into increasingly detailed directives and we have had some difficulty in knowing what comes out at the other end. I do think we must find some way to establish policy guidance which will at least be helpful to a commander who faces a situation not covered by instructions and without an opportunity to check with the higher chain of command. The contingency you mentioned to me (of a massacre of fleeing people) is a case in point. We consider that this contingency is covered by the political guidance if properly implemented by the military instructions.

Two comments about our Allies. The one is that we must go to considerable length to assure their solidarity, else the western position could crumble in a crisis under the most calamitous circumstances. At the present time, given some special problems of personalities in various capitals, this is not easy. In general, however, I am encouraged by the degree of unity we have achieved about Berlin.

The matter of a single allied commander in Berlin is a bit complicated. My own impression is that we could probably get one appointed in advance only if we tied his hands to London and Paris. In fact, under crisis conditions, the U.S. Commandant would have to be the “take charge” man. I have resisted the pleadings of London and Paris that, even under present arrangements, the Commandants must act in unison—which would give each a veto on all three. We’ll continue to give this thought and see whether anything can be done to clarify.

With specific reference to our telegram 1128,⁶ this had been prepared as a summary of the present status of our contingency planning on Berlin on which we hoped you would comment. Specific recommendations from you would be most helpful in guiding further efforts in this field.

Your presence there is symbolic but goes far beyond that role. Your ability to monitor the “feel” of the situation in Berlin and advise us on what our policy or directives look like at the other end of the line is of enormous help in a tight situation like that one. The President and I both are aware of the anomalies in your position outside of somewhat complex military and civilian channels worked out among three allies over a period of years.

Let me urge you to “sweat it out” for a time longer, giving us your views as to how we ought to improve the arrangements and as to specific problems which the other side might throw at us. I can assure you that your views count for a great deal back here and the President is grateful for them.

We may have some clearer indications during the course of this month as to what is ahead. But I do hope you can continue to help us during what will certainly be a tense period.

Cordially,

Dean Rusk⁷

1. Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192. Secret; Personal. Drafted by Rusk and approved by Kohler.
2. Rusk telephoned Clay at 3:15 p.m. and reviewed the points made in this letter. A memorandum for the record of this conversation is ibid.
3. Document 276.
4. For text of Khrushchev’s March 3 letter (U.N. doc. ENDC/8, March 19, 1962), see Department of State Bulletin, March 26, 1962, pp. 494-497.
5. Ulbricht visited Moscow February 26-28.
6. Document 311.
7. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.