Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

311. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin¹

Washington, March 3, 1962, 7:16 p.m.

1128. Paris pass USRO, Stoessel, McGuire. Question has been raised here regarding US policy, if, as a result of disturbances in West Berlin, West Berliners should become involved in incidents at wall or just inside East Berlin. Particular concern has been expressed lest Allied soldiers find themselves battling West Berliners in order to prevent crowd from assaulting wall (for example, in connection with May 1 rally normally held near Brandenburg Gate).

Department has pointed out that US and its allies in Berlin, in coordination with West Berlin authorities, have taken steps to guard against crowds getting out of hand and precipitating incidents along sector/zonal or sector/sector border. Department has noted in particular: (1) West Berlin policy instructions dated October 12, 1961, which provide for prevention incidents and control of crowds, (2) instructions to US forces for their role in supporting West Berlin police, contained in annex to Berlin Command Internal Security Directive, and (3) instructions issued on December 6, 1961 to US military forces in Berlin concerning actions along sector/sector and sector/zonal border (similar instructions were subsequently issued by British and French).²

In unlikely event that allied forces and West Berlin police were not able to control a crowd and this led to incidents along border or just inside East Berlin, we believe USCINCEUR’s implementing instructions issued as a result of BQD-EG-2,³ as well as December 6, 1961 instructions, should apply. Together, these provide: (1) Allied forces should not go into East Berlin, (2) They should, however, return fire in certain specified circumstances, (3) They should prevent incursions by Soviet or GDR personnel into West Berlin, and (4) They should not furnish arms or ammunition to individuals or groups in East Berlin, although an exception might be made for food and medical supplies.

If situation became sufficiently grave, three Commandants would presumably agree to appointment single allied commander. He would be responsible for dealing with situation within scope of his guidance. If he required further guidance, he would request it from General Norstad.

Request your comments, including indication whether you believe guidance you now have is adequate. If you desire further authority in order to deal with any incidents at wall or just inside East Berlin, please make specific recommendations.⁴

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-362. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ausland; cleared by Hillenbrand, Davis, G/PM, SOV, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of Defense (ISA); and initialed and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, London, and Moscow.
2. None of the instructions listed has been found.
3. Not found.
4. On March 4 Clay cabled: “In view of Department’s 1128 to Berlin, I see no useful purpose that I serve in Berlin and hence request soonest possible action on my letter.” (Telegram 1655 from Berlin; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-462) His letter is printed as Document 276.