Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

203. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin¹

Washington, November 3, 1961, 10:38 p.m.

676. Berlin for Clay. Paris pass USRO Stoessel, McGuire. For Ambassadors and Norstad. In light of your comments and continuing French and German opposition, President agrees² that official civilians in vehicles should continue for time being to refrain from showing identification at Friedrichstrasse crossing. On other hand he does not believe that steps should be taken at this time to implement Para 3 of tripartite recommendations contained Berlin’s telegram 855.³ Apart from fact that quadripartite agreement on this unlikely in light governmental views expressed in Ambassadorial Group discussions here, action proposed does not seem appropriate under current circumstances.

While armed probes of last week were useful in provoking public demonstration of Soviet responsibility, in another sense they simply confirmed Soviet/GDR forces indeed have effective physical control of East Berlin. This is a fact of life which the Western Allies accepted on August 13, and to a considerable degree as long ago as 1948, when the Soviets walked out of the Kommandatura. The identification issue is a particularly weak one, in view of the divergencies of practice with our own pedestrian officials, with the British and with our own contingency planning for ground access. But there are other slices of salami which the Soviets will try to take to establish the wall as a “state frontier” of the GDR. It will be important in dealing with all these not to undertake actions which can only demonstrate impotence, or focus attention on non-vital issues or arouse hopes and expectations which in the end could only be disillusioned. Essential as are a strong posture (and Allied unity) in West Berlin and sustained morale, the big issues can clearly only be solved by coming to grips with the Soviets in a broader context, either by finding a basis for a negotiated modus vivendi, or if this proves impossible, by large-scale preparations for a showdown.

Larger problem has been raised in Moscow and we will of course have to review situation if and when Gromyko gives his reply to most recent Thompson approach.

Bowles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 862A.181/10-2761. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Kohler and Hillenbrand, cleared by the President, and approved and initialed by Kohler. Repeated to Bonn, London, Tokyo for the Secretary, Paris, and Moscow.
2. This decision was taken at a meeting at the White House at 9:30 a.m. on November 3. For a further report on this meeting, see Document 204.
3. Paragraph 3 of telegram 855, October 27, recommended that if Thompson’s talks with Gromyko failed to produce satisfactory results, all Soviet and East German vehicles with civilian occupants, except those on quadripartite business, should be denied access to West Berlin. (Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/10-2761)