Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

202. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State¹

Berlin, November 2, 1961, 4 p.m.

920. Paris for Embassy, USRO, Stoessel and McGuire. From Clay. Re Deptel 653 Berlin, 1268 Bonn, 2412 London, 2516 Paris, 1192 Moscow, CINCEUR unn.²

In my view we have nothing to gain now by having either our military or civilian personnel show identification to East German police at Friedrichstrasse. To do so would imply acceptance of East Berlin being a part of East Germany. Entry into East Berlin is not of sufficient importance to be obtained at this price. Thus, if the demand is made for military personnel to show identification, I would recommend we deny ourselves entry and concurrently close entry to all Soviet personnel except air safety and Spandau personnel if this not already in effect (see ourtel 919 Dept, 812 Bonn).³ Concurrently, I would recommend that we state publicly we cannot accept this illegal assumption of authority by Vopos which constitutes duress and makes negotiation impossible. We should do nothing else here but remain in defensive posture while Soviet makes whatever move it intends to formally recognize East German Government.

I realize that if this happens and East German police replace Soviet personnel on the Autobahn it is not a cause for war. However, I think it would be far better to await this development than to yield now at Friedrichstrasse.⁴

Lightner

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-261. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.
2. Dated November 1, this telegram reported a discussion with British and French officials about Allied reaction to any East German demand that uniformed military show identification on entering East Berlin. (Ibid., 862.181/11-161)
3. Telegram 919, November 2, summarized a discussion of the Western Political Advisers on that day in which various countermeasures against Soviet personnel were discussed. (Ibid., 862.181/11-261)
4. In telegram 1068 from Bonn, November 3, Dowling supported Clay’s views and added that since the range of countermeasures in Berlin was limited the United States might consider expelling Soviet and East German trade representatives in proportion to the number of personnel denied entrance to East Berlin. (Ibid., 762.0221/11-361)