Office of the Historian

201. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany1

Washington, October 30, 1961, 9:01 p.m.

1238. Exclusive for POLAD, pass eyes only Secretary Rusk.2 Eyes only for Dowling and Clay from Acting Secretary. Paris eyes only for Stoessel for Norstad. President feels we have achieved favorable result in provoking Soviet intervention in Friedrichstrasse situation. Their clear admission of responsibility provides rationale for proceeding along lines suggested by Norstad’s Msg to Secretaries State, Defense, Lemnitzer and Ambassador Dowling which Dept repeating separately to Clay.3 President therefore feels it would be best solution to move ahead at this time on basis of real reciprocity including limitation of Soviets to one access point. As reported separate telegram,4 we raised possibility today in Ambassadorial Group. With German qualification re use of West Berlin police, all seemed to feel this would be acceptable and could be supported to public opinion because of reciprocity aspect. They urgently seeking positions their Governments.

Would appreciate receiving your views on urgent basis.4

Bowles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-3061. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Hillenbrand, cleared in substance by the President and Nitze, and approved and initialed by Kohler. Also sent to Berlin, Paris, and CINCPAC as Tosec 2.↩
  2. Secretary Rusk was in Tokyo for a meeting of the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs.↩
  3. Document 199.↩
  4. Telegram 1240 to Bonn, October 30, 10:45 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/10-3061)↩
  5. On October 31 Clay replied that reciprocity in showing identity cards would no longer serve a useful purpose. (Telegram 896 from Berlin; ibid.) Dowling supported the plan. (Telegram 1036 from Bonn, October 31; ibid.)↩