204. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Rusk1
SUBJECT
- Problems of Berlin and Germany in the Last Week
Summary
An inordinate amount of time and energy has been expended by Allied officials in the last week in trying to reach some kind of mutually acceptable arrangements at Friedrichstrasse— the exercise has not been a happy one for Allied unity. Some progress was made at the Ambassadorial Group level in getting ready an outline of Western negotiating positions, but the basis for further immediate probes by our Ambassador at Moscow does not appear to exist as long as the East Berlin access question continues as it is. In the larger sense, General de Gaulle has not changed his position and the new German government has not been formed although this seems likely within a few days. Intimations and evidences of other Soviet and GDR harassments have been seen in BASC, on the autobahn and in the air corridors. To these must be added the Soviet harassment in the name of the German problem of Finland.
Friedrichstrasse
You will have seen the Department’s telegram 676 to Berlin of November 3 (Tab A)2 instructing Berlin not to have official civilians provide identification at the Friedrichstrasse crossing and at the same time [Page 555] not to impose further restrictions on the movement of Soviet civilian officials into West Berlin. The dispatch of this telegram was preceded by a meeting with the President, attended by Mr. Bundy, Mr. Hillenbrand, and myself. We had prepared a draft instruction authorizing the showing of identification by civilian officials and providing the rationale for this action. However, upon consideration, the President felt that, in the absence of French and German concurrence, and given the strong recommendations of General Clay (since supported by Ambassador Dowling), we should continue to impose self-denial upon American official civilians.
We will, of course, want to review the situation when the Soviets have further responded to Ambassador Thompson’s meeting with Kuznetsov,3 as indicated in the telegram. Meanwhile, we are giving urgent thought quadripartitely as to how best to deal with the probable next attempt to slice the salami—GDR demands upon our military to produce identification. It would be only fair to point out that, given the British intention to revert back to authorizing their military to produce identification upon demand, we would again be faced with the fact of differing Allied practices. The President was prepared to accept this in the case of civilian officials. He did indicate, however, that he thought our military should be authorized to produce identification from the outset. He believed that this might be carried off despite the inconsistency of doing this in the face of refusal to permit civilians to identify themselves. I believe this inconsistency to be a matter which would not be obliterated by the mere passage of a few weeks, and it therefore seems likely that our eventual recommendation on military access to East Berlin would have to be consistent with the procedures applied to civilian officials.
Other Harassments
In the BASC we have received a protest from the Soviet controller against local Allied flights over the East Sector in the Berlin Flight Zone.4 This protest was aimed at helicopter flights on the grounds that such planes are not included in the term “aircraft” whose flights would be authorized. We believe the protest was triggered by the hovering of US helicopters over the Soviet tanks at Friedrichstrasse, although the flights to Steinstucken (approximately twice a week) may have also been in the Soviets’ minds. We have rejected the protest.
[Page 556]In East Berlin US military patrols have been harassed by Vopos and we are protesting this to the Soviets. We propose to retaliate against Soviet patrols in our sector and, possibly to institute tripartite patrols of East Berlin to prevent the Soviets from splitting the Allies on this issue (the British and French have not been so harassed as yet).
On the autobahn, our assistance vehicles have been refused passage by the Soviets. Other US military cars have been stopped on suspicion of being assistance vehicles. Although regular military formations have moved in and out of Berlin along the autobahn without incident, we are protesting the stopping of the assistance cars on the grounds that the Soviets can not pick and choose which military vehicle uses the road.
Western Negotiating Positions
There have been some impediments to a true marriage of the German Ambassador’s paper and the paper on Western substantive positions which had been previously developed in the Ambassadorial Group. These impediments are now being worked on in a sub-group. The melded paper, which does not as yet reflect the discussion of November 3 in the Ambassadorial Group, is Tab B.5 One point on which we continue to have difficulty with the Germans is the matter of contacts between the Federal Republic and the GDR. It may be that Grewe’s instructions are not current, but he has thus far seemed less than realistic in facing up to the necessity for making practical arrangements with someone from the other side.
Ambassador Thompson has expressed doubts concerning the wisdom of continuing the Moscow probe of the Soviet position on the Berlin and German questions. (Tab C)6
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-561. Secret. Initialed by Kohler. Prepared to brief Secretary Rusk on his return from Japan and Korea.↩
- Document 203.↩
- In telegram 1398, October 29, Thompson reported his unproductive discussion of Berlin with Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetzov, who had shown no interest in the West’s proposals. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Cables)↩
- The protest was transmitted in telegram 921 from Berlin, November 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 962.72/11-261)↩
- Not printed.↩
- A copy of telegram 1424, November 2, which was not attached to the source text, is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-261.↩