Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

152. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 15, 1961, 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Washington Foreign Ministers’ Conference (Restricted Session)

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Bohlen
  • Mr. Kohler
• United Kingdom
  • Lord Home
  • Sir Harold Caccia
  • Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
• France
  • Couve de Murville
  • Ambassador Alphand
  • Mr. Lucet
• Germany
  • Mr. Von Brentano
  • Ambassador Grewe
  • Dr. Carstens
  • (Interpreter—Mr. Kasterer)

The Secretary, after referring to the fact that the luncheon conversation at the White House² had been a good start for this meeting, asked the French Foreign Minister if he could give them the French view as to negotiations and the general courses they should follow, looking down the road. He had in mind that in his conversation with Gromyko, he could say that the Soviet Union and the Western Powers were on a collision course; the Western Powers had rights and obligations and were in Berlin and intended to abide by these rights in which they were supported by NATO; if Khrushchev signed his treaty and as a result considered that these rights were canceled, then they were indeed on a collision course. He asked Couve de Murville to please let his colleagues know what he saw for the future.

Couve de Murville said it was a difficult enterprise to foresee the future. He said the French did not disagree with the idea of any discussions or even negotiations with the Soviets, but rather questioned the type of negotiation. It was clear that the Soviets would certainly not object to a discussion on their proposals for peace treaties and a free city for Berlin, but it was also possible that they might be prepared to consider variations of this in which Western rights were not prejudiced. If, for example, the Soviets renounced their threats then there would be a basis for discussion. (In reply to the question from the Secretary, Couve de Murville outlined what he meant by threats.) The Russians say they will sign a treaty and that as a result the GDR would control access and the Western Powers then must make separate deals with the GDR or possibly the three allies collectively, but if not, there will be no access and any attempt by the Western Powers to go through would be aggression and the Soviet Union, with all its power, would support the GDR against such aggression. This was what he meant as a threat. If there was an indication that the Soviets accept our access rights, this would remove the threat. He was speaking in general terms and there were, of course, many variations on this point, but this is essentially the basis. He continued that if there were to be talks, and repeated that the French did not object to talks, then roughly speaking, the aim should be in the direction of the removal of the Soviet threat. If we are to talk business, this can only be achieved if the real issues are clearly understood by both sides. He said the French fully understand the gravity of the situation and would fight if necessary, but that one aspect was not clear, and that was whether the Soviet Union wants a war or thinks that it can achieve its objectives without war because the West is divided or lacking in determination. Therefore, the aim in any talks with the Soviets should be to convince them of our purpose and determination. The Soviet threats against one country after another must be clarified. He concluded by saying that these talks begun with Gromyko would be protracted as the issues were not simple. He said Gromyko would not be given requisite authority and that they would certainly go on as long as Gromyko is in New York. He concluded that the general idea was to bring the Soviets back to reality unless they want a war, and that as he had said at lunch, he felt the dangers of war lay in misunderstanding.

Lord Home said that he agreed with the objective of bringing the Russians back to reality, and inquired if Couve de Murville would contemplate negotiations if something concerning access came out of the discussions. This, in essence, was the case for probing, but he was not sure that the Secretary would get very far with Gromyko on substance since Gromyko would have no authority. The maximum that might be expected would be an agreement on an agenda for future negotiations.

Couve de Murville replied that the Russians were quite clearly putting their case to the world, saying that they had put forth their views and inquiring what was the position of the Western Powers. In effect, they had put their case in such a way that we could take it or leave it and, in effect, were merely asking for our acceptance. Khrushchev says that access will be guaranteed, but generally, do we know what conditions he had in mind. It was possible that the Secretary could ascertain this from Gromyko. He thought, however, it meant the continuance of the Western right for military access but the suppression of the unlimited right we now enjoy in the air corridors in respect to German travel.

The Secretary agreed that this might be the main purpose, but that he was thinking of what he could say to his colleagues after his talk with Gromyko.

Couve de Murville said it would be difficult to foretell until the conversations had taken place.

The Secretary continued that what he wanted to know was what was the object of the enterprise and specifically what his colleagues would consider a success.

Couve de Murville said he imagined two stages, not necessarily separated by a long term. The first stage, as he had mentioned at the luncheon, would be one of warning the Soviets. No one could tell what Gromyko’s reaction would be and, therefore, it was difficult to plan the second stage. But, the second stage would deal with the question of the Soviet attempts against the rights of access in Berlin. For example, an unlikely but good solution would be to transfer to the treaty the Bolz-Zorin agreement.³ In the second stage he felt that it would be important to find out how rigid the Soviets were on their positions.

The Secretary said he had the impression that what Couve de Murville had in mind would be a successful negotiation and inquired if there was anything that would be satisfactory short of a successful solution.

Couve de Murville said that these talks would take a long time. The Secretary agreed and added that he felt that Khrushchev would wish to participate personally at some stage.

Lord Home remarked that they did not have unlimited time, and pointed out that Khrushchev intended to make his treaty in December and that it would be very awkward for the Western Powers if he got to this point before there were any real negotiations.

Couve de Murville pointed out that the Secretary’s talks with Gromyko would constitute real negotiations. He felt that the Secretary would have something to tell them in a week or so regarding Gromyko’s reaction and they could then see. He felt that the British idea was that Rusk should see Gromyko and propose a conference in November. In such an event, let us say the twenty-fifth of September to November, everything would be frozen and then in November at the conference it would break down.

Lord Home said he did not see why Couve de Murville saw a breakdown and he thought that the Secretary might go quite a way with Gromyko.

Couve de Murville said that this could be done without fixing a conference date. He said, for example, the military build-up would be affected by the fixing of the conference, there would be general relaxation and people would feel that there was nothing to worry about.

The Secretary inquired how important was it for us to have the situation in Berlin maintained until the conference. He felt that this should be a pre-condition for any conference.

Couve de Murville said that if we fixed a conference, the Soviets would become more confident and would go ahead with whatever plans they had in mind, and that after the conference had failed, the West would be confronted with the choice of capitulation or war.

Lord Home said that he believed that whether you got the conference or not that situation might come when the treaty was signed with the GDR.

Couve de Murville said that if he understood Lord Home correctly there would be a conference in the beginning of November but there would be no conversations with the Soviets. He personally believed in discreet talks rather than a conference.

Lord Home inquired why there should be a stagnation between now and November.

Couve de Murville said that once they had achieved a conference, the Soviets would not be disposed to discuss any subject. He felt the subject of fixing a date for a conference should await the outcome of the Rusk-Gromyko talks. Couve de Murville and the Secretary agreed that the Soviets might discuss substance bilaterally.

The Secretary said that it was obvious that they could not negotiate on Soviet terms for Gemany and Berlin, but that they had in mind a wider agenda under which each side would put forth its proposals. He inquired whether, if the agenda were open to both sides, this would be acceptable to his colleagues or did they feel that they could only accept an agenda which excluded the Soviet item of a peace treaty and a free city for Berlin. In other words, was this a matter of openness of agenda for us or a rejection of the Soviet item.

Lord Home said that in any negotiations both sides have a right to put forward their proposition, a general agenda which seemed to him to be in accord with Khrushchev’s. He then read what Khrushchev had said to Nehru.⁴

Couve de Murville said that what was of interest to the West was the question of access; that the occupation statute was an academic question provided it had no consequences.

The Secretary said he was anxious to explore his colleagues’ thinking since he was not anxious to talk to Gromyko with his flanks or rear exposed.

Couve de Murville said the Secretary would be doing it with the general support of them all.

Lord Home said there was no need to name dates now, but he personally was doubtful if the talks would get that far. He felt that public opinion would sooner or later get them all around the table and the question was how long they could avoid this development.

Couve de Murville remarked that the Rusk-Gromyko talks may show there is no prospect of a conference.

The Secretary inquired whether we would be better off with no conference or a conference that met and failed—that is a Foreign Ministers’ conference since a summit was a different matter.

Couve de Murville said it was too soon to speak of a conference.

Lord Home said that we would not be allowed not to have a conference. People who are about to be blown to atomic dust would insist upon a conference. He personally would prefer to do this on our own initiative than be forced into it. He felt that the Secretary’s conversation with Gromyko would give us some idea on the subject, adding that if the conference were fixed, it would be more difficult for Khrushchev to undertake unilateral action in regard to Berlin.

The Secretary remarked that it appeared to be Khrushchev’s plan to concentrate on our rights rather than on the status of the GDR; since 1955 the GDR had been treated by the Soviets as a sovereign state, and that he felt that a peace treaty would not change this relationship. The chief effect of a peace treaty would be on our rights, although it might have some effect on the Oder-Neisse line. Otherwise, he did not see why Khrushchev would run all the risks merely to achieve something that he already had. He asked Mr. Kohler if there was any consensus in the Working Party as to what kind of status the GDR was expected to get. He went on to say that the Russians did not seem to be thinking in terms of de jure recognition but rather de facto dealings.

Mr. Kohler said that his colleagues in the Working Group felt that the Soviet purpose was to strengthen the GDR internationally, and to afford the GDR some control over the access question, in addition to breaking the ties between the Federal Republic and Berlin. He said he was leaving aside the more general possibilities such as humiliation of the Western Powers and an impressive demonstration of Soviet power. He said they did not know whether the Russians would insist upon the Western Powers’ dealing directly with the GDR and that the military buildup might have had some effect on this point.

Mr. Carstens said he felt that there were two points the Soviets were seeking: (1) the recognition of the GDR as an independent state; and (2)GDR authority over Berlin access; and that the second was the more important.

The Secretary said it seemed to him that there would be little reason in establishing the competence of the GDR unless Khrushchev intended to accomplish something specific by utilizing this competence.

Mr. Von Brentano said that he thought that Khrushchev’s intention was the transfer of the control rights over access to the GDR. This would result in a situation where today you might have something but the day after it would be changed; that Mr. X would be permitted to go to Berlin and Mr. Y not. The same procedures would apply to types of goods. The Soviets would then deny any responsibility. He felt that this path was dangerous, if not fatal.

Lord Home pointed out that the Soviets could virtually do that now in regard to German travel by land, although not by air.

Mr. Kohler mentioned that one thing was certain, that no West German official would be permitted to go to West Berlin if the East Germans controlled the access; that one of their main purposes was to break the ties between West Berlin and West Germany.

Mr. Von Brentano said that the removal of the ties with the Federal Republic would be the beginning of the end for West Berlin. He said we should not try to interpret what the Russians really mean, but should read what they say. He mentioned there were people in Germany who lived by interpreting Soviet actions but what they say was very clear. They intend to sign a peace treaty with the GDR and turn over the access to GDR control. The Soviet guarantee would not be a guarantee of the status quo, but merely a guarantee of whatever agreement the GDR might make. There would be no rights left and the West would be in a very difficult position and the Soviets would be completely disengaged.

The Secretary said that while we are all vitally interested in Berlin, it was of greater interest to Germany. He would, therefore, like to inquire of the German Foreign Minister what he saw in the future as to relations between the Federal Republic and East Germany, and between West Berlin and East Germany.

Von Brentano said that this was not an easy question to answer, but, in general, he thought that the division of Germany would become more acute. He said up to now, while traffic had been obstructed by the Soviet Zone, it still continued, but he felt that the travel would now become much more difficult. Trade, he felt, would continue since it was in GDR interest but in September it was made very plain that the negotiators could deal only with trade and with other matters of traffic; they specifically stated they did not have any authority, especially in the financial and currency field. He felt that human contacts would decline and saw little prospect of any improvement in this respect and none whatsoever for any move towards reunification. He mentioned the example of church matters, pointing out that the new bishop of Berlin who lived in the Eastern Sector had not been permitted to come to West Berlin, nor had the Catholic bishops in Eastern Germany been permitted to attend the conference of German bishops. The successor to Dibelius had not been permitted to return to his home in the Eastern zone after a trip to West Berlin. He said the toughness of the East German attitude in regard to the churches indicated what their attitude would be on other matters.

Lord Home said that the revised Western peace plan contained provision for “mixed commissions” and he wondered whether or not one of these commissions might not be a vehicle to make access arrangements.

Mr. Von Brentano said that he had agreed to the proposal of mixed commissions with the exception of the third commission on human rights, which he felt was a little perverse. He had agreed to these commissions because he thought possibly the one on freedom of movement might effect some slight improvement despite their basic objection to the commissions where you would have coming into one body two incommensurable elements. He was willing, however, to try in the faint hope that this might improve communications. He felt, however, that any cooperation was impossible in political fields, no matter whether the commission met once or a thousand times. The Communists’ ideas in the political field were so different from their own that there was no hope.

Lord Home said that he would agree on the political elements and human rights but felt that technical arrangements might be helpful in regard to access, particularly if these were guaranteed by the Soviets.

Mr. Von Brentano felt that this would be a very dangerous idea since if allied rights were considered by this commission, made up as it would be of completely disparate elements, the Communists would try and refer this matter to Bolz, the East German Foreign Minister, with implications of recognition. He felt the three Western allies should not favor this course.

Lord Home explained that he had not had allied rights in mind, but German.

The Secretary said that he felt that at some stage Khrushchev was going to sign a peace treaty, but supposed that in the peace treaty there was a reservation along the lines of the Bolz-Zorin letter. There would be no question in regard to rights themselves but it might involve some dealings with East Germans. In other words, the reservation might contain a reaffirmation of the allied rights but the exercise of the rights would be with the East Germans. He inquired what alternatives there would be to the allies in this event: to endeavor to obtain some UN responsibility; or, have the three allies deal with the East Germans; or transfer such dealing to the West Germans.

Von Brentano said the situation would be different if allied rights were the subject of the reservation and with the East Germans to implement. It would be necessary to negotiate with the East Germans, and he felt that the difference between rights and their implementation was razor-thin. The reservations might be in very general terms, which would have to be spelled out in negotiations with the GDR. An opinion on this would only be possible when they saw the language.

The Secretary agreed and added that we should seek to have as little to do with the East Germans as possible. He said he previously, in a somewhat light vein, had referred to the fact that allied rights were in relation to Germany as a whole and that, therefore, it might be possible to have these rights worked out by Germans, if the rights themselves were not involved.

Von Brentano said they would be prepared to accept this fiction but pointed out by reading from the Bolz-Zorin letter the fact that this had been merely done with a part of Germany, the GDR. He also mentioned that these rights were temporarily handled by the Soviets, pending a subsequent agreement.

The Secretary said the Ministers may have strayed somewhat from the purpose of this meeting, which was primarily the talks with Gromyko. He wished to return to Couve de Murville’s remark at the luncheon when Couve had stressed the necessity of warning the Russians. He would like to inquire what his colleagues thought were the casi belli. For example, we had been speaking of the three vital Western interests: (1) the Western presence in Berlin, (2) the freedom and viability of West Berlin, and (3) access. He wondered whether these were sufficiently precise, since Gromyko might say that if we accepted the Soviet propositions these would be taken care of.

Mr. Von Brentano said that there was general disagreement between what the Soviets meant and what the Western Powers meant, both on freedom and on access. The Soviets give the term “free city” one meaning, but we have a completely different idea. What we mean is the democratic order with freedom of speech, freedom of political parties, etc. The Soviets have a completely different point of view on ties with the Federal Republic. He mentioned that West Germany paid out 1.2 billion marks a year to the “lost child” of Berlin. He said of course we could say to the Soviets that if they included a definition of our requirements for freedom this might be a possibility, but he felt the incompatibility of ideas was very profound. He continued that it was awkward for a German to talk of these matters but he felt that in this small privileged gathering he could be frank. He said there were many people who said that the situation in Berlin was basically the fault of the Germans but the President had stated at the luncheon that it was not Berlin but our common policy that was at issue. If we started to liquidate the status of Berlin there would be an exodus from Berlin and that this would mean the liquidation of an advanced free world post. He recalled a 1958 conversation at NATO in which it had been said that if Berlin goes, there is no certainty what will go next, and that he felt that in that event there would be more than one Foreign Minister on the way to Moscow to negotiate the circumstances of his country’s suicide.

The Secretary said that Mr. Von Brentano had graphically stated the problem. He himself felt that with Gromyko the three vital interests were not enough and it might be necessary to go into further detail. He said we were all agreed on the importance of these three vital issues: our presence in Berlin, our protection of Berlin’s freedoms, and the right of access, over which we could not accept control or censure, but that he would feel that we should go beyond this and it might be a good idea to draw up a check list.

Mr. Von Brentano said he was very grateful for the Secretary’s words which had said what he had in mind. He felt it would be dangerous to attempt to stick to the three points since Gromyko might consider that anything not mentioned would not be considered important.

Couve de Murville said he wished to make two points. He said that for life in Berlin it was very important to have links with the outside world, and especially with Western Germany. The Russians have raised the matter of political activity, but there were, in addition, many other kinds of ties—economic, financial, currency. He recalled that in 1959 in Geneva on the subject of political relations the Western delegations had said that Berlin was not a part of the Federal Republic. He was sure that Gromyko would mention this point to the Secretary. He pointed out that political activities in West Berlin, in effect, were part of the question of access of West Germans to West Berlin. He felt that the main idea was, therefore, the uncontrolled nature of the air corridor for German traffic. He summarized that the two questions which he felt that Gromyko would logically raise were, (1) political activities, and (2) air access.

The Secretary said the Ministers should devote a good deal of their time to the consideration of the proposals which might be made to the Russians. He felt they might think about the possibility of telling the Russians that since East Berlin has been made the capital of East Germany, that they did not have any right to go into the question of the ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. He said he felt that when we had first said that West Berlin was not part of the Federal Republic, we had, in effect, been reserving our position on all Berlin. He was not suggesting incorporation of West Berlin in the Federal Republic.

He mentioned that tomorrow the Ministers would also discuss the question of a naval blockade.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-WA/9-1561. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Bohlen, also initialed by Kohler, and approved in S on October 1. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 733, October 16. (Ibid., 762.0221/9-1661)
2. See Document 151.
3. For text of letters between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin and German Democratic Republic Foreign Minister Bolz, September 20, 1955, see Otnosheniia SSSR s GDR, pp. 649-652; for the Bolz letter alone, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 460-461. See also Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XXVI, pp. 537–538.
4. Nehru visited Moscow September 6-8 following the Belgrade Conference.