Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

153. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany¹

Washington, September 17, 1961, 3:12 p.m.

735. Paris pass USRO Stoessel, McGuire. Following based on uncleared memorandum of conversation:²

Quadripartite Ministerial session morning September 16 opened with US briefing on naval blockade report prepared by US group supplemented by Quadripartite committee.³ Secretary noted blockade was severe step. Said principal question was whether we should take such measure without bracing for Soviet military action in Europe or Soviet initiation all-out war. Home stated maritime control measures covered by report actually first act of war, and were actions to take when war almost inevitable. Felt they perhaps preferable land war however. Suggested study possible uses naval forces other than maritime control in context Berlin issue. Von Brentano expressed FedRep’s approval of report, noting such measures gave West arsenal weapons of varying degree severity which had advantage of being flexible and not irrevocable. It was agreed send study to Military Subcommittee.

Meeting having moved to restricted session, Secretary raised question of dealing with Soviet proposals. Noted certain seductive quality in terms “peace treaty” and “free city.” Noted it had been agreed Paris Ministerial Meeting to prepare simplified and attractive Western proposals. He asked Ministers how large gap there should be between initial Western proposals and probable outcome negotiations. Khrushchev had committed himself strongly to signing treaty. Not going be easy prevent this. Asked if we should attempt put treaty into some context in which it would appear as provisional arrangement. Suggested as example declaration reaffirming self-determination German people to provide overriding concept reducing actions of two sides to nature of interim arrangements only. This would open up possibilities of flexibility to be exploited by proposed mixed East-West German technical commissions, European security arrangements, etc.

Couve noted we all agreed treaty would not tough us; we could not prevent it but did not recognize its validity. One thing of importance was consequences Soviets could draw from it re our rights in Berlin. Thus we must concentrate on defending our rights and interests. Secretary agreed heart of our position was insistence on our rights. Feared however Western position would erode after signing of peace treaty as other countries increasingly recognized GDR attempted secure its entry into UN, etc. Thought declaration some overriding principle such as self-determination German people might cast post-peace treaty situation in light of interim status. He had in mind statement such as that of Khrushchev that reunification matter for German people. Home wondered if we could use something like draft opening negotiating proposal suggested by Working Group.⁴ We could state certain practical arrangements could be made in interim pending final solution. Von Brentano agreed with Secretary’s estimate effects of peace treaty, but argued we could not say Soviets did not want to do what they in fact did want to do. They did not want provisional but final arrangement incorporating GDR in bloc. Suggested using proposal based on Western Peace Plan coupled perhaps with statement of principles worked out in 1959.⁵ Idea of mixed East-West German technical commissions might provide rationale for referring to post-peace treaty status as provisional.

Home asked what purpose remained for life of West Berlin now that iron curtain dropped across city. Suggested putting UN into all Berlin or West Berlin. Von Brentano said idea of moving UN to Berlin very questionable. UN would be faced with problems now faced by Allies there; must in any case include all-Berlin; such arrangement could only be interim as division Germany into three separate parts not acceptable permanently (referred to establishment Berlin as international city). Should study possibilities, however. Secretary said US had no formal position on UN aspect but agreed problem of future role for city required hard thought. Believed introduction UN presence of lesser scope than headquarters itself offered possibility. Moving UN headquarters behind iron curtain had prestige value for Soviets. Furthermore, UN guarantee for city could not be as satisfactory as that of Three Powers, while UN would likely feel Three Power guarantee of site of its headquarters inappropriate. Saw other roles for city, such as seat of 4-power and mixed German technical Commissions, etc. It agreed Ambassadorial Group should study question. Secretary also mentioned possibility putting legal aspects Berlin problem before ICJ. Said US experts believed this unwise. Von Brentano agreed.

Von Brentano raised question paragraph 16 Western Peace Plan providing for European security arrangements. Said dangerous take measures in security field without linking them with political solutions. Secretary replied terms of reference of proposed group to study this point very broad. Said he felt political settlement and security arrangements not mutually exclusive in point of time, however. Same question arose in disarmament. Political situation must be taken into account but we should get on with efforts meanwhile reduce effects of confrontation great power systems.

Secretary then raised question FedRep F-84s in Berlin. Couve stated French had talked with pilots and were persuaded of their good faith. He recommended and it was agreed that we remain quiet for the present on the matter.

Ministers were then briefed on Congo situation by Assistant Secretary Cleveland.

Memorandum of conversation will be pouched addressees.⁶

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/9-1761. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Day and approved by Kohler. Also sent to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.
2. The paragraph on the naval blockade is based on WFMMC-12; the paragraphs on the restricted session are based on WFMMC-14. (Both ibid., 762.00/9-1661)
3. This report has not been further identified.
4. Home is referring to Annex D-2 to the Report of the Four-Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin, September 13. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1953)
5. For text of the Draft Statement of Principles, which was part of the Report of the Four-Power Working Group, April 23, 1959, see The New York Times, May 20, 1959, p. 15. See also Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. VIII, pp. 638–641.
6. At 3 p.m. on September 16 the Foreign Ministers met for the fourth and final time and agreed on the text of a report to NATO and the various sections of their own report, including a final communiqué. A memorandum of the conversation at this meeting (WFMMC-15) is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-1661. A copy of their Report (BER-2), which had the same five sections as the Working Group Report (see footnote 1, Document 149), with the report to NATO and the final communiqué attached, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1951. A copy of the decisions taken by the Foreign Ministers on the report (BER-3), September 18, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Documents.