Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

151. Memorandum of Conversation¹

WFMMC-3

Washington, September 15, 1961, 1 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The President
  • The Vice President
  • The Secretary of State
  • The Secretary of Defense
  • Mr. Bowles
  • Mr. Bohlen
  • Mr. Kohler
  • Mr. Nitze
• France
  • M. Couve de Murville
  • Ambassador Alphand
  • Mr. Lucet
• United Kingdom
  • Lord Home
  • Ambassador Caccia
  • Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh
• Germany
  • Dr. Von Brentano
  • Ambassador Grewe
  • Dr. Karl Carstens

Toward the end of the luncheon the Secretary gave the President a brief report on the work of the Ambassadorial Steering Group on Berlin and of the four Foreign Ministers.² The President responded by speaking of his own interest in the work of the Ambassadorial group. However, he wondered in view of the developing crisis, whether it might not be strengthened, particularly by the reinforcement of the personnel of the Embassies for the purpose, and its methods of work expedited so that the four of us would be capable of prompt and decisive action. In this connection he cited the delay in response to the Soviet/East German clamp-down on the East Berlin sector borders on August 13. He then stressed the basic importance of the build-up of NATO forces. In this connection he referred to US plans and to the difficulties which would be presented for us if we alone in fact seemed to be doing more than all our NATO allies put together. He also emphasized the importance of decisions by the NATO Governments with respect to the application of economic countermeasures, indicating that he had not been encouraged by the NATO discussions of this subject to date. Referring to this latter point, Secretary Rusk said we recognized that problems were raised for some countries in connection with economic countermeasures and that we were prepared to consider these. The President then referred to the question of contingency procedures relating to possible harassment or interruption of ground access to Berlin, indicating that he felt that there should be further work on this and more government decisions as to actions to be taken.

The President called on Secretary McNamara to comment on the contingency planning aspect. Mr. McNamara said that he wanted to stress three points. First of all, he felt it was essential that both national and allied planning be accelerated. He thought that we were far behind the requirements of the situation in this respect. Another critical problem was that of achieving a better balance in available stocks of ammunition and supplies. The third important question was that of planning and reaching decisions with respect to naval actions, particularly the question of blockading Soviet shipping. In response to a question from the Secretary, M. Couve de Murville spoke of the French equipment problem, saying that he believed the French could quickly re-equip their two divisions brought back from Algeria provided they had American help in one or two respects. Continuing on the question of strengthening our military posture, Secretary McNamara said that perhaps work could be expedited if we set new readiness dates. The Secretary asked whether it was better to do this through the military subgroups of the Ambassadorial steering group here or through General Norstad’s headquarters. Mr. McNamara replied that he thought the best way to solve the questions connected with the build-up was by rapid unilateral planning on the part of the countries concerned and bilateral discussions in cases where US cooperation and assistance was required. Of course General Norstad should be kept fully informed. There then ensued some general discussion of the question of naval blockade, which Lord Home remarked would be regarded by the Soviets and would in fact be “an act of war.” Couve de Murville commented that an economic blockade would also be regarded as “an act of war.” In connection with the military planning question it was agreed that both national and Live Oak planning should be pushed forward rapidly. The President concluded this phase of the discussion by commenting that if the Four Powers were themselves so far away from agreement and preparedness on these questions the situation was even more serious as respects the other NATO countries. It was clear to him that better consultation with NATO was needed if we were to bring our allies along. The Secretary pointed out that a related and delicate problem which we faced was the question of direction of NATO forces in case of hostilities. This problem had never really been tackled. It was clearly not feasible to have decisions made and directives given by a Council of fifteen members and some way would accordingly need to be found by which NATO would delegate operational control to a smaller group. The President pointed out that in the case of naval actions, for example, in the Baltic or the Dardanelles, the cooperation of Denmark and Norway and of Greece and Turkey would be very important. Lord Home remarked that perhaps in the event of a crisis it would be necessary for the Foreign Ministers to be in permanent session in Paris near SHAPE headquarters. The President remarked that steps might be taken to strengthen the North Atlantic Council by the appointment of members who could speak more authoritatively for their governments.

The President then raised the question as to what differences existed among the four with respect to the problem of negotiations with the Soviets. The Secretary said that it might be premature really to speak of differences since this was a question which still had to be discussed. M. Couve de Murville commented that he thought the problem of negotiations was the same problem as that involved in the military build-up. The real task was to convince Khrushchev that he was facing a serious risk of war and that he would not be allowed to have his own way. Only the United States, he said, had the strength to speak convincingly to Khrushchev along these lines. The President said it was clear that Khrushchev “hears many voices in the West” which presumably indicate to him a division within NATO, particularly between the United States and the European countries. He asked what more we should do than we are doing to convince Khrushchev of our determination. M. Couve de Murville replied that of course the military build-up must continue. However, a United States private warning to the Soviets was extremely important. Indeed, he regarded this as the preliminary to everything.

Lord Home said that he did not think that a warning to Khrushchev and public speeches were enough. It was necessary that we get into a conference where we could talk things out directly. The French Foreign Minister disagreed with this. He said that it was only in the very smallest forum, two or three or four persons, that it would be possible to speak frankly to Khrushchev and not have press leaks. This, Couve said, could only be done by the United States. Only the United States would be able to say bluntly, “What are you up to? Do you want war?”—etc. Lord Home replied that he felt that even in the conversations that Secretary Rusk would have with Gromyko it was not realistic to think that he could get any farther than some agreement on an agenda and arrangements for a conference. M. Couve de Murville again expressed disagreement, repeating that we must convince Khrushchev before arrangements were made for a conference. Herr von Brentano said that he agreed essentially with Couve de Murville. If we went into a conference without satisfactory preliminaries there was great danger of pressures for disastrous compromises. He also agreed with Couve that it was not just a question of Berlin but of the whole confrontation between the Soviet bloc and the West. It was therefore not enough in the exploratory talks with the Russians simply to seek an agenda.

The President commented that after listening to these views he was not sure there was any real difference. Obviously, if the results of the approaches to Gromyko were negative then there could be no meaningful negotiations; though, even in this case, there might have to be some formal meeting to show that every diplomatic effort had been made before we were faced with the decision actually to go to war. However, if the Gromyko talks revealed some prospects of serious negotiations then we could go ahead. Lord Home repeated that Secretary Rusk could not hope to get far beyond arrangements for a meeting and an agenda with Gromyko, since Gromyko was simply not given enough latitude really to go into substance. Of course while the agenda could not be limited to the Soviet proposal of a “peace treaty,” this would clearly have to be included along with our own items.

Secretary Rusk said that perhaps what we were talking about as a difference was essentially only a problem of political leadership. The President of the United States would have the support of all Americans in taking the country to war, if that were necessary, but only if we could do so with a “clear conscience.” The United States Government needed to show that it had made every effort to exhaust possibilities of peaceful settlement. What was required in the circumstances was a mixture of firmness, on one hand, and of readiness to negotiate, on the other. However no one need fear that the United States could go to a disastrous “compromise;” indeed this would be opposed by American public opinion. M. Couve de Murville said that the basic problem was how to avoid going to war. What was important now was the necessity of convincing the Russians of our determination and not the timing or an agenda for a conference. Herr von Brentano, addressing himself principally to Lord Home, said that he wanted to clarify that he was warning only against agreeing to a one-sided or purely Soviet version of an agenda. The agenda for a conference must be two-sided. For example the Soviets’ “peace treaty” must be counter-balanced by the West’s “free elections.”

The President indicated his agreement with Herr von Brentano and added that there was a problem of making known a public position. For example he had been shown broadsides which the Soviets were mailing all over the United States in which Khrushchev was propagandizing his proposals, even in our country, while saying the West had made no response or counter proposals of their own.

Terminating the luncheon discussion, the President said he wanted to stress the role of the Federal Republic in this question. This was a matter of the most vital concern to the West Germans. It was therefore essential that we keep closely in step with them and that we not undertake courses of action or proposals which would turn them away from the Alliance. Herr von Brentano indicated his appreciation of the President’s statement.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-1561. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Kohler and approved in S on October 2. The meeting was held during a luncheon at the White House.
2. At the first quadripartite meeting at 10:30 a.m. on September 15, the Foreign Ministers discussed air access to Berlin, intelligence reports on the Soviet Zone, economic countermeasures, and the Soviet timetable for a peace treaty, without reaching any final decisions. A memorandum of this conversation (WFMMC-2) is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1950.