Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962

150. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 14, 1961, 6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Western Access to Berlin and Related Problems

PARTICIPANTS

• His Excellency Mikhail A. Menshikov, Soviet Ambassador
• Mr. Mikhail N. Smirnovsky, Minister Counselor, Soviet Embassy
• The Secretary Mr. John C. Guthrie, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs

After an exchange of pleasantries, Ambassador Menshikov said that he had been instructed to reply to the oral statement which the Secretary had given the Soviet Chargé, Mr. Smirnovsky, August 31.² The Ambassador said that the Secretary’s statement had been forwarded to Moscow where it had been carefully studied and that he had been instructed by his government to ask what the aims of the Secretary’s presentation were and how it should be understood. If the statement meant that the US Government seeks a settlement of the problem of West Berlin on a mutually acceptable basis, and is prepared to sit around a conference table in a businesslike meeting to discuss the problem, then any steps which the US Government might take in this direction will meet the full understanding and support of the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government, the Ambassador said, has always advocated peace and the removal of sources of tension between the USSR and the US and has always sought normal relations between the two.

On the other hand, the Ambassador continued, the Secretary’s statement can also be understood as a threat. If this is the aim of the statement, it is appropriate to remind the US that the Soviet Union is not a country against which threats can be used. This has been proved by the entire history of the USSR. Threats are absolutely out of place and do not impress the Soviet Union. Warnings are not needed. The Soviet Government stands for relations between states not on the basis of threats and strength but of mutual respect for the rights of the other.

In reply to the Ambassador’s first point, the Secretary observed that the United States is prepared to undertake negotiations which might find a solution of the present crisis. We are interested in businesslike, constructive negotiations which will take into consideration the views of all parties concerned. The Secretary said that he expects to discuss these problems with Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York, if this is agreeable with the latter. However, he does not wish to discuss formulations of the subjects which might be discussed with the Foreign Minister at this time.

With regard to the Ambassador’s second point, the Secretary said that he simply wished to remind him that we have received more than one written communication from the Soviet Government and have observed the apparent threats, including some from the East German regime against the air corridors linking West Berlin and West Germany. In his statement of August 31, the Secretary said, his purpose was to underline the position that unilateral actions against Western rights and interests are not only dangerous in themselves but can also impair the prospects for successful negotiations. The Secretary told Ambassador Menshikov that the language he has used does not impress the US. He pointed out that it was not the US which has raised the question of pressures against our right of access to Berlin nor the US which has taken unilateral actions in Berlin. These actions and pressures have come from the other side. It is important, he said, that it be clearly understood that his oral statement of August 31, and written and public statements by the President and others were serious statements and should be taken seriously.

Ambassador Menshikov said that he could not add anything to that which he had already said concerning the air corridors and that the Soviet notes of August 23 and September 2 speak for themselves.³ As for the Secretary’s latest statement, the Ambassador asked the Secretary to review the statements which Ambassador Menshikov had just made.

The Secretary said that he wished to illustrate the kind of unhelpful incidents which could increase tensions and dangers. Just today we have received reports that certain civilian aircraft operated by PAA, and flying in the corridor between West Germany and West Berlin were closely buzzed by fighter aircraft from the other side. We were trying to get further facts on these incidents. However, it is our understanding that these aircraft were flying under normal conditions in the corridor and had the usual clearance from BASC. This type of harassment or close approach without indication of purpose or attitude, the Secretary continued, ought to be avoided at this time. Such incidents raise rather than solve problems and both governments should seek to avoid them.

The Ambassador noted that it was difficult to comment on the incident if the US does not have the full facts. He could only assume that the aircraft had been guilty of some kind of violation of existing regulations.

The Secretary noted the possibility that the problem involved in these latest incidents could be worked out by the appropriate authorities on the spot.

Ambassador Menshikov observed upon departing that he would not be going to the United Nations General Assembly this year and had only gone last year as an exception because Chairman Khrushchev was present at that time.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/9-1461. Confidential. Drafted by Guthrie and approved in S on September 19. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Moscow in telegram 776, September 14. (Ibid.)
2. See Document 136.
3. For text of the August 23 note and an extract from the September 2 note to the United States, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 783-784 and 788-789; for full text of the September 2 note as sent to the United Kingdom, see Documents on International Affairs, 1961, pp. 356-359.