Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

75. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, April 9, 1963, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS.

• United States
  • The President
  • Secretary Freeman
  • Under Secretary Ball
  • Mr. Carl Kaysen
  • Ambassador John W. Tuthill
• EEC
  • Mr. Sicco L. Mansholt, Vice President of the European Economic Commission
  • Mr. Mozer, Chef de Cabinet

SUBJECT

• Trade; Common Market; European Unity

The following informal memorandum is not based upon notes taken during the meeting but is, I believe, a summary of the essential points covered during the 50-minute conversation.

The President opened the conversation by welcoming Mr. Mansholt and asking what in his view should be done in the light of the European situation “over the next 18 months.”

In reply Mr. Mansholt stated that Europe and the Atlantic area are in a crisis caused by de Gaulle. The question was how far one could let de Gaulle proceed. While de Gaulle is not a positive force, he is a negative force and unity is required in opposing him. Because of de Gaulle the U.K. negotiations have failed and if now the Trade Expansion Act negotiations fail it will be the end of the Common Market. While Mansholt stated he was not an expert in the nuclear field, he understood that de Gaulle was in technical trouble. Mansholt fully supported the U.S. project for a multilateral nuclear force and warned about French participation in a NATO national nuclear force. In that case the French would be free to withdraw whenever they wished. He felt that it was too soon to know whether a European nuclear force was the answer.

Mansholt also set forth his conviction that we are faced with a basic conflict of political concepts. De Gaulle wishes a “Europe des patries” under French leadership. He stated further that de Gaulle’s concept was of a Continental Europe which would be inward looking. Thus there was no place in this Europe for the United Kingdom and the U.K. application for accession had to be vetoed.

In opposition to this concept there is that of a unified Europe based on common democratic institutions and oriented outward. In Mr. Mansholt’s view this concept is supported by the other Five members of the Common Market, by many Frenchmen, and is fully consistent with the policies of the United States.

Mr. Mansholt felt that de Gaulle’s concept must be resisted vigorously by the supporters of the democratic concept. He believed that while de Gaulle’s views would not change that de Gaulle would adjust himself to a Europe and an Atlantic area which insisted upon a unified, democratic and outward-looking orientation.

Mr. Mansholt stressed that the major element in our relationship with de Gaulle is the nuclear weapons problem. He felt that if de Gaulle achieved his objective of national nuclear forces that it would be catastrophic because it would lead to fourth, fifth, and sixth, etc. nuclear powers. He stressed that de Gaulle was attempting to obtain concessions from the United States in the nuclear weapons field.

Mr. Mansholt stressed that the next test for the Common Market is the Kennedy Round negotiation. The Benelux, Germany, and Italy all wish these negotiations to succeed not only because this would mean a general lowering of tariff barriers but also because this has become the next—and vital—test of the relationship of the Common Market to outside countries. Furthermore, if the negotiations are successful this would greatly facilitate the subsequent adherence of the U.K. and certain other European countries to the Common Market. Mr. Mansholt warned, however, that there is no assurance that de Gaulle will not veto the negotiations under the Trade Expansion Act at some future date. In Mr. Mansholt’s view, de Gaulle does not want successful negotiations but might allow them to run on looking for the right moment to attempt to achieve a deal in the nuclear weapons field.

In view of Mansholt’s emphasis on the importance of nuclear matters in determining de Gaulle’s position, the President asked Mansholt whether he felt that the United States should have made nuclear concessions to de Gaulle in 1961 or 1962 in order to avoid the collapse of the U.K. negotiations. Mansholt vigorously rejected this idea and furthermore, looking to the future, stated emphatically he felt under no circumstances should de Gaulle be offered aid for his national nuclear force as a bargain in order to obtain his agreement on economic considerations. The President agreed.

The President asked Mansholt about U.S. agricultural policies toward the Common Market pointing out that if the United States lost a substantial portion of such exports that it would adversely affect the U.S. balance of payments and reduce our ability to support our foreign policy. Mr. Mansholt pointed out that U.S. agricultural exports to the Common Market had increased from the start of the Common Market in 1958 until the year 1962. He did not expect that there would be any substantial decline from the present high level of U.S. agricultural exports within the next few years unless of course the Common Market followed high price policies especially in grains. He pointed out to the President that he favored a common agricultural policy which would offer continued reasonable access for the United States and other traditional agricultural exporters. Mr. Mansholt stressed that the common agriculture policy was “merely machinery” which could be used for liberal or protective purposes. In his view the negotiations under the Trade Expansion Act must be used to turn the machinery in a liberal direction. He therefore welcomed the U.S. proposal to include agriculture in the negotiations under the Trade Expansion Act. He pointed out, however, that he was very doubtful about the effectiveness of the GATT especially in the field of agriculture. He stated that Agriculture Ministers could always find ways to avoid GATT commitments. However, he was prepared to negotiate on tariffs for those items where tariffs represent the major trade obstacles. For other items such as grain and meat he favored international commodity agreements. He emphasized however, that the key to the U.S. and the world’s interest, in terms of the Common Market, is the internal price of wheat. If this price is kept near the current French level there will not be such an expansion of European production as seriously to jeopardize access for foreign exporters. If, however, the price of grain goes to a high price, then U.S. exports in grains would be eliminated in the next five years.

At this point the President pointed out that high grain prices would be in the interest of some of the members of the Common Market and asked how one could avoid the increase in price. In reply Mr. Mansholt stated that it was essential that internal prices be kept low and stressed that U.S. policies designed to reduce U.S. surplus, plus bargaining under the TEA would help to achieve this.

Mansholt recognized that poultry was a special case. He recognized that U.S. exports had been almost eliminated because of the current obstacles. Having this in mind, he had proposed to the European Economic Commission a reduction in the gate price which would have the effect of reducing the charges against imports by 1.8 cents a pound. However, poultry was a hot political issue not only in the U.S. but in Europe as well. While Europe is now moving towards mass production on the American style, there remain many small poultry farmers. Nevertheless his proposal had been agreed to by the Commission and has now been referred to the Council of Ministers. He expected opposition to this proposal by Germany and France and he hinted broadly that American representations, at least to these two countries, would be appropriate.

Secretary Freeman stated that he felt the U.S. was entitled to average poultry exports of 50,000 to 70,000 tons per year. In order to achieve this he suggested a reduction of price from 13 cents to 8 cents and a quota arrangement of up to 50,000 to 70,000 tons. Mr. Mansholt did not respond directly to this proposal.

The President stated that he was very much concerned at the inability of the Atlantic countries to coordinate policies on the inter-related problems of agriculture, defense spending, interest rates, capital movements, tourism, and all the other items which go into the balance of payments. He felt that these issues were being dealt with by technical experts but that no one is bringing all of the related factors into one coherent whole. Thus there was lacking a coherent overall policy which would influence decisions on the individual technical issues. He asked Mr. Mansholt whether he had any idea as to how to achieve this high level coordination.

In the discussion which followed Mansholt did not provide any real response to the President on this issue. However, Mr. Mansholt did stress that agricultural problems consisted of much more than simply trade. He felt that if satisfactory answers were to be reached that they would have to include basic agricultural policies. For example, he stated that if the United States could enter the negotiations under the Trade Expansion Act in the agricultural field on the basis of an internal program which would gradually reduce U.S. domestic surpluses that it would put the United States negotiators in a very strong position to insist that their European partners also follow policies designed to avoid surpluses which would create international difficulties. In terms of the Common Market, the important point he stressed was the internal price for wheat. Secretary Freeman pointed out that in his presentation of the current Administration proposals to the American farmer on “supply management” that he stressed that if the U.S. was going to demand reasonable policies on the part of other countries in the agriculture field, that it must have internal policies which take better into account international repercussions. Mr. Mansholt was thoroughly in agreement with this position.

At the close of the conversation, Mr. Mansholt stated that he wished to comment on the President’s plan for a trip to Germany.¹ Mr. Mansholt stated that he knew all good Europeans were delighted at the prospect of this trip and especially welcomed the President’s plan to visit Berlin. He hoped the President could cover as much of West Germany as possible and especially recommended he visit Hamburg. He stated that if the President visited Hamburg 100,000 people would line the streets to greet him. Mr. Mozer corrected the figure to “300,000.”

The President pointed out that there are, of course, some limitations as to what he, as President of the United States, can say in Europe and asked for Mr. Mansholt’s reactions. Mr. Mansholt stated that, of course the President must not seem to be telling Europeans the type of Europe that they should want, but that the major theme which was fully consistent with U.S. policies over the past 15 years was one supporting a unified, democratic Europe which could operate as a full and equal partner of the United States. Mr. Mansholt felt that the partnership theme stressed the importance of an Atlantic Alliance and the fact that Europe, in order to play the proper role, must develop democratically and in a manner which takes fully into account the needs of other nations of the Free World. Without attacking de Gaulle specifically, the President could point out that only this type of Europe could play its full and effective role.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC. Confidential. Drafted by Tuthill on April 10 and approved by the White House on April 24. The meeting was held at the White House. A 9-page memorandum of Mansholt’s conversation with Freeman on April 8 concerning poultry, grains, and rice is ibid., INCO Poultry US.
1. Scheduled for June 1963.