Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

74. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, March 22, 1963, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Western Unity; Franco-German Treaty; de Gaulle; Common Market; TEA

• PARTICIPANTS
• Germans
  • Dr. Heinrich von Brentano, Chairman, CDU Bundestag Faction and former German Foreign Minister
  • Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein, German Embassy
  • Mr. Hermann Kusterer, Interpreter, German Embassy
• Americans
  • The Secretary
  • Under Secretary George W. Ball
  • Mr. Robert M. Brandin, EUR/GER

Western Unity

Dr. von Brentano referred to the unfortunate coincidence in the dates of de Gaulle’s press conference, the Franco-German Treaty, and Brussels meeting. He assured the Secretary there would be no change in German policy after ratification of the Treaty and that Germany’s position on NATO and European matters would remain the same. Germany wanted the UK in the EEC. No one in Germany dreamed of a Franco-German bloc in Europe or NATO. Only a fool would think of sacrificing anything on the altar of Franco-German reconciliation. All German political parties realized Europe’s freedom depends on close cooperation with the US in all fields. German decisions in recent weeks confirmed this view—e.g., support of the MLF and maintenance of the pipe embargo.

The Secretary agreed that the coincidence of dates in January was unfortunate and had raised questions better left unasked. In 1948–49, the US people made an utterly fundamental decision of historic importance; viz., that US and European security could not be separated. Consequently, we regarded ourselves committed to European security like our own security. The danger of de Gaulle’s press conference was that it raised the possibility that American people would get the feeling that the American connection was not wanted in Europe. If this happened, it would be impossible for any American Government to keep US troops there. For this reason, the attitude of the Five at Brussels was most important in demonstrating to the American people that the rest of Europe did not agree with de Gaulle on this point.

Later in the conversation, the Secretary said that what Moscow thought about Western unity was important. Moscow might think the West was divided but there was no real indication that the USSR would be tempted to try to take any advantage of the West on a matter of security. The Soviet reaction to the Franco-German Treaty and the Soviet refusal to negotiate on nuclear testing indicated that the USSR understood there was no weakening in Western unity where essential security was concerned. The USSR knew that de Gaulle and the rest of the Alliance had backed the US even at the risk of war.

Franco-German Treaty

The Secretary expressed the hope that the Bundstag and the Federal Government would be able to make it clear that the Franco-German Treaty would not mean a change in German policies.

Dr. von Brentano replied that all three parties were resolved to make a clear statement on this point. There were two possible procedures. First, a paragraph might be inserted in the ratification law. Dr. von Brentano did not know whether this would be possible under international law. The second possibility was the passage of a resolution. Such a resolution would not be simply a resolution of the Bundestag; it would be an authentic interpretation of the Treaty which the Federal Government would have to accept before final ratification. Dr. von Brentano said this was the position of himself, his party, and of the opposition parties. This procedure might lead to irritation in Paris but Dr. von Brentano said he was prepared to accept this because Germany did not want and could not afford any ambiguity with its friends or its opponents.

The Secretary said it would be very helpful for the future if no government in Paris or Bonn could read any other interpretation into the Treaty. There should be a clear legislative record of intent.

De Gaulle

The Secretary went on to say that for the past four years we had felt an absence of exchange of views with de Gaulle. Since our rejection of his proposals for reorganizing the three, there had been no contact with the mind and personality of de Gaulle. Such contact with national leaders was necessary to NATO. The personal isolation of de Gaulle seemed to exist within his own Government as well as toward foreign governments. It was difficult to see how to move toward greater cooperation. In this situation things were all right when conclusions coincided, but when they did not, there was a pulling away.

The Secretary hoped a way could be found to talk things out with de Gaulle. It was not possible through normal diplomatic channels or Foreign Ministers. For example, we had found de Gaulle’s press conference very informative. Apparently, we were not the only ones in this position.

The Secretary said we felt we should be prepared to cooperate with France on whatever points were possible. Perhaps there was no fundamental change in de Gaulle’s views, but we were puzzled about what he had in mind and the relationship between his long-range ideas and current problems. The concept of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals might be something for fifty years hence, but Foreign Ministers had to live from day to day.

Dr. von Brentano acknowledged that what the Secretary had said also applied to Germany. It was a strange contact. De Gaulle said “no” to everything, especially in the NATO field. We should not fear letting de Gaulle feel he was isolating himself. He had isolated himself from the US, the UK, Italy and Benelux countries. He must be made to fear that he would isolate himself from Germany too. This was a task for Germany. It was questionable whether de Gaulle could be influenced, but Germany would make it clear that it would not go the wrong way with him.

Later Dr. von Brentano returned to the subject of de Gaulle and said that while he was an awkward partner, he was still a very intelligent man.

The Secretary said we fully understood a man who had lived through his experiences, was patriotic and wanted to bolster his country’s morale. It was a question of method however. If France had thrown itself wholeheartedly into the EEC, French prestige would have come. In isolation it might be possible to build French prestige.

Dr. von Brentano said one must be aware that de Gaulle thought in nationalistic terms. Nevertheless, he had showed courage in solving the Algerian problem and in opposing his earlier supporters. France suffered greatly during and after World War II and de Gaulle felt the need for national prestige in order to rebuild France’s confidence. Such prestige was also a means of meeting the accusations of treason regarding Algeria. Germany recognized these things, but that did not mean Germany would follow de Gaulle or make his mistakes. But it was necessary to understand de Gaulle, because this was the only means of persuading him.

Common Market and TEA

The Secretary then raised the question of where we all go after the breakdown of the Brussels talks. Europe was unanimous that the US should stay out of the UK-EEC negotiations. Part of the present problem of US-European relations, however, was how to share leadership. In the late 40s and early 50s, special circumstances existed: Europe was recovering and rebuilding. This situation was at an end and we realized the importance of Europe’s having a new role. This was relevant to the question of who would take the initiative after Brussels. We were reluctant to inject ourselves into the matters largely of a European character—i.e., the shape and arrangements of the future Europe. The Secretary invited Dr. von Brentano’s comments on this problem.

Dr. von Brentano replied that first of all efforts should be continued in the Six to fulfill the Rome Treaties. France must not be let out of its responsibilities in that connection, but permanent close contact would also have to be maintained with the UK. Therefore, the positions in Britain and under the Rome Treaty should be developed along parallel lines even if France did not participate. The objective should be to achieve the same decisions in London and Brussels and to avoid decisions that would make more difficult the UK entry into the EEC.

Dr. von Brentano said that in the second place, the talks with Mr. Herter should be continued. Dr. von Brentano said he had just learned that the Foreign Trade Commission of the European Parliament had formed a subcommittee to contact the US in implementing the TEA and preparing for Atlantic partnership. This initiative of the European Parliament was welcome.

The Secretary observed that the timing of the TEA itself was based on the expectation that the UK would join the EEC. It was hoped that this year would see each side working out its internal problems so that trade negotiations could begin next year. It was unfortunate that things could not move as fast as the Act permitted.

The Secretary asked whether there was any support in Europe for de Gaulle’s views on economic autarchy.

Dr. von Brentano said even if it wanted to, Germany could not pursue fatal ideas. Germany would wither away in such a system because it was more dependent than others on foreign trade. It had to import raw materials and to export the products of its labor. Autarchy would be fatal for foreign trade. Germany favored liberal trade as laid down in Vice Chancellor Erhard’s policies. It would not permit the European Community to develop an inward looking policy.

Dr. von Brentano said he did not want to see one wrong nationalism replaced by a worse nationalism; he personally opposed German, French and European nationalism. Friendship with the US was essential. Balance-of-trade problems and balance-of-payments problems should be solved through cooperation. Any serious balance-of-payments deficit of one country was harmful to others.

The Secretary said we would try to avoid unwise actions in meeting the balance-of-payments problem, but that the problem would have to be met in the next two years or three years. It could be settled if the Alliance looked at it together. We wanted to avoid bad trade policies and would continue to keep in close touch with our Allies.

Later, the Secretary asked whether it could be anticipated that the Common Market would function in a normal way despite the problems created at Brussels.

Dr. von Brentano said that the Common Market should be developed within the framework of the Rome Treaty. A standstill would be a setback. Developments should be in close contact with the UK. No one could prevent concerted action with the UK and decisions should be avoided which might prejudice the UK’s entry into the EEC. Permanent contact with the UK would show that the breakdown at Brussels was an interruption in and not the end of developments.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, Def W Eur. Secret. Drafted by Brandin and approved in S on March 26. Brief memoranda of Brentano’s conversations with Ball on March 21 and the President at 10:30 a.m. on March 22 along similar lines are ibid., Pol 4 Fr-W Ger and Pol 1 Eur. The meeting was held in the Under Secretary’s Conference Room.