Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

76. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Bonn, May 20, 1963.

PARTICIPANTS

• Chancellor Adenauer
• Ambassador McGhee
• Dr. Osterheld (Interpreter)
• Ambassador von Holleben

SUBJECT

• Franco-German Treaty

The Chancellor said that he wished to discuss with me the Franco-German Treaty. He said that he had before him a communiqué from the Agence-France Press which took the general line that there was a natural affinity between the Soviets and French and that they should get together. They could provide a link between the East and West. He said that he wanted us to understand that the primary objective he had in negotiating this treaty was to prevent just such an alliance. There had, of course, been many historical precedents dating back from the time of the Czars. In 1944 de Gaulle himself had gone to Russia to reaffirm the Franco-Russian alliance made prior to the war. It was necessary that this not happen again.

I pointed out to the Chancellor that a Franco-German rapprochement was, as he knew, something which we desired as much as he. In fact, had he not arranged one we would probably be urging him to do so. The only thing that caused concern for some, and this appeared to have been taken care of by the preamble which was a part of the enabling legislation of the treaty, was that it would become a basis for agreement between the two nations which would then be presented as a fait accompli in bilateral relations with us and in the multilateral councils such as NATO and the EEC. It was our hope that matters affecting Europe as a whole could be worked out jointly in the multilateral context.

The Chancellor came back very sharply on this point. Had we, for example, discussed with Germany and France the matters which were agreed to in Nassau? It was the fact that Macmillan, after his visit with de Gaulle in which he had not mentioned that he was going to seek Polaris weapons from the United States or help to create a multilateral force, had made an agreement with President Kennedy on these points, that had precipitated the de Gaulle press statement.

I responded that I understood the inferences that might have been derived from the Nassau meeting and communiqué.¹ However, it should be pointed out that this meeting was basically to solve a bilateral US-UK problem, i.e., our inability to supply weapons which we had agreed we would supply to the British if they became available. The solution to this problem, which involved our offer to furnish the Polaris without nuclear warheads was in a sense a bilateral problem. The proposal for a multilateral force was made at this time largely as a result of circumstances, however, it might be considered as a gesture to compensate the other members of NATO for the Polaris offer.

In any event, it was clearly a proposal which had no validity unless it was acceptable to other NATO members, including the Germans. We had immediately discussed it with the Germans before finalizing any of its details. Perhaps it would have been better if we had been able to engage in talks with all concerned before making the proposal public, however, it is not always possible to control the precise timing under which questions like this arise. Our concept of the way allies should deal with each other is to discuss a new matter quietly with all concerned, and then to seek decisions within a multilateral framework in a give-and-take manner, with everyone sitting around the table. It was General de Gaulle alone who appeared to inject the nationalistic element into the growing consensus in favor of the “European idea.”

The Chancellor rose rather sharply to the defense of General de Gaulle. In the first place, he said, it was necessary that General de Gaulle revive confidence in France before anything could be accomplished. He had first to revive the pride of the French army and then to solve the problem of Algeria. These were very great achievements.

I agreed and stated that we gave full marks to General de Gaulle on these counts. I pointed out that other European nations, however, had made very considerable progress without injecting a nationalistic element into their relations with other European nations. Germany itself was the best example of this. Chancellor Adenauer had rebuilt the German army and German prosperity while still favoring European integration.

The Chancellor replied that this was easier for Germany. Germany had a great problem to overcome after the war. They did not want to incur reactions. It was better for Germany to keep quiet about its army and its economic progress, and to merge into the European context.

I pointed out that other countries who did not face this problem—Belgium and Holland in particular, but also Italy, and now, I thought, Britain—had also accepted the “European idea”.

The Chancellor then complained that it was not de Gaulle but in fact the other European nations, particularly Belgium and Holland, who had in 1961 rejected the results of his efforts for a European political union, which de Gaulle had accepted. He admitted that de Gaulle had changed it somewhat by including the existing Community institutions in it, but he still insisted it was their fault.

The Chancellor insisted that it was not de Gaulle’s fault that Europe had not made progress toward union. He said that he himself had told General de Gaulle during his stay in Paris after the Press announcement, when the treaty was concluded, that he was in favor of the multilateral force and Britain’s entry in the Common Market. De Gaulle assured him that he also favored Britain’s (I assume ultimate) entry into the Common Market. He said that de Gaulle was not nationalistic, as he understood the distinction, but national.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, Pol 7 US Kennedy. Confidential. The source text was transmitted as enclosure 2 to airgram 2465, May 22. The meeting was held in the Chancellor’s office at Palais Schaumburg. McGhee presented his credentials on May 18; this was his first meeting with the Chancellor.
1. For text of the Nassau Communiqué and Attached Statement on Nuclear Defense Systems, December 21, 1962, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 633–637.