Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

69. Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 40⁰

Washington, February 5, 1963, 4:30 p.m.

Second Portion: U.S. Policy Toward Europe

The President opened the discussion of U.S. policy toward Europe by commenting on the attached draft instructions from him to Ambassador Bruce with respect to the subjects which would be discussed in the immediate future as we proceed with our reappraisal.¹ His first question concerned our plans for a multilateral mixed manned seaborne Polaris force. He suggested that Ambassador Merchant not proceed too rapidly with his discussions with the Europeans about this force. He thought that de Gaulle would probably oppose it, that it might turn out that the proposal was not very attractive to other Europeans because it did not have enough in it to interest them.

A second question involved the relationship of our foreign economic policy to our political objectives in Europe. The President asked Secretary Acheson to look at our balance of payments problem, consulting with Treasury, Defense, State, and Governor Herter.

Parenthetically, the President asked for a recommendation as to whether we should take an initiative now, wait to see how things developed, or go on as we now plan. He asked Secretary Acheson to concern himself with this problem as well.

The President said he did not want us to appear as if we were approaching the Europeans hat in hand. Possibly it would be best for the U.S. to negotiate alone, but he also wanted the views of those present as to whether it would be best to go forward with a group consisting of the British and other Europeans except France.

Governor Herter said de Gaulle’s position was not yet clear and would not be in the immediate future. The situation in Europe had not yet jelled and the views of European powers other than France were changing rapidly. He said that the European powers might take reprisals against the French, but we did not yet know whether they would do so or, after a short time, calm down. The Dutch were now blocking discussions with the French, but the Italians appeared to be going one way, while the Belgians were going another way. If we decide to go with the Six, that would be one thing, but if we decide to support some kind of a trade association between the U.K., the EFTA countries, and the Common Market, a different way of proceeding would be necessary.

Secretary Rusk said we did not know which way the Five would go. One way they could move in the political area would be to use the Western European Union structure, and economically, some association with the Common Market. (Earlier the President had stated that if the U.K. in some way joins in an economic association with Europe, but is not a part of the political structure of Europe, the U.S. would get the worst of both worlds.)

The President’s next question concerned our stance in negotiations with the Russians. He noted that Gromyko had made a specific approach to Ambassador Kohler, and that we must shortly give instructions to our Ambassador. The President said the Germans appeared to be relaxed on this issue because the Russians were not now exerting pressure on Berlin. He asked whether we were consulting our allies on the proposal made by the Russians. He asked what we would do if the Germans and the French agree to proceed with negotiation with the Russians only on the condition that the talks do not involve discussion of the removal of allied forces from Berlin.

Secretary Rusk said that if the French and the Germans made this pre-condition, we were back where we were before the last negotiations with the Russians. He said we should go ahead and talk to the Russians as we had done before, but give the French and the Germans a chance to accept or to turn down participation in such talks.

The President expressed his view that we should ask the allies whether they wished to join with us in these discussions, but not tell them now what we would do if they decide not to participate.

Assistant Secretary Tyler explained that he would make known to the French and the British Ambassadors here the proposal which Gromyko had made. (The Germans have already been informed.) The Ambassadors would seek instructions from their governments as to whether they wished to make the negotiations tripartite. A variant of this suggestion would be for a quadripartite group to approve positions which we would take as the sole negotiator with the Russians.

The President’s next question concerned our relations with Germany. He felt that unless we make clear our opposition to the Franco-German treaty we would not be able to make clear to the Germans that they faced a choice between working with the French or working with us. If the Franco-German treaty is approved, the Germans would be able to tell us that nothing really had changed as a result of the treaty when, in fact, the Germans would be accepting de Gaulle’s policy.

Parenthetically, the President asked Secretary Dillon why the Spanish were buying gold. Secretary Dillon replied that they were doing so primarily for psychological reasons, i.e. they had always hoped to regain the amount of gold they had prior to their civil war.

The President did not specifically discuss questions five and six on the attached list² covering our relations with the U.K. and our relations with France. He did raise the question of nuclear weapons for Europe and touched on the tripartite U.S./U.K./France concept. He said that Ambassador Bruce and Secretary Acheson would be looking at these questions for the next two weeks. They would be free to do this outside of the day-to-day routine other officials were obliged to follow. The objective would be to agree on a plan covering our relations with Europe during the next five or six months.

Ambassador Dowling, who had just arrived from Bonn, expressed his view that the Germans would not lead the Five in opposition to de Gaulle unless we keep them nervous about our relations with them. He felt that the Germans would not stick their necks out in opposition to de Gaulle unless they were uncertain as to how we would react if they did not so act. He felt we should discreetly encourage Erhard to insist that the Germans would ratify the treaty with France only with two reservations; (a) it would be understood that Germany would work for a resolution of the Common Market and U.K. problem, and (b) it would be understood that no provision of the Franco-German treaty would override existing NATO treaty provisions. He felt that we should not try to prevent ratification of the treaty because we could not be successful in so doing. However, he thought we should send German State Secretary Carstens back to Bonn with full knowledge of our concern in the hope that he would urge the German Government to proceed carefully.³

The President asked Ambassador Dowling whether we should ask the Germans for something specific. The Ambassador responded that we could not become specific until we had answered some of the questions raised by the President.

Secretary Dillon said an item of interest as to existing European attitudes had arisen in connection with our efforts to increase European subscriptions to IDA. In the past, the French had been willing to try to persuade the Germans to subscribe larger amounts. The Germans had been resisting larger subscriptions. The French were still putting pressure on the Germans to add to their IDA subscription.

Ambassador Bruce said that some of the questions the President had raised required immediate answers, i.e. our attitude toward the Franco-German treaty and our stance toward the USSR. Other questions were not so immediate. He said he wanted to feel free to deal with the short term questions promptly and take more time to provide replies to other questions.

The President asked how the WEU would solve any problems which arose following the veto of British membership in the Common Market. Ambassador Bruce replied that the British could get a political tie to the Continent via WEU. If the French refused to go along with such a political tie, the other members of the WEU could go forward with the British. He cautioned that no European government had yet chosen its course of action.

The President said the British were seeking any kind of a substitute for the Common Market. Any deal which they could make would hurt us economically.

Ambassador Dowling reported that the Germans might support some economic association of the British with the Continental states in addition to emphasis on the WEU. He urged that we decide promptly whether we want them to follow this line. If we do not soon inform them of our view, they may adopt this policy in the belief that this is what we would want them to do.

The President pointed out that we cannot be in the position of keeping the British from joining some economic association with the other European powers. He asked for an estimate of the economic effect on the U.S. if the British did accept some form of association with the Common Market. If it turned out that the economic effect on us would be bad, then we would be in a most difficult position, i.e. opposing British association with the Common Market, having supported British membership in the Common Market.

Governor Herter reported that the British had flatly rejected association with the Common Market, but added that the EFTA powers favored an association and were anxious to work out economic arrangements with the Common Market.

Secretary Acheson and Carstens had told him something he did not fully understand, namely, that the Germans were thinking of suggesting that they join with the British and with us and the Five countries in promptly negotiating lower tariffs now. If de Gaulle refused to join this effort, the Germans could threaten to use the Common Market voting rules which become applicable in 1966 to cause de Gaulle real difficulties. After 1966 the Common Market provisions do not give a veto to France.

Ambassador Bruce felt that despite what the British had said so far, they would consider some type of association with the Common Market and that the EFTA countries would exert strong pressure on them to do so.

Governor Herter pointed out to the President that a year from this April is the earliest time when we can begin the Kennedy round of trade negotiations. He said we were in a very difficult box and could not proceed promptly. The EEC is now studying our tariff simplification proposals and we cannot move until they have completed this study. They will then ask for recompense as a result of our tariff simplifications. Following that, we must hold public hearings, make our proposals, and then table them in Congress sixty days prior to negotiations.

Following an exchange between the President and Mr. Bundy, it was agreed that we should not let the Germans make a proposal in the mistaken belief that it would please us. In effect, we must try to see that no state makes any proposal which we are not aware of in advance.

General Taylor gave a brief report of his discussions with Lord Mountbatten:

a. The British are highly skeptical that a multilateral second phase force will ever become a reality. Hence, they wish to emphasize a first phase NATO force to which they would like to ask others to contribute, i.e. the Germans to offer to include their tactical bombers.

b. The cost to the British for Polaris is apparently going to be higher than that for Skybolt. Hence, the British feel they must cut the cost of their NATO contribution, reduce their military commitments worldwide, or undertake to persuade the government to increase the total defense budget, a highly doubtful task.

c. The British are convinced that the French are serious about building their own submarine missile force.

Secretary Acheson referred back to the Bruce instructions and said he did not think we would get answers to these questions and that the effort to do so would bog down in futile discussions involving national sovereignty questions and other unrealistic issues. He asked whether the memorandum he had written on the January debacle had been read by those present.⁴ He urged that a decision be taken now to give the Germans and Italians something which, if they did not follow our leadership, we could take away from them. He urged that we initiate training of foreign officers for the NATO nuclear force now while we are discussing the longer range proposal of a multilateral force.

Ambassador Dowling noted that the multilateral force has appeal for the Germans, even if we keep the veto, as long as we set up something like the NATO Executive Committee in which they would have a role.

General Taylor asked that we talk to the German military leaders as we are now doing with the British.

Ambassador Dowling said the Germans do want to participate in the manning of the multilateral force, they want a voice in the Executive Committee, and they are quite prepared to contribute to the cost of the multilateral force.

The President said that before we undertake any discussions with the Germans we should firm up our multilateral proposal. He thought that Ambassador Merchant should work on this proposal, consult with Ambassador Bruce, and then we could discuss the proposal again. The President pointed out that Secretary Acheson had recommended that we tell everyone we will not remove our troops from Europe for at least eighteen months. He said the threat of withdrawing our troops was about the only sanction we had, and, therefore, if we made such a statement, we would give away our bargaining power.

Secretary Acheson said he had not recommended that we guarantee we would not withdraw our troops from Europe, but merely that we would let the Europeans know that we would not fiddle with this force for eighteen months for peripheral reasons, i.e. budgetary or balance of payments. Any action looking to troop withdrawal would rock the boat and convey to the Europeans uncertainty as to our intentions. At the end of eighteen months, we could examine the situation, and, if, during this period, the Europeans had not come around to supporting us fully, then we could consider withdrawal. He opposed conveying to the Germans the thought that unless they acted in a certain way they could not be sure of our continued support.

The President asked then how we could put any pressure on the Germans.

Ambassador Dowling said that those Germans who are our friends say we will not pull out of Europe. If by our actions we caused the Germans to doubt that we would remain in Europe, de Gaulle could take great advantage of the uncertainty created.

The President asked what we want the Germans to do.

Secretary Acheson replied that we want them to add reservations with respect to NATO provisions when they ratify the Franco-German treaty. He said he had made clear to Carstens that the Germans must take action to clear up the doubt about their intentions which they created by accepting the Franco-German treaty. He said he had suggested that the Germans must make clear that they are for France and for NATO.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that if the Germans insisted on making clear the continued existence of their pledge to NATO, de Gaulle would be influenced.

Ambassador Dowling emphasized that the Germans looked at the Franco-German treaty as the way to acquire equal partnership for Germany. At the same time, he acknowledged that the German association with the U.S. is very meaningful to them.

Secretary Acheson gave additional details of his conversation with Carstens.⁵ He said he bluntly told Carstens that Adenauer’s agreeing to the Franco-German treaty and statements to the effect that this action made no real difference meant that the Germans either thought the Americans were stupid or that the Germans were admitting they were duplicitous.

Bromley Smith⁶

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Executive Committee Meetings. Top Secret; Sensitive. In the first portion of the meeting, the Executive Committee discussed Cuba.
1. The draft has not been found; the final text of Bruce’s instructions is printed as Document 70.
2. Questions five and six in Bruce’s instructions.
3. For a memorandum of Rusk’s conversation with Carstens at 6 p.m., see Document 71.
4. Not found.
5. No other record of Acheson’s conversation with Carstens has been found.
6. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.