Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

68. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State⁰

Paris, February 3, 1963, 3 p.m.

3098. Brussels also for Busec. Ref: London 2858 to Department.¹ In absence Ambassador, Embassy submits following comment re US posture in face de Gaulle tactics.

De Gaulle’s recent actions create special problem for US and NATO allies in sense that failure react may create impression he can continue to impose his will on other countries by unilateral action. However, since there is apparently no course of action which can immediately efface reversal suffered by UK and US at Brussels, US objective would seem on one hand to be to avoid measures likely further reduce considerable progress already achieved toward European integration and Atlantic interdependence and on other hand to pursue our own announced policies in manner which re-enforce considerable doubt which exists in Europe and even in France as to wisdom de Gaulle’s policies.

Success de Gaulle’s effort develop a “European” Europe under French leadership capable of functioning as third great concentration of international political force may depend to certain extent on his ability arouse potential anti-American forces which are becoming apparent in France and which are latent in various degrees elsewhere in Western Europe. Obviously punitive measures against France (likely for most part to be injurious to wider US interests) and especially measures resulting from clear US initiatives would undoubtedly play into hands of those who allege we are seeking dominate Europe economically, militarily and politically. Some of us are concerned that themes such as needed for “independence” of Europe, for independent European defense capability (including nuclear), and protection from economic exploitation by behemoth of American capitalism have considerable political potential in hands of de Gaulle and perhaps other European leaders who are convinced that nineteenth century nationalism is motor force of international affairs. Effective manipulation of these nationalistic forces could result in serious erosion of American position.

Consequently, we should move steadily ahead, with those allies who are prepared to cooperate on projects which will contribute to our goal of an Atlantic Community such as NATO nuclear force and reduction of trade barriers. France should be offered continuing opportunity participate in those projects to which she is prepared respond.

Best way exploit French fears of being isolated is to offer our friends programs which they will find more in their long-term interests than French proposals.

In our dealings with France we must not forget that harsh or discourteous attitude would quickly alienate sensitive nationalistic feelings in important segments of population and government cadres who may entertain basic sympathy for US and our objectives and who constitute vital long term US asset.

Attempting to whip up opposition by other five to France within framework of EEC seems to us to be dangerous course and would also cast us in role for which France being severely criticized. While de Gaulle’s arbitrary action in ending negotiations with UK will undoubtedly seriously affect working relations within community, community should and will survive. Therefore we must bend our efforts to seeing that, as far as it lies within our power to influence events, it develops an outward-looking community.

We would question desirability of our encouraging other EEC countries to reject trade arrangements which were incorporated in recently negotiated convention with African-associated countries. While trade arrangements in this convention are not in many ways satisfactory to US, they represent improvement over present arrangements and a move in right direction. Moreover, they are integal part of agreements which also provide financial assistance. Refusal to carry out these arrangements or otherwise obstruct EEC assistance to Africa might embarrass French, but real injury would be not to France but to African countries. We believe that we should direct our energies toward improving trade aspect of these arrangements in forthcoming GATT negotiations and commodity agreements. We do not think they should be used as a means of attempting to exert pressure on de Gaulle.

While it undoubtedly lies in our power to complicate the situation for the French in Africa and elsewhere in a number of ways, this could lead to attitudes here which would destroy what up to now still remains a reasonably satisfactory collaboration in this area and one of great interest to the US, especially re Algeria. We might find that in the end we would do untold damage to the fragile structures of the new states and end up by advancing the Soviet capacity for mischief as well as increasing the expense both political and financial to the US.

As regards agriculture, French effort to expand agricultural exports in Common Market area is directed partly at expense of overseas countries and partly at expense of less-efficient production with community, e.g. Germany. Our policy is already directed at defense of our own efforts. To the extent that French efforts, for example to get prices fixed around French level within community, are adverse to Germans’ interests, they coincide with ours. It seems to us that agricultural problem is something of a double-edged sword and it is not clear to what extent it could usefully be employed as political instrument. It seems to us difficult enough to protect our interests as it is without introducing additional political element.

In longer term, some of us believe effective Atlantic Community will depend upon our ability create political superstructure which will accommodate sensibilities of both large and small members and serve as practical alternative to other solutions (such as de Gaulle’s which would tend disperse and fragment resources of West).

Bohlen

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, Pol Fr-US. Confidential. Repeated to London, Brussels, Rome, The Hague, Luxembourg, and Bonn.
1. Telegram 2858, January 30, stated that in view of the rejection of the British application, the United States should reexamine the situation and perhaps “give General de Gaulle a discreet touch of the whip.” The telegram suggested that without an “open display of feverish diplomatic activity,” the United States should secure the opposition of the other five governments in the community and concurrently examine how it could contribute to alternatives to British entry. (Ibid., 375.42/1–3063)