Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

67. Telegram From the Mission to the European Communities to the Department of State⁰

Brussels, February 2, 1963, 11 p.m.

Ecbus 844. Luxembourg for USEC and Embassy. Paris for Embassy and USRO. Purpose this message is to suggest considerations relevant to posture US in period immediately ahead.

1. Fact of capital importance on January 29 was solidarity of other five in standing up to De Gaulle; First and immediate task is to do everything possible to encourage maintenance this solidarity. We should let the other five and the UK take the lead, giving our support to any appropriate proposals they develop designed to keep open British movement toward Europe.

2. The pivotal element in this picture is Germany. The decision to make their stand against the French has undoubtedly been a very difficult and even agonizing one for them. Since they have nevertheless made the right decision it behooves us to be sensitive and as forthcoming as possible with respect to their other major preoccupations. The British should be encouraged to adopt a similar posture and work seriously for rapprochement at national level.

3. Although we should coordinate closely in all moves with the British, we should avoid taking steps that will give the appearance that the special relationship is being strengthened. This would be fully exploited by De Gaulle on the continent to serve his ends. In this connections, do not favor joint US-UK Ministerial meetings proposed London’s 2890 to Department.¹

4. We must fully accept the fact that De Gaulle is carrying out calculated policy to terminate the American presence in Europe and to destroy the entire concept of an Atlantic partnership. We must not be hesitant in accepting his challenge and combatting it. Publicly, however, we should assume a calm posture, avoiding the appearance of open split. But privately, through diplomacy, we should do everything we can to support those opposing De Gaulle. Essential make clear however that US support for European integration including EEC remains.

5. There are now various lines of action open to us:

(A) We should continue to restate often the kind of Atlantic partnership we stand for, with special emphasis on Europe as a unified, strong and equal partner.

(B) In particular, we must continue to make clear that there is no intention on our part to reduce or remove US forces in Europe.

Doing otherwise would seem to confirm in the minds of the Germans De Gaulle’s claims on an issue on which the Germans are extremely sensitive.

(C) However, such reaffirmations, although very necessary, are not nearly enough in the present situation. Of greatest importance is moving ahead on solid programs with those allies prepared to do so.

(D) Most important of these is the NATO multilateral force. De Gaulle is extremely vulnerable in this area. It will be particularly important if we can demonstrate concrete progress at the earliest possible moment and if we can bring into being a force which will be effective sooner and be technically better than the force de frappe. It would be useful if we could discreetly make these points publicly now. The appointment of Merchant for this program is an excellent omen and should be widely talked up by USReps. (We need some convincing answer to charge that even MLF will deny Europe access to advanced industrial techniques.)

(E) On the negative side we should of course remain absolutely firm in our refusal to assist De Gaulle in any way in developing his independent nuclear weapons and delivery capability. (Such gestures as we have made in the past, as for example, the sale of KC 135 tankers, have clearly had no beneficial effects—in fact every gesture that has been made by us has been interpreted by French spokesmen as proof of wisdom De Gaulle’s tactics re US).

(F) Fullest possible British participation in the multilateral force is essential, including the multinationally manned force. We should press the British hard in this direction. British should at all costs avoid threats about withdrawal of BAOR from Germany, just as we should assure that there is no question about US withdrawals.

(G) It may well prove necessary to consider steps going beyond the multilateral force (see Ecbus 730).²

(H) Other constructive programs, such as the Trade Expansion Act, should also be moved steadily ahead, although guarding carefully against French campaign to present our position as attempt dilute EEC. For reasons explained in Ecbus 834³ separate message, we have reservations about practicality and value of speeding up implementation TEA via earlier GATT Ministerial meeting.

(I) We must be especially careful now to avoid US actions (e.g., woolen textiles and public over-emphasis on our concerns re agricultural policies of the Six) which will be distorted by the French in their present ruthless campaign to sow distrust of the US and to portray us as attempting to destroy the Common Market.

(J) On the counter propaganda side, we must be prepared to enter the lists and, through discreet means, counteract the vicious campaign being waged against us. As examples of the kind of points we should get across are the following:

(1) It is De Gaulle, not the US, who is forcing Western Europe to make a choice between himself and the US.

(2) De Gaulle is fundamentally antagonistic to European integration. De Gaulle’s policies will lead to the opposite of what he intends, i.e., he will create a weak and divided Europe and will lessen, not increase, European influence elsewhere.

(3) Perhaps most pretentious of all De Gaulle’s claims—that he alone stands firm on Berlin, Cuba and other East-West issues—is a position which he is able to take only under the umbrella of the US deterrent in which he professes to have no confidence. For the benefit of the Germans we need stress continuously that it is US not France which is leading proponent of forward strategy and gives that strategy effect by actual deployment of forces.

(4) Most telling of all would be to encourage thought re meaning of “from Atlantic to the Urals”. Stress on this theme should be especially telling for its effect on the Germans, with their concerns on Berlin.

[1 paragraph (9-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

In conclusion, we suggest the following program of action procedurally:

1. Primary emphasis should be given to ensuring continuing strong ties between the UK and other five. The other five are showing a disposition to do this (Ecbus 835),⁴ and Brussels is the logical point of contact. British should be encouraged to strengthen their staff here for this purpose by assigning two or three top quality people.

2. NATO becomes the forum of primary importance for pushing ahead with those programs (especially multilateral force) in which French cannot exercise veto and in which we can demonstrate our readiness move ahead.

3. In monetary field, best procedure might be to use OECD WP Three meeting as an opportunity for US-UK-Five-Canada to caucus in order assure British on sterling (second numbered paragraph three in London’s 2890 to Department). Believe this preferable to bilateral US-UK arrangements for obvious reasons.

4. As for TEA, believe we should move steadily ahead as planned, not calling for earlier meeting of GATT.

Tuthill

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC. Confidential, Priority. Repeated to Bonn, The Hague, Luxembourg, Paris, Rome, London, Oslo, Copenhagen, Ottawa, Stockholm, Vienna, and Geneva.
1. Document 412.
2. Ecbus 730, January 22, suggested a variety of steps that might be taken relating to British accession to the Common Market in the face of de Gaulle’s statement on January 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 375.42/1–2263)
3. Not printed. (Ibid., ECIN 3 EEC)
4. Ecbus 835, February 1, reported that talk of continued negotiations between the five EC countries and the British was dead, but that they were exploring other ideas. (Ibid., ECIN 6 EEC)