Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

70. Instructions From President Kennedy to the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce)⁰

Washington, February 5, 1963.

After discussion with Secretary Rusk, and on his recommendation, I request that you make a review of certain of our leading policies toward Europe and make recommendations for action in the coming months. In this review you should feel free to request reports or studies or other assistance from any Department, and you should act directly for me and for Secretary Rusk. When your recommendations are in preliminary form I shall plan to meet with you to determine what further study they may require before decisions are taken.

The following list sets forth some of the topics which seem important to me and in which I hope for your specific comment. But you should not feel limited by this list, if other elements of the problem seem of equal importance to you. You should understand that I am asking other officers to review the broad problems of our military posture in Europe and our monetary relations in that area. Progress of these other studies will be reported to you through Mr. Bundy’s office.

Questions for your consideration:

1. I would like you to review our plans for a NATO Nuclear Force, and in particular the plans for a multilateral, mixed-manned seaborne Polaris force. I would like your judgment of this plan not only in terms of its immediate political attraction, but also in terms of its durable value as an instrument for strengthening the alliance. I want your judgment on the preferred means of command and control—and in particular your opinion of the value of this force if it is organized with—and without—a U.S. vote. I also wish your judgment of the proposal that this force, in whole or in part, might be organized under European multilateral arrangements, integrated with ours much as we now expect British forces to be integrated—possibly under the auspices of WEU. In the light of Soviet complaints about the Franco-German treaty and its possible relation to a German nuclear capability, I should also like your judgment of the relation between our effort for a multilateral force and a possible Soviet reaction. Finally, I should like to have your judgment on the best way of using this and other instruments to produce a shared sense of understanding, responsibility, and confidence with respect to the nuclear defense of the alliance.

2. What plan is recommended for coordinating our foreign economic policy with our political objectives in Europe? This question includes such matters as our own negotiating requirements, our views of a possible UK economic association with the Five or the Six, the varied relations between commercial and political issues, and important problems of domestic political pressure. Mr. Herter has leading responsibilities here, and I would like to have recommendations, co-ordinated with him, which connect these matters firmly to our European policy as a whole.

3. What should be our stance in negotiations with the Russians? This problem is one of substance, on such questions as Berlin, testing, and German reunification. It is also one of tactics, including such questions as the use of the Ambassadorial Group, and the degree of British, French and German participation in such discussions.

4. What combination of actions will be most effective in our relations with Germany? What should be our position toward the Franco-German Treaty? How far can we ensure German cooperation in other fields, like finance, as a price for our own steadfast presence?

5. What policy should we follow with respect to the UK, on economic, political and military problems? I assume that our negotiations on Polaris will proceed on the lines already approved, but it is clear that we need decisions also on economic relations and on processes of political cooperation.

6. I do not wish to lose sight of the continuing problem of our relations with France. I should like to have your recommendations for ways and means of sustaining such cooperation as may be possible with France, while at the same time limiting the damage that may be done to our policy and to the alliance by General de Gaulle’s commitment to purposes which are not readily aligned with ours. What is your judgment of the eventual prospects for a new relation with General de Gaulle, in political consultation or nuclear cooperation, which might be to our interest, and what preparations would you recommend for such a possibility?

0. Source: Johnson Library, Vice Presidential Security Files, NSC I. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, but the instructions were discussed and approved at the NSC Executive Committee meeting on February 5; see Document 69.