Office of the Historian

47. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Missions0

Washington, July 3, 1962, 3:21 p.m.

8. Following is summary appraisal Secretary’s trip to Europe which addresses may use as appropriate in discussions with host country officials. Dept is using this material here in response to numerous requests.

General: Secretary’s discussions in all capitals visited were very full and frank and led to harmonization or better mutual understanding US [Page 112] and European views on key questions of day. Dept feels trip created better atmosphere in all countries visited, impression which appears be borne out by European press reaction.

1.
European Integration: Predominant subject in Europe at present is US negotiation with EEC. One highlight of trip was evidence that, although there may be climactic crises before completion, ultimate success these negotiations is generally expected. Fact of UK membership seems accepted everywhere, including France. British have apparently succeeded in fully persuading French of seriousness their intentions in joining Common Market. Interest in political integration remains strong, this being particularly emphasized in Germany and Italy. Secretary took special pains make clear we were not seeking drive wedge between France and Germany; on contrary, encouragement of Franco-German rapprochement remains one of fundamental bases our support for European integration.
2.
Nuclear Issues: Second highlight of trip was frankness with which nuclear issues were discussed in capitals visited and with NATO Council, resulting in advancement of thinking by all concerned. US made plain its continuing opposition to proliferation of independent national nuclear deterrents, stressing essential indivisibility of nuclear warfare. US also made plain its willingness consider multilateral solution, if Allies so desire. US pointed out we not pressing this issue and not submitting “made in America” plan. Trip revealed growing European interest in multilateral solution, although at same time there was general tendency not to meet nuclear issues “head on” at present moment, since UK entry into Common Market generally considered to be first priority step. Discussions with French on nuclear issue resulted in no change in US or French position, although frankness of discussion was such as to be mutually beneficial. Discussions with Germans revealed strong German interest in finding multilateral solution to nuclear question.
3.
Berlin and Germany: US carefully laid out rationale of its approach to Berlin problem in all capitals visited and in NATO Council. US posture of maintaining contact with Soviets while refusing yield in any way on vital interests received widespread support from nearly all NATO members. French acknowledged talks had not led to concessions or to unsettling results in FRG they had anticipated, but feared indefinite continuance would induce European mood of leaving all problems to “big two.” Discussions in Bonn especially beneficial in creating full German understanding of US posture.
4.
NATO: US expressed agreement with generally held sentiment that any steps to reorganize NATO not timely at moment in view UK-EEC negotiations. US stressed importance improving political consultation in NATO, encouraged particularly countries visited to take more [Page 113] initiatives, citing US record on consultation. US also stressed importance strong conventional forces and forward strategy.
5.
Khrushchev Offensive against Common Market: US raised with countries visited and in NATO Council dangers of Khrushchev offensive against Common Market and importance of EEC and Common Market countries preventing Soviets from exploiting concerns of LDC’s and non-aligned countries. There was generally sympathetic reaction to this on part countries with which raised.
6.
Economic Problems: Secretary raised various specific economic problems in countries visited, including actions looking toward liberalization of trade and increase in aid to LDC’s by Western Europe. Secretary stressed need these liberal international economic policies as aid to balance of payments problem.
7.
Portugal: Secretary had discussions with Salazar and Nogueira1 on basic US-Portuguese problems, including full exploration on situation in Africa with Nogueira. Secretary stressed that US desires find common solution and is not seeking replace Portugal in Africa. Discussions with Portuguese did not result in concrete accomplishments but at least produced some improvement in mutual comprehension.
Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–RU/7–362. Secret. Drafted by Fessenden on July 2, cleared by Hillenbrand and Kohler, and initialed by Rusk. Sent to New Delhi, Ottawa, Tokyo, and 18 missions in Europe.↩
  2. Regarding Rusk’s conversations with Salazar and Nogueira, see Document 343 and footnote 1 thereto.↩