Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

48. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the European Communities⁰

Washington, July 31, 1962, 8:10 p.m.

Busec 54. From Ball for Ambassador Butterworth.

1. On the basis of field comments and an assessment of the pros and cons of putting our views forward in written form at this time, the White House believes that our interests have been sufficiently represented and that our injecting ourselves into the negotiations at this time would do more harm than good. We are therefore not proposing to send an aide-mémoire at this time, nor do we propose to make an oral presentation.¹

2. French Ambassador Alphand came in this morning however, asking for suggestions, and I was able to use a large part of the substance of the aide-mémoire in response to his request. A separate telegram will report the discussion with Alphand.² I thought it nevertheless indispensable for you to have the basic document from which we have been working.

3. I am sending the text of the document which we have decided not to send for your information. I would appreciate it if you would hold it very closely.

Begin text.

1) We are not party to negotiations now being conducted between EEC countries and UK, and have no wish to impose our views as to form or content of any agreement that may result from those negotiations. At same time, as non-member country, US has important trading interests that can be significantly affected by manner in which certain outstanding problems are resolved in course of negotiations.

2) Bearing in mind that EEC will play central role in world trade, it essential that trade problems arising out of UK accession be resolved in such a manner as to maximize access and trading opportunities for third countries. United States would have great difficulty with solutions that have effect of making the United States, as against other third party countries, residual supplier to an expanded EEC with respect to commodities and products in which it has a significant export interest.

3) US expects that solutions to problems involving temperate zone agricultural commodities and products will not include interim preferential arrangements where there are today no preferences accorded. It recognizes that, for certain commodities interim arrangements to assure maintenance of trade may be required. Such arrangements should provide comparable treatment for trade from all third countries.

Should there be exceptional treatment for Commonwealth trade involving certain commodities, we would expect this to be limited to cases where other third party interests are not of major importance.

US is fully prepared to play its part in carrying forward negotiations for more permanent arrangements aimed at maintaining international trade in agricultural products at satisfactory levels. On products not involving fixed tariffs in an enlarged EEC, US stands ready to negotiate special arrangements, including international commodity agreements, beginning with grains as the most important agricultural commodity. In US judgment, a conference to negotiate special arrangements for the maintenance of trade in grain should be convened immediately after the conclusion of an agreement between the UK and the EEC. As an interim measure pending the conclusion of these special arrangements, US believes that the Govts of the member states of the EEC should undertake not to raise their respective producer prices on grains.

US also wishes to state its willingness to negotiate in the World Grains Agreement Conference concerning its domestic price support level.

For commodities or processed foodstuffs subject to fixed tariffs, US anticipates that non-discriminatory solutions will be found, such as a reduction in the common external tariff.

US notes that it has existing rights and obligations in the agricultural field with respect to EEC. Some of these rights and obligations arise, or have been reserved, in connection with earlier negotiations and are not directly involved in UK-EEC negotiations. US looks forward to further discussions and negotiations with regard to these rights and obligations, and in that context, is prepared to discuss its own agricultural restrictions.

By same token, US expects that EEC will show a continuous awareness of its obligations to third country suppliers by pursuing reasonable price, production and trade policies.

4) With respect to association under terms and conditions of Part IV of Rome Treaty, US expects that this would continue to be confined to less developed countries having predominantly tropical economies.

5) In respect of industrial raw materials, US favors adoption of zero or low duties for these items wherever possible.

6) US wishes to make plain that, in any future tariff negotiations, it is prepared to accord an enlarged EEC appropriate credit on certain critical items in which the United States has a substantial export interest, such as industrial raw materials or processed foodstuffs, should a reduction in, or elimination of, the common external tariff for these items result in an unrequited benefit.

US has already informed certain of the Commonwealth countries that it is prepared to recognize that the trade benefits resulting from the elimination of margins of preference, which those countries presently accord imports from UK, would represent a valuable consideration to their credit in future tariff negotiations. End text.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375.800/7–3162. Secret; Eyes Only; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Vine, cleared by Schaetzel and the White House, and initialed by Ball.
1. On July 25 the Department of State asked Ambassadors Gavin, Bruce, and Butterworth about the wisdom of submitting to the United Kingdom and Common Market a written communication setting forth U.S. requirements in connection with the outcome of their negotiations. (Telegram 41 to Brussels; ibid., 375.800/7–2562) Bruce and Butterworth both counseled against a written communication. (Telegrams 375 from London, July 27, and Ecbus 119 from Brussels, July 26; ibid., 375.800/7–2662) No response from Gavin has been found.
2. Telegram 191 to Brussels, July 31. (Ibid., 375.800/7–3162)