46. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State0
Secto 66. Paris for Embassy and USRO; Brussels for Embassy and BUSEC. Following based uncleared Mencon is summary report Secretary’s conversation with German For Min Schroeder on European integration.1
- 1.
- Schroeder’s basic stress was on importance political aspect European integration movement. Common Market (even with British in) not itself unified Europe. Needed to develop “common bonds” as U.S. had in its federal institutions. This only way to solve major problems we face (possibly, though not explicitly, referring nuclear problem).
- 2.
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UK-EEC Negotiations.
Schroeder optimistic on outcome negotiations. Only real problem is find solution in spirit of Treaty which will leave open opportunities for Commonwealth exports (especially temperate agricultural products) after 1970; possible to deal with this through world-wide arrangements. Such solution feasible. Also stressed British need to wrap up negotiations by summer.
- 3.
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Political Union.
Schroeder referred difficulties caused by French withdrawal their own proposal on political integration, and later by Benelux insistence await outcome UK-EEC negotiations before agreeing Political Union Treaty. German position was that Six should proceed rapidly work out political arrangements among themselves in consultation with U.K. and on understanding U.K. would join Political Union as soon as Common Market issues settled. German Government favors speed: if political integration allowed to sleep, would push economic arrangements into front row and increase obstacles to further progress. Immediate task, therefore, was ask British persuade Benelux withdraw objections to immediate forward movement on political front.
- 4.
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Role of other Applicants.
Schroeder opened discussion entire subject with statement Rome Treaty contains offer of membership all European states prepared accept objectives and obligations of Treaty. Britain, Norway, Denmark, Ireland and Cyprus (sic) have applied membership, many others want [Page 111] association. In German view Common Market countries must be prepared discuss problem with all applicants and stand by offer once made in Treaty. Later in conversation Schroeder said rapid adoption political statute acceptable to British would make political problem soluble, “irrespective of exact arrangements which are made for other countries.”
Secretary replied we are not raising European integration problem in any detail on his trip as position well known and we feel our help at this stage intrusion. (Schroeder had earlier said he was glad we had avoided “excessive interest,” which might indeed create difficulties). Nevertheless, we hope U.K.-EEC negotiations would succeed and had good impression this subject in Paris. Despite potential economic difficulties resulting Common Market extension we recognize political gains potentially very large.
As country made up of immigrants from all over Western Europe, Secretary said, we inclined to be less skeptical than some of our friends on Continent about how fundamental differences among European countries really are. We also feel Britain has been becoming more and more European since war. Finally, Secretary commented we see current developments as major chapter in developing broader solidarity in Atlantic Community. This means unified Europe and U.S. should move together in concert with no hegemony or domination.