Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

449. Telegram From Hyannis Port to the Department of State⁰

Hyannis Port, May 11, 1963.

HYWH02–63. From Tyler. Following uncleared summary conversation, Friday, May 10. President and Prime Minister met Friday afternoon from 2:30 to 5 o’clock. Also present Ambassadors Ritchie and Butterworth, Tyler, Ed Ritchie and Basil Robinson. President showed Prime Minister Khrushchev’s reply to joint US-UK démarche on test ban.¹ Prime Minister commented reply obviously not very encouraging. He found it hard to make up his own mind in view of complexity of scientific factors. Said Macmillan more optimistic on means of detection than US Govt. Prime Minister noted that first part Khrushchev’s message very negative, but later appeared almost to be contradicting himself and not excluding possibility further discussions. Prime Minister said he hoped US would continue plugging away at test ban question even if outlook poor so as to reassure public opinion that every effort being made. Stressed sensitivity Canadian opinion to nuclear issue. Added that nevertheless Canadian Govt does not expect US Govt to accept anything which would prejudice its own security. President reaffirmed desire to get some solution this field and said that sentiment within administration ahead of Congress in this respect.

Conversation then turned to US-Canadian nuclear relations. Prime Minister affirmed his govt’s intention to fulfill commitments previously entered into by Canada. Said that note had been drafted in Ottawa which would be sent to President after Prime Minister’s return. He was hopeful that US Govt reply to this note would constitute agreement between governments. Considered that changes which Canadian Govt proposing were largely matter of wording for domestic political reasons, but felt confident substance would be acceptable to US Govt. Said that he would not be able to table text of any agreement because there would be secret clauses. Prime Minister said Canadian note would cover stockpiling for US, and equipment, including CF–104’s, Voodoos, Bomarcs and Honest Johns. Said that Canadian Govt would go ahead on this basis “and stand or fall by it.”

PM said he wished commitments had not been made in first place but this was water over the dam. He said he found greater difficulty with regard to stockpile for strategic weapons. President commented that latter was of lower priority. PM, in answer to President’s question re communiqué, said we should say that we have agreed to initiate negotiations at once which will permit Canadian Govt to move ahead, consistent with parliamentary procedures.

PM stressed desirability US Govt informing Canadian Govt ahead of time if any change is contemplated in military field. Canadian Govt had been embarrassed by testimony of Secretary of Defense re Bomarcs.² President commented testimony had been checked from security standpoint but not in terms of political implications. President suggested we might say that question of Bomarcs should be reviewed, and that if it were at any time decided to move to newer weapons, situation would be looked at again. PM stressed importance of Canadian air contribution in Europe which was second in importance only to that of United States.

The President and the PM then reviewed the established and institutional channels of communication between US and Canada such as the PJDB and Parliamentarians Committee and agreed that the work of these bilateral committees should be harmonized and brought into common focus. PM said his govt would be setting up Defense Committee in Canadian Parliament, and that he wanted increase consultation. He would like Foreign Minister Martin and Defense Minister Hellyer to go to Washington for talks. PM commented on one problem in Canadian public opinion: when US Govt moves US air squadrons to Canada, people ask why this should happen while Canadian squadrons are overseas in Europe. Also pointed out it costs much more to maintain military units in Europe than to raise them locally.

On defense production sharing, PM said present agreement³ working out very well, since Canada has favorable balance which important in light of Canada’s adverse trade balance of over $1 billion. President at this point drew on text of message received from Secretary of Defense⁴ and said we planned to go ahead as we now are. President said we should have conversations in this field. PM said he had been disturbed by possibility cancellation Caribou aircraft. President and PM agreed that Canadian Minister Defense Production should come to Washington for talks to discuss this and other matters relating to production sharing. President commented that Canadian balance of trade adverse but balance of payments was relatively much better. PM said that over 10-year period Canada had contributed equivalent of $6 billion to US balance of payments. President said that the West has more or less been living on the US balance of payments deficit for 10 years. It was agreed that no decision should be made on Caribou aircraft without consultation.

The President then gave the PM a rundown on Nassau and the MLF. He told PM that he had sent letter to Macmillan asking him to come in on MLF.⁵ Emphasized political significance of MLF in relation to European unity and to German role in Europe. PM said he had at first had doubts about military value MLF but was fully sympathetic to idea of its political role in relation to Germany. Said did not think it desirable for Canada to participate in MLF since there was much for Canada to do on this side of the Atlantic. On the other hand, PM was very sympathetic to IANF.

Expressed some worry that differences between UK and France might result in flare-up at NATO meeting. Hoped matter would not be pushed to point of open row with French. President said he hoped Canada would give its support to MLF and PM agreed and said he would “make good noises.” President said we would send PM briefing paper on where we stand with regard to MLF. Said he felt a better case for MLF could be made than had been done hitherto. PM commented there was some worry about the large part which Germans would play in MLF and President said it was better to have Germans in on that basis than to have them stay out.

With regard to trade matters, PM said that talks with Governor Herter in Ottawa⁶ had been very good and that Canadian Govt was always delighted to have people like him and Ambassador Merchant come to see them. He agreed that new approach was required in GATT and felt that linear tariff cut desirable. Stressed need for equivalent concessions in US-Canadian trade. Also stated that if there is to be failure at Geneva it won’t be Canadians’ fault. Paid tribute to imaginative concept embodied in TEA. Pointed out Canada has some difficulties with 50 percent cut because this does not help some of their trade problems. Ruefully admitted that enunciation of principle in opposition was wonderful, but application in practice sometimes difficult.

There was some discussion of Canadian oil exports. PM said northwest Canada must develop its economy on basis of oil exports and base metals. President mentioned that present agreement runs only for a few more months. PM hoped that conditions would provide for gradual increase Canadian oil exports, in view of Canada’s balance of payments problem. President referred to increase in District Five. Ritchie commented Canada considered District Five was free in any case, and that Districts One through Four were the important ones. President said he would be glad to have this matter discussed with Canadians by Feldman so that we could arrive at a joint prognosis for next two years. PM pointed out that from viewpoint security there was definite advantage to United States to have supply available on same continent. Also said that US owns over 60 percent Canadian oil so might as well take exports from Canada. Ambassador Butterworth pointed out that as far as security factor was concerned, US Govt had long recognized this, which was why we had allowed considerable expansion to take place in Canadian oil exports which had vitiated the other purposes of our quota control of imports.

With regard to US-Canadian trade balance, PM stressed heavy Canadian payments imbalance of $1,200,000,000. Canada does not want to discourage import of capital which has been most helpful to her economic development but fact remained that more than half Canadian industry owned by United States. Canada was going to take steps which would not penalize US investments, but would encourage Canadians to buy in, so as to have real sense participation. Said that US management Canadian properties getting more and more enlightened. PM said his govt going to set up Canadian development corporation with private as well as public capital.

President referred to great lakes labor union problem, and PM stressed his concern. Said SIU playing harmful role, specifically in person Hal Banks. President said he had talked with George Meany, and pointed out difficulties for US Govt to do anything. It was agreed between President and PM that Secretary of Labor and George Meany would meet at some unspecified time in near future with Canadian Minister of Labor and Canadian Labor Union leader Jodoin.

Referring to Latin America, PM said the new govt would continue the interest of previous govt in developing relations with Latin America. Said that “perhaps if we were invited to join OAS, and if circumstances very propitious, we might accept.” Recalled that during campaign, he had said that Liberals would give “sympathetic consideration” to possibility joining OAS. Said problem was that Canada already belongs to good many clubs and sometimes felt it was doing enough in terms of its resources. He said he personally would like to see Canada moving in direction greater involvement Western Hemisphere affairs. Canadian public opinion was divided on this point. He though Canada had certain assets in Latin America and was well regarded there. He wanted to wait until Canada obtained more specific conditions of admission and would have to weigh matter. For example, Canada would not want to have to play a role opposed to former British colonies. Cuba was discussed briefly. PM stressed US action last October very well received in Canada, and that he had been cheered during campaign when he referred to it. He felt United States was doing right thing: to continue to exert economic pressure on Cuba without provocation. President referred to possibility that Soviet Union might be willing to pay economic price required to make Cuban economy prosperous which would be adverse development. President said he attached great importance to warding off possibility of new Communist country being established in Western Hemisphere, especially on continent. PM said Canada intended to continue its diplomatic representation in Cuba but would be careful to avoid any statements implying approval of Cuban regime. PM said he had unfavorable impressions from his visits in Brazil and Mexico. He considered first “very rocky” while in the second he had found even non-Communist youth very excited about what is going on in Cuba.

President raised question of Canadian contributions to aid to LDC’s and commented that Canada seemed to have done relatively much better under Marshall Plan when its contribution was approximately 10 percent of that of United States. PM countered by pointing to Canadian adverse balance of payments. President asked whether Canada could do more in the India consortium. PM pleaded “financial mess” Canada found herself in but said Canada “would try to do better though she is undeveloped country.” Said that burden US was carrying was inseparable from power which we exerted in world affairs: “US calls the tune so let them pay the piper.”

President and PM met subsequently at PM’s house for drinks with US and Canadian press and held informal briefing with PM doing most of talking.

Conversations resuming 10 a.m. Saturday. General atmosphere talks excellent with Pearson giving repeated evidence his determination create and sustain cordial and frank relationship between two countries whose destiny closely linked by history as well as geography, while maintaining Canadian identity and defending Canadian interests.⁷

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Canada. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. Individual memoranda of the subjects discussed are in the Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2238. For two other accounts of this meeting and the one on May 11, see Lester B. Pearson, Mike, The Memoirs of The Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, vol. 3, pp. 100–102 and 111–113, and Charles Ritchie, Storm Signals, pp. 48–49.
1. For text, see vol. VI, Document 95.
2. On February 13 McNamara testified that the Bomarc missile would be useful in drawing Soviet missile fire away from other targets. The statement was released on March 29.
3. For text of the Defense Production Sharing Agreement, signed at Ottawa, June 12, 1961, see 12 UST 723.
4. Not found.
5. See Document 195.
6. Documentation on Herter’s visit to Ottawa, April 26–27, 1963, to discuss GATT and the Trade Expansion Act is in Department of State, Central Files, Pol 7 US/Herter.
7. On May 11 the President and the Prime Minister discussed the Columbia River project, air transport, the territorial sea, Canadian lumber and cheese, Laos, Jordan, and the Congo. Memoranda of these conversations are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2238. For text of the joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of the meeting, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 371–374.