Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

357. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State⁰

Paris, August 31, 1963, 3 p.m.

986. For Secretary from Ball. Pass White House. Following is report Under Secretary Ball’s August 29 talk with Salazar. Also present were Ambassador Coelho of Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Elbrick and Counselor Xanthaky.

The Under Secretary expressed his appreciation to Salazar for receiving him and handed him a letter from President Kennedy¹ which the Prime Minister read. He said that he had just recently discussed with President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk the question of Portuguese/American relations and misunderstandings which had arisen. Portugal and the US had enjoyed a long and close friendship and it is important that we clarify any misunderstandings and, while we may not be able to agree on all points, the Under Secretary said, it is probable that we can agree on a substantial number and make cooperation between the two countries more fruitful. If it was agreeable to the Prime Minister, he would endeavor to sketch for him the basis for the position adopted by the US regarding African problems. Ball realized that the two governments have different views and he wished to make it clear that the policy of the US must be considered within the framework of our overall responsibilities and the East/West conflict. After the Second World War, the US felt obliged to move into certain power vacuums created by the retirement of certain European countries from areas in which they had previously been vitally interested, e.g., Viet Nam, Laos, etc. In addition, the US had given billions of dollars to India and Pakistan to protect the sub-continent from communism and to meet what had previously been a British responsibility. We had considered it essential to move into these situations to prevent the communists from doing so.

The Under Secretary emphasized that the continent of Africa was only of marginal interest to the US as far as American national interests are concerned. We feel that commercial possibilities in Africa are limited and we have no large economic ambitions there. We have, however, taken an active interest in African affairs for fear that the continent might be subjected to communist penetration. He said he would like to emphasize again that of all the areas in the world Africa was the least important from the point of view of American national interests, but our role there must be viewed in the light of the East/West struggle. The Under Secretary recognized that the Portuguese Government adopts a different approach and has a long-standing vital interest in Africa after 500 years of occupation and a sense of mission in the area. We felt it is very useful to define clearly our separate points of departure, emphasizing that everything we do in Africa is in the fundamental interest of the protection of the free world.

The Under Secretary said that world political evolution since the Second World War has been greater than that of the previous three centuries. With the dismantling of colonial arrangements that existed for many years, a marked change occurred in the relations between the metropolitan powers and those colonial areas. He cited developments in north and central Africa affecting France, and developments in various areas which affect Great Britain. This movement of political evolution has achieved considerable momentum and must be regarded as a political fact of life. The speed of the movement has been fantastic and the change of relationships between the metropolitan powers and the indigenous peoples has been profound. Admittedly there has been considerable “breakage” in connection with these developments, but the amount of bloodshed involved has been very limited. In the development of our own foreign policy this nationalism has had to be recognized and an attempt made to exercise a certain control in order to channel the movement into useful directions. For this reason, the US could not permit itself to take rigid positions. There is no doubt that the communist powers are eager to exploit the situation for their own purposes. We do not say that we have been wise in everything we have done and we have probably made mistakes, but we have made a serious effort to employ such resources and influence as we possess in an effort to give direction to this evolution.

With regard to Portugal’s overseas problems, the Portuguese Government has managed to maintain its relations with the overseas territories with the least possible change. This very fact tends to concentrate pressure on Portugal at this time. The Under Secretary said that one point is very clear as far as President Kennedy is concerned, namely that Portuguese interests and influence in Africa should be preserved. It would be catastrophic if Portugal abandoned its territories there, and the agony which attended the birth of the Congo Republic should be avoided at all costs. France has been able to maintain with the countries of the UAM extremely useful and profitable relations and has also retained a large part of its interests in those countries. In like manner we feel that we should seek to help ensure the continuation of Portuguese influence in Africa.

The Under Secretary pointed out that the ideal of self-determination is a part of our constitutional heritage and that the idea of the consent of the governed is rooted in our past. It is true that in the UN, self-determination is frequently equated by many with independence—a thesis which we do not accept because it prejudges the ultimate outcome of self-determination. We must, however, encourage the operation of the principle of self-determination. As Ambassador Theotonio Pereira had pointed out in at least two speeches in the US, the Portuguese Government recognizes this principle as a matter of internal evolution. The Under Secretary had discussed this with the Foreign Minister today and President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk had also spoken to him about it.

The Under Secretary said that from the point of view of our long-term objectives he felt there was a large area of agreement. The major point which presented the greatest possibility of disagreement relates to the sense of urgency and the speed with which the evolutionary process takes place. We are persuaded that if this evolutionary process is to be channeled in a useful way some arrangement should be made for accelerating it and for telescoping the necessary actions into a fairly short period. The Under Secretary was not thinking in terms of months or even a year or two, but if we wished to avoid a situation where forces may get out of hand actions must be taken in a reasonable time span which would permit the evolutionary process to move very quickly by historic standards.

The Under Secretary assured the Prime Minister that the US Government is unhappy to be in opposition to Portugal, an old friend and NATO ally. We are prepared to assist and defend Portugal in accordance with our own constitutional principles and our analysis of the situation as it exists in Africa.

Dr. Salazar agreed that we seemed to proceed from different premises. He said the evolution in French and British overseas territories followed what the people themselves desired or what the metropolitan powers wanted. He had heard it said that the abandonment of India by Great Britain was a great piece of business because it relieved the British of the expense involved in maintaining the economy of the country and commerce between the two had increased. In Africa, however, the British found a very different situation. Indian culture was highly advanced and there existed a very fine civil service, which was not true in the African territories. Therefore, applying the same principles gave different results.

He did not propose to discuss French or British policy, however, but would confine his remarks to the Portuguese territories. There are several small territories and two large ones. The UN apparently considers all the territories to be equal and asserts that all should be independent (he noted in passing that the US had voted for a resolution which called for independence of all Portuguese territories). He said that the Cape Verde Islands have a population of 180 thousand; Portuguese Guinea, 500 thousand; Sao Tome, 100 thousand, and Timor and Macao with very small populations. It has always been the contention of the Portuguese Government that these territories could not maintain their independence but would be quickly annexed by neighboring states as in the case of Goa. Portuguese Guinea, for example would probably go either to Senegal or the Republic of Guinea. The UN demand for independence of these territories, therefore, can only mean annexation or absorption by others. It is not reasonable to maintain that one-half of the Island of Timor can be independent—but would automatically be absorbed by Indonesia which occupied the other half, and this is also true of Macao and Communist China.

The two large territories, however, Angola and Mozambique, could be independent nations. There is no problem here of lack of physical resources but only of human elements to maintain the territories as independent countries. The populations of both territories are made up of numerous tribes which the Portuguese Government has succeeded in encouraging to live in peace. These territories are not sufficiently developed, however, to offer a guarantee that they would not return to their previous primitive state if cast adrift. The situation in Africa has often been compared to the American revolutionary experience. Salazar felt that this was an absurd comparison because in the US it was the colonizers themselves who achieved independence whereas in Africa it is the colonized that are in question. There is no doubt that Angola and Mozambique may become independent states in the future but the question is when and how. The US is known to be greatly advanced in the science of social psychology but Salazar felt that we had not applied the principles we had learned to underdeveloped peoples. Angola is a very large area. Even if there were three to four thousand trained individuals capable of administering the territory, this would be inadequate for such a large area. He felt that if Angola were to become independent now the situation would be worse than that which had existed in the Congo.

Salazar felt that the US is partly responsible for the condition of African states today (which he described as chaotic). Ball had spoken of the winds of history, alluding to African nationalism.

He believed that in the greater part of Africa there is no nationalism. In Angola there is Portuguese nationality or nothing other than tribal identity. He felt that the problem is extraordinarily difficult and lamented the fact that the UN seemed to have been transformed into a forum for African representatives to call for independence which, in reality, does not exist in the African countries. He said this is perhaps just as well because the Africans could not administer themselves without outside assistance. There seems to be an illusion that an elite exists in such countries but it is actually very small. Europe and America furnish the technicians and administrators required but he did not believe that this is necessarily a good solution.

Salazar said that for many centuries the Portuguese have considered the overseas territories to be part of their country and they feel that the cutting off of those territories would leave no Portugal. Ball had spoken of maintaining Portuguese influence in Africa. If the territories became independent and if the new leaders would respect the Portuguese properties this might be possible but he pointed out that the French and the British had the financial “resources of the city” and the “bourse” in Paris to fall back on. Portugal, a poor country, could not compare with these two. He said that it is alleged that Portugal cannot develop the overseas territories but this is not true. In addition to Portuguese resources used for the purpose, foreign resources would be available and would be guaranteed by the Portuguese Government. If a political link continued to exist between the overseas territories and the metropole the government could continue to guarantee such investments but would not do so with [without] such a link.

Salazar said that the work of development of the African territories had only started at the end of the nineteenth century, unlike Brazil which had been developed by the Portuguese for 300 years before its independence. He said the US has a particular addiction to the idea of self-determination but before this principle can be applied the peoples themselves must be in a position to “determine”. The Africans seem to think that self-determination is the same thing as independence and have said so in the UN. Actually the self-determination that the African countries have in mind would be imposed from outside Angola and Mozambique. He could not understand, for example, why the African countries should wish to impose independence, through the UN or by force of arms on the two Portuguese territories.

Salazar said he was in agreement with the Under Secretary on the principle of self-determination which he interpreted as responding to the “consent” or “sentiment” of the people of the areas concerned. He did not know that he could agree with the other point regarding acceleration of the process. Are the inhabitants of the territories in a position to express their wants? While a certain number are entitled to vote in national and local elections, the electoral list is still small. As education increases and the economy develops, these lists will become larger. In metropolitan Portugal itself, he said, only 10 to 15 percent of the population is qualified to vote. He remarked that any election not complying with the fixed views of the African nations would not be recognized by them in any case. The Government of Portugal works in its own way and is attempting to raise the standard of living up to the point where the people can express their preference. The USG has great faith, he said, in the idea of the quick development of administrators, but Portugal, with its long experience in Africa, does not believe that this can be done. He said he was not absolutely certain that the natives of the African provinces could all be raised to the level of the white population, although it will be possible to create an elite to take over the administration.

Salazar said what we see now by way of administrative talent in Africa is pathetic. He said the mailman is now a Minister of Transport, a nurse Minister of Health, and a process server a high judge. He said he would like very much for the USG to use its influence to instill some sense of responsibility in the African countries, though it appeared that the US, like the UK, did not want to annoy the new countries. The new nations have no sense of responsibility and it seems imperative that someone call them to account. Portugal, a small nation, cannot do this, but the US supports some of the African Governments and could have some influence.

Salazar repeated that he agreed with Ball on the principle of self-determination and that the expression of the sentiments of the people involved could lead to a possible federation or confederation, or to other forms. The UN, however, is not in agreement and therefore Portugal’s only defense in this situation is to deny the UN the right to judge and to continue to disregard the African views in the UN. Portugal wants to save western civilization in Africa, but not to the extent of adopting precipitate political formulas for which the people are not prepared.

Salazar felt political changes will continue to occur in Africa and the powerful will absorb the weak, a solution which will give rise to a long period of war. He felt the western powers should think of safeguarding those territories which still remain intact.

Salazar said that he made this lengthy exposé to show the Under Secretary the problem and difficulties facing Portugal in Africa. He asked if the USG really believes that there is an internal nationalist movement in Angola. He said that the Portuguese Government had noted no such movement but had experienced invasions by terrorists from the Congo. On such a long frontier, he said, Portugal cannot prevent entry and departure of these individuals and he compared the situation with that which at one time existed between Algeria and Tunisia.

The Under Secretary said he was grateful for Salazar’s exposition and could agree with much of what he said. By way of illustrating what we have in mind with regard to self-determination, he cited the case of Puerto Rico which, until the 1930’s, had been neglected by the US. Under President Roosevelt, however, there had been a high level of development and a commonwealth relationship had been established which had been voted by the people of the area. He felt that if the people of Angola and Mozambique should choose some similar arrangement with Portugal it would be very beneficial. But like the Puerto Ricans they should have the option of independence open to them.

The Under Secretary said he agreed that self-determination is an objective and that the full and adequate expression of self-determination is not a possibility at the present moment. If 95 percent of the natives of Angola, for example, are illiterate, an expression of their views would mean little.

The solution seems to lie in the principle of evolution and education and in the progressively larger participation in local government. The fundamental point of difference he felt is the matter of timing, as he had told the Foreign Minister earlier in the day. He agreed that it was not possible to solve this problem overnight and that many new nations have been born prematurely, but the speed of evolution at this juncture is of great importance.

Salazar said that the US makes the African problem a political one whereas, for Portugal, it was a sociological one involving the proper preparation of the people of the areas. The Under Secretary said that we have already suggested we might assist in the problem of education and Salazar acknowledged that such an offer had been made, but that the Portuguese Government had not submitted detailed plans to the USG. These plans, he said, had been drawn up for both Angola and Mozambique but, because of complications in the UN, Portugal had seen fit to withhold them. Portugal is a poor, modest country which does not ask for help, he said, and he cited the fact that the Portuguese Government had refused economic aid in the first year of the Marshall Plan. He assumed that the American offer of assistance in education and in highway construction still stood, even though the Portuguese Government had not yet responded.

The Under Secretary said that we have discussed this matter of assistance in the field of education though pointed out the US did not furnish teachers in view of the language difficulty. Salazar said that money is important to build schools and to train personnel and to purchase school supplies. Salazar said that unfortunately Portugal was spending a great deal of money on defense, money which could otherwise be spent for more productive projects, and implied that progress in the field of increased education fell far short of his desires.

Under Secretary Ball said that he would like to clear up some apparent misunderstandings which had arisen recently. He said that the impression seemed to have gained ground in Portugal that the US is supporting Holden Roberto and he wanted to make it quite clear that this was not the case. He said that certain private organizations in the US had voiced support for Roberto but they had no connection with the Government and, he believed, had made no great financial contributions to Roberto. He wanted Salazar to understand that the USG had no jurisdiction over such groups.

Another misunderstanding concerned the recent action of the Leopoldville Government in recognizing Roberto’s group as the Angolan Government in exile. The Under Secretary understood that Youlou had said that we had suggested that Adoula recognize Roberto. The fact is that we had advised Adoula not to do so very strongly but he had gone ahead anyway.

Salazar said he believed the Under Secretary’s explanations of these matters but he found it difficult to understand why the USG could not oblige Adoula to follow US guidance. The Under Secretary said this would not be possible. We have had many difficulties with Adoula but from our point of view he is the best leader available for the Congo. For example, he had resisted efforts by the Soviet bloc to infiltrate the Congo. Adoula lives in a highly political atmosphere marked by great irresponsibility but if the US imposes its will on him, Adoula’s government would fall.

We must, therefore, handle him very gently. We try through persuasion to keep him on a sensible course and we find that sometimes he is reasonable but that sometimes he is an African politican.

Salazar found it strange that countries which had previously supported the MPLA should now recognize the Roberto exile group. He remarked that Roberto is a foreigner in Angola and that he does not even speak Portuguese. Therefore, he has no particular attraction for the Angolan people. He said perhaps recognition of Roberto might not be such a bad thing after all since he had no following in Angola.

Salazar spoke of the danger occasioned by the presence of UN troops in the Congo and the fact, as he stated it, that UN forces are giving or selling arms to Holden Roberto. From his point of view, he said, it would be preferable for the UN forces to leave quickly. The Under Secretary said that the USG is anxious to see the UN forces remain in the Congo for six months beyond the end of this year because the Congolese army is not reliable and the UN forces will have an important role in training that army.

It was agreed that the Under Secretary would meet again with Salazar at 11 a.m., Friday, August 30.²

Lyon

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D110, CF 2301. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Lisbon. For another account of this meeting, see George W. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, pp. 276–279.
1. Presumably a reference to President Kennedy’s letter of August 27, which thanked Salazar for receiving Ball. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D110, CF 2301)

2. In their second conversation Ball and Salazar continued the discussion and agreed that Ball would return for further talks on September 6 and 7. (Telegram 988 from Paris, August 31; ibid.) In commenting on his discussions in Lisbon, Ball stated:

   “As anticipated Salazar has strongly defended Portuguese colonial practices and his instincts on these matters are far different from ours. At the same time he is showing signs of recognizing need to move. He wants US friendship and support and I believe I have established basis of confidence with him without yielding any points of principle.” (Telegram 979 from Paris, August 30; ibid., Central Files, Pol 19 Port)