Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

358. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Norway⁰

Washington, September 10, 1963, 9:05 p.m.

171. Eyes only for Vice President.¹ On his return visit to Lisbon Sept 6–7, Under Secretary Ball met separately with Foreign Minister and Salazar.² Discussion centered around secret paper³ (existence of which being closely held) which Portuguese Govt had prepared following previous week’s discussion. Paper contained general observations relating principally to discussion of self-determination, statement on time factor, and section purporting to be a proposed program. In his final meeting with Salazar Under Secretary Ball gave his preliminary reaction to key points in paper. He said paper would be studied further in Washington and reactions conveyed through one means or another. Made following four points:

1. With regard to meaning of self-determination, Mr. Ball said in extreme African and some UN circles, self-determination regarded as synonym for independence. Appeared, however, that Portuguese have gone to opposite extreme, excluding from self-determination the option of independence but allowing other options.

2. US hoped Portuguese relations with peoples of their African territories could evolve so that Portuguese “presence, influence, and interests” might be continued in some form. Portuguese interpreted this as requiring continuance of political control. While US did not exclude possibility of preserving strong political connection, such as that between US and Puerto Rico, US would regard this as compatible with self-determination only if it represented free choice of peoples through mechanism under which other options also available. US could not agree that direct political control was essential to maintainence of Portuguese influence. Cited UK, French experience where overseas territories had become juridically independent states, yet metropoles were able to maintain presence and preserve commercial and economic interests. Cited French relationship with UAM states as example which might be a form through which Portuguese could maintain influence in overseas provinces.

3. US felt strongly that election rolls in countries with Negro majority should be expanded to ensure that that majority had adequate right of expression. Obviously, expansion of voting rolls could be achieved only over period of time and with intensive education.

4. Mr. Ball indicated there was a basic difference in US, Portuguese analysis of forces at work in Africa. US believes there are still moderate elements on the African scene who must be strengthened so as to check drive of extremists and radicals, but time is short. Might be possible to enlist support of moderates in progressive program towards self-determination within 10-year time span. Moderate elements do not wish to move too fast in Angola and Mozambique for fear of another Congo; however, if moderates cannot see in Portuguese plans type of progress they can support in order to restrain extremists, they will be silent. Under resulting chaos, within 5 or 6 years Portugal might find it too costly in lives and money to maintain its presence in Africa. Such an event would be catastrophic for all of us.

Salazar thanked Ball for frank reactions to Portuguese paper, but questioned some interpretations. Responded along following lines:

1. Portuguese did not exclude independence from consideration of self-determination. He said that the greatest difficulty was that the Africans, within a certain time limit, are not in a position to opt for anything of substance. If allowed to develop peacefully, everything was possible, including independence.

2. Portuguese believed their presence, influence and interests cannot continue in Africa without political link between metropole and overseas territories. Said link between French and British and their former colonies depended on funds available to be expended in now independent countries to maintain link. Previously he had indicated Portugal has no such resources.

3. Cited large Negro majority in Mozambique and Angola, predicting that eventually electoral lists would reflect this situation. If multi-racial society could proceed in peace, should be possible for whites to vote for blacks and blacks for whites. If not, racists would take over and whites would be excluded from government. Portuguese system was to require minimum of education or some economic position before allowing people to enter electoral rolls. Under this system, would take some time for reversal of majority on rolls to take place. On the other hand, if Portugal proceeded with any other system, the new selfgoverning territories would fall into the hands of a dozen leaders very quickly and the electorate would vote for something they did not understand. Would be impossible to expand electoral lists quickly without prejudice to the future of Angola; Angola could not remain as a unit if lists expanded quickly, even with UN forces there, but would be quickly divided on tribal basis into “many Katangas.” Portugal still defends its desires to continue multi-racial society in which best people will be chosen to run; in Africa now only the African is chosen.

4. While he understood US preoccupation with the fate of moderate leaders in Africa, before US or Portuguese could take action, there would be no more moderates left. Cited recent plot against Houphouet-Boigny, and ouster of Youlou, saying this would happen to all moderates as long as natives believe they must have democratic system without preparation. Said populations of countries where moderates are in control are being poisoned by vicious elements, including Communists, while extremists (Nkrumah, Nasser, and Ben Bella) hold complete power in their countries. While US stressed necessity of having support of moderate elements, he could reply only that soon they would not exist. Portuguese consider extremism has no roots among great majority of African peoples but was caused by small number of agitators. If there were true spirit of national independence, would not be possible for army of 40-thousand to resist more than 4-million. Portuguese considered most African peoples perfectly in accord with Portuguese position. Claimed Holden Roberto would not live for five minutes after arriving in Angola.

Salazar acknowledged that he was a conservative—a reactionary—who believed all South America had become independent earlier than it should have and that the US was now suffering the consequences of this premature independence. He asked what we could expect in Africa which was two-to-three-hundred years behind South America. He opined that, if present trends continued, Africa would either return to the jungle or be recolonized—he saw no escape from these consequences.

Salazar understood Ball had reacted only to brief study of Portuguese paper and hoped he would give Portugal his views after careful study. Expressed his gratitude to President for sending Ball to carry on discussion with Portuguese. Under Secretary assured Salazar he would give careful study to paper and to Prime Minister’s views which had been helpful in clarifying paper. Said problem was a serious matter for the US which he would discuss with President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk. Expressed appreciation of the President and himself for Salazar’s kindness in giving him so liberally of his time. It was agreed US and GOP would continue these discussions in Washington when Foreign Minister comes to US for UNGA sessions.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, Pol 19 Port. Secret; Priority.
1. Vice President Johnson visited northern Europe September 2–17.
2. Memoranda of Ball’s conversations with Salazar and Nogueira on September 7 are in Department of State, Central Files, Pol 7 US/Ball and Pol 10 Port.
3. A copy of this paper was attached to airgram A–135, September 18; ibid., Pol 19 Port.