Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

356. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State⁰

Lisbon, August 29, 1963, 10 p.m.

213. For Secretary from Ball.¹ Please pass White House. Following is summary of luncheon meeting with Foreign Minister today at which we had frank preliminary exchange of views. Fuller version will follow August 30.²

I opened by setting our position toward Africa in context of East-West struggle and defining differences between premises of Portuguese approach and our own.

I assured Foreign Minister of US interest in preservation Portuguese presence Africa. I said there seemed be measure of agreement on question of self-determination, but after lengthy consideration was of view key element of disagreement was time factor. I said we shared Portuguese objection to equating self-determination with independence which had effect of prejudging exercise.

Foreign Minister stated Portuguese did not fear power African nationalism but considered issue being exploited by communists and implied US policies aggravate problem. He said that unfortunately it was his impression present US administration felt it was working in favor Portugal because their policies more realistic.

He said he considered that Ben Bella threats to send volunteers and arms were empty. I disagreed and told him threats such as those made by Ben Bella might be prompted by demagoguery, but could be effective and could cause increasing trouble in Portuguese Africa as even moderate leaders would have to adopt like measures in order preserve their own position. I reminded him that even most responsible African leaders today were under compulsion to consolidate positions at home by taking strong position against Portuguese, South Africans, etc. I said that even if US accepted hypothetical position that it could cease support African aspirations in Africa such action would result in destruction moderate leaders and takeover by extremists.

During conversation Foreign Minister announced that Portuguese Ambassador at UN today handed U Thant invitation to come to Lisbon for discussions. He said Portuguese had initiative and intended to keep it, citing invitation to SYG and other steps which they intend to take. I agreed that initiative was important in that it created atmosphere of credibility to declared Portuguese intentions and gave sense of motion but told Foreign Minister in all frankness Portuguese would have to think in terms of some practical time schedule such as outside figure 10 years and make consistent and visible progress during interim. This prompted Foreign Minister to go into rather lengthy presentation as to why it would be impossible for Portugal to think in terms of self-determination within such a time framework. He insisted that responsible whites and blacks in Angola and Mozambique, for example, would not accept such proposal and that this was a matter that even Salazar could not control. I told him that I had heard similar views expressed by the French both in the metropole and in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia during years before independence. I mentioned that the French also had had deep sense of civilizing mission. I pointed out that events had brought about a change even in Algeria, but, unfortunately, it had come about only after a long and agonizing struggle which had left us with Mr. Ben Bella. The Foreign Minister assured me that the two situations were not at all comparable but gave no facts to support this position.

In conclusion, Foreign Minister indicated his view that US policies in Africa and elsewhere were detrimental to the position of the West and that as a result the West was weaker rather than stronger. I, of course, took issue with him on this, stating that the wave of anti-colonialism was a political fact that could not be ignored. I described its origins. I said that it had developed momentum during difficult time of East-West competition. It was proceeding at fast pace, and some breakage was inevitable. I told him that I thought that because Portugal was one of the last remaining European powers in Africa to give effect to change pressure was being concentrated on it and that pressure would increase. The Foreign Minister professed to see the only way out of the situation as I outlined it was the abandonment of their overseas provinces. I termed this a bad rather than a good way to terminate the unfinished business.

Toward close of conversation Foreign Minister delivered lengthy statement on difficulty of any progress being made on territories problem in UN. He said concession there only led to further impossible demands from the insatiable Africans who equated self-determination with immediate independence for peoples unprepared to govern. He said that when serious problems arose between the great powers—the US and USSR principally—they were settled outside of UN. He said that in settling such problems outside of UN, result was that difficulties on them within the UN settled themselves. He then suggested rather clearly that if Portugal and the US could reach an understanding on the territories problem outside of the UN, UN difficulties would disappear. I felt he was suggesting a possible approach, but subsequent probing revealed no details, and he did not pursue matter further.

In conclusion, I told Foreign Minister I did not despair of ability two governments come to agreement although it would be difficult. If we could agree on program and timing of action, US prepared absorb some damage to our other interests in order be helpful. I said, however, that our two views still seemed far apart, particularly on timing question. I also added that I would like to think over our conversation overnight and see Foreign Minister again tomorrow before my departure.³

Elbrick

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, Pol 19 Port. Confidential; Priority.
1. On August 15 Elbrick was informed that the President had decided to have Ball visit Lisbon. (Telegram 134 to Lisbon; ibid., Pol 7 US/Ball) Ball’s instructions, which stated that his mission was to explore relations between the two governments with particular reference to the problems raised by the Portuguese territories, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2301.
2. Transmitted in telegram 985 from Paris, August 31. (Ibid.)
3. In their second conversation on August 30 Ball and Nogueira went over much of the ground covered in their first. Ball also asked the Foreign Minister to look into the question of military assistance material being used in Portuguese African territories. (Telegram 987 from Paris, August 31; ibid.)