355. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy0
This is in response to your memorandum of July 31, 1963,1 requesting my thoughts on what action we would take in the event of the loss of the Azores base.
I can see three possibilities with respect to the continued use of the Azores base: (1) that its use would be limited solely to NATO related activities both in peacetime and wartime; (2) that its use would be restricted to serious crises involving NATO, and (3) that we would be denied its use for all purposes. I have assumed Case (2), that it would be available to us in case of a serious NATO crisis but not in peacetime. Since we may become involved in non-NATO contingencies in which we now plan to use the Azores, this memo deals mainly with those actions which would be necessary under this possibility.
Present Facilities and Uses
Our facilities in the Azores consist of the major Air Force Base at Lages, Naval Air Facilities at Lages and at Santa Maria, port and support facilities on Terceira, Santa Maria, San Miguel and Graciosa Island. We have 3323 personnel manning these facilities, 1763 of them are U.S. military. The facilities provide for an en route MATS stop in support of its peacetime and wartime airlift responsibilities, a base for tankers used in air refueling of strategic and tactical aircraft, CINCLANT’s anti-submarine warfare and surveillance operations, en route air-ground communications and an alternate route for trans-Atlantic communications.
Air Operations—Peacetime, Wartime—Near and Long Term
There has been a downward trend in our use of Lages in the past several years which stems from the increasing range of our transport aircraft and the greater use of air refueling of our tactical and strategic aircraft from CONUS. During the 12-month period ending March 1962 the monthly average number of landings at Lages was 537, while in the 15 months through June 1963 this figure dropped to 442. We can, in any case, expect a continued gradual reduction in the future.
The most important planned usage of the Azores base is in the event of a limited war. The planned usage, in support of 20 separate contingency plans in Africa and the Middle East, would involve about 2800 [Page 966] landings during a 30-day period based on the movement of one Army division-air wing personnel and equipment.
If we were denied the use of the Azores we would re-route much of our peacetime and crisis traffic along the northern route. Part of this traffic would pass through our Newfoundland bases (Harmon, Argentia and Gander) to Prestwick, Scotland, and thence to European, Middle East or African destinations. Some aircraft such as the C–130 would be routed non-stop from Newfoundland bases to Continental destinations. (Even with the Azores available a large proportion of these aircraft would follow this non-stop route.) South Atlantic re-routing is quite inefficient. There is a loss of about 50 percent of the airlift capacity quite apart from anticipated difficulties with base and overflight rights in South America and Africa.
[Here follow details on the impact of re-routing and sections on tanker aircraft and ASW operations.]
Communications
The communications facilities in the Azores provide a significant portion of the Atlantic area air-to-ground coverage in conjunction with stations at Harmon; Croughton, England; Torrejon, Spain; and Kindley, Bermuda. This coverage includes control of aircraft, weather-reconnaissance reporting, search and rescue transmissions. In addition, long-range point-to-point communications facilities are used for the control and movement of aircraft across the mid-Atlantic, weather reporting and relay, support of SAC alerting and control systems and as an alternative routing of communications traffic when trans-Atlantic cables are inoperative or when atmospheric disturbances preclude transmissions in the North Atlantic.
Denial of the Azores would necessitate increasing the capacity and extending the coverage of the four remaining air-to-ground stations, mentioned above, to compensate for the loss of the Azores; reallocation of frequencies from the Lages facility to these other stations; renegotiation with nations concerned to clear frequencies for use in their areas; and realigning North Atlantic weather reconnaissance tracks to insure communications coverage now provided by the Lages facility. The long-range point-to-point communications capability at the Azores could be replaced by expansion of the existing high frequency radio systems connecting the North American continent with Europe and Africa, complementing the present submarine cable routes and the North Atlantic tropospheric scatter system.
Manpower
An initial look at the manpower situation indicates that the increased requirements at alternate locations which would be involved in [Page 967] our withdrawal from the Azores could be accommodated by reallocation of personnel resources from the Azores, and Bermuda, where a reduction in activities will result. However, if we wish to retain a ready capability for using the Azores in NATO contingencies, we might keep the base on a standby status which would involve keeping some personnel there for caretaker duties.
Availability of Spanish Bases
The loss of the Spanish bases in addition to the Azores facilities, following the evacuation of the Moroccan bases, would pose additional problems. For example, TAC fighters flown non-stop from the U.S. to European and Middle East bases over the generally favorable mid-Atlantic route would be re-routed over the North Atlantic with attendant weather and air space saturation problems. Recovery of tankers, now accomplished at Spanish bases, would have to be done at Wheelus or on French bases. The Navy would be forced to operate its ASW carriers and patrol aircraft and support them from the Western Atlantic, Iceland and the U.K. The loss of Spanish bases would further exacerbate the communications problems produced by the loss of the Azores.
Summary
In summary, if we lose the Azores base we will re-route our transport aircraft via Newfoundland bases to Prestwick, or to European destinations if they have non-stop capabilities. Tactical aircraft will be flown non-stop over the mid-Atlantic route and refueled en route by a buddy KC–135 tanker. ASW activities will be moved to Rota. Airground communications capabilities at Lages will be absorbed by stations at Harmon, Croughton, Torrejon and Kindley. Point-to-point communications capabilities will be compensated for by expansion of the existing high frequency radio system from the North American continent to Europe and Africa.
[1 paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified]
Detailed actions, costs and timing involved in this planned contingency for the loss of the Azores base are being prepared.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Portugal, Azores Base. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.↩
- Document 353.↩