Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

354. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, August 2, 1963, 2:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Portuguese Explanation of Fragoso Démarche

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Mr. Alberto Franco Nogueira, Portuguese Foreign Minister
• Ambassador Pedro Theotonio Pereira, Portuguese Embassy
• Mr. William C. Burdett, EUR
• Mr. Francis E. Meloy, Jr., WE

The Portuguese Foreign Minister, accompanied by Ambassador Pereira, called on the Secretary following intimations given Ambassador Stevenson in New York that he would welcome an invitation. Franco Nogueira said he wished to come directly to the matter on his mind. He had jotted down a few points on the plane coming from New York so that he would not forget. He was sure the Secretary said he was aware of the “misunderstanding” of the last few days. The Secretary said he was aware of the démarche made by Mr. Fragoso and of the shaking repercussions it had caused in Washington. Franco Nogueira said he was referring to this. He wished to make a matter of record that both he and Portugal had the highest respect and consideration for the President not only as the leader of the Free World but also as a person and an individual. He was not saying this just because of this misunderstanding. He hoped Ambassador Elbrick had reported previous conversations in Lisbon in which he had said the same thing. He has always had such views. The Secretary could ask Burke Elbrick to confirm this. He was not trying to patch matters up or to flatter the President. Franco Nogueira said “let me put a question to you. Do you think it in our interest to offend the President or to offend the United States? Surely not! If this was done it must have been done inadvertently”.

Franco Nogueira said he was sure the United States has confidence in Ambassador Elbrick. Portugal also has confidence in him. There must, however, have been some reporting error. He was sure Fragoso was speaking of the overall situation in the United Nations. Portugal holds the United States largely responsible for this. There was no intention of offending the President. Franco Nogueira said: “This I would like to have the opportunity of saying in person to the President”. It is unbelievable that we intended to affront the President or that he should be offended by remarks made by the Director General of Political Affairs in the Portuguese Foreign Office even though this man is a responsible official.

The Secretary rejoined that the President did not believe that the remarks had been directed at him personally. Franco Nogueira said “not even officially as President”? The Secretary said the President has been working hard personally to ameliorate this situation. The problem has posed itself in more acute form since the Addis Ababa Conference.¹ As the result of discussions the Africans have cut back their position but not far enough in our view. The African resolution before the Security Council, however, was a far cry from what started out at Addis Ababa. The United States took lots of lumps and bruises and expended much credit but it was in the direction of ameliorating the resolution. To hold the United States responsible for the African resolution before the Security Council is not acceptable.

The United States does take responsibility for the improvement in the African position and for the difference between the African views at Addis Ababa and the resolution passed by the U.N. We still did not find the resolution acceptable, however, and we could not vote for it. The Portuguese should realize that the President had intervened on several occasions to try to moderate the African position. For example, he had spoken to Nyerere.² Hence it was only natural that he should have a strong reaction to the fact that Portugal blamed the U.S. for the African resolution. The Secretary said he had spoken frankly to make the Foreign Minister understand.

Franco Nogueira said he had not known the history in such great detail. The Portuguese may be suspicious, but the impression at the U.N. and in the press was not precisely in keeping with what the Secretary had said. Serious newspapers like Le Monde and Figaro had said that the USUN delegation wanted to go much further but that the Department and perhaps the White House had restrained the U.S. delegation. Frankly, Portugal had the same impression.

The Secretary said “do you mean we were trying to strengthen the African resolution”?

Franco Nogueira said not the U.S. Government, not the U.S. Delegation, not Ambassador Stevenson. However, we believe the U.S. Delegation or some members of it let it be known they would support a strong resolution. “There are ways of doing this indirectly”. There are always “ghosts” who can let this word get around. Other delegations, including the Venezuelan Delegation had this impression. This was the general impression of the U.N. delegations and of the press and Portugal shared this view. However, if the Secretary told him this was not so than it was not so and this would end the conversation.

The Secretary said it was true that the Venezuelan resolution was an improvement but it was still not enough of an improvement for the U.S. to accept. Franco Nogueira said it may have been “better” but not from the Portuguese view. He said Portugal must understand U.S. policy and the U.S. must understand Portuguese policy. You wanted to moderate the resolution, we wanted as, extreme a resolution as possible so that it would be rejected. We are not accusing Ambassador Stevenson but it was the impression in New York that some members of the U.S. Delegation were ready to support a strong resolution. We do hold the U.S. responsible for the overall situation in the U.N. This is what was meant by the Fragoso démarche.³

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, Pol Port-US. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Meloy and approved by S on August 8. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.
1. The Conference of African Heads of State and Government held at Addis Ababa, May 22–26.
2. President Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika visited Washington July 15–16.
3. Rusk and Nogueira also discussed the U.S. attitude on self-determination and the possibility of the United States sending a special Presidential envoy to Lisbon to talk with Salazar. Memoranda of these parts of the conversation are in Department of State, Central Files, Pol Port-US.