336. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State0
745. For the Secretary. I spent an hour with Franco Nogueira last night in an effort to learn what moves Portuguese Government might make next, particularly in connection with UN. As I had expected, I found him extremely bitter and unreconstructed (though at no point did he renew Salazar’s threat to withdraw from UN).
I asked him how he expected to deal with Angolan item to be debated this month in UNGA and I inquired particularly whether he expected to attend. He said he would not be present and would leave Portuguese representation entirely up to Garin.1 I told him I was sorry to hear this, referring to your conversation with him last November2 and hope expressed at that time that Portugal would make forthcoming statement in GA re overseas reforms and their intentions for future. I reminded him that such a statement would make it possible for Portugal’s friends to offer some support against attacks of extremists. This produced an immediate and unpleasant reaction. Nogueira said US has been constantly pushing Portugal to take various and successive steps in connection with overseas territories, but so far had offered nothing in return. He said he had asked you in Paris3 and had subsequently asked me exactly what US would be prepared to do to help Portugal and had never received any definitive reply. He saw no purpose, therefore, in following our suggestions re tactics in UNGA. Speaking personally, he said that Portugal has lost all confidence in US. He said our “carrot and stick” tactics had thoroughly antagonized people here. Fact is, he said, encouragement we offer Portugal on one hand is always nullified by unfriendly acts on the other.
It is apparent that our vote on December 19 on resolution condemning Portugal for failure to cooperate with UN in overseas matters, coming immediately after our efforts to prevent forcible take-over of Goa, rankles greatly. Moreover, Nogueira feels that we did not bring sufficient pressure to bear on Nehru and that outcome of Goa affair would have been quite different if we had. He read to me excerpts from a report (source unknown, but it was written in French) which alleged that Ambassador Galbraith, by expressing to Nehru sympathy for Indian cause, [Page 918] had actually encouraged Indian invasion of Goa. Nogueira expressed interest in seeing copy of letter which he understood had been transmitted by Galbraith to Nehru,4 setting forth US Government’s concern over threat to use force. I said letters to and from heads of government cannot be released to third parties, as he knew. I told him, however, as I had told him before, that concern of President and Government of US over use of force had been expressed most clearly to Nehru.
I again asked what course Portugal would follow in UN. I pointed out it would serve no purpose for Portugal to boycott UN proceedings which would only result in even greater isolation and more violent attacks by some UN members. Nogueira said this seemed to worry US, but did not worry Portugal. He did say Portugal, realizing it cannot “go it alone” with any success, will take other actions in its defense, but he refused to describe them.
Nogueira was in a very unreasonable frame of mind. He said he felt US was working against Portugal, that dialogue which had begun so promisingly between us last year had produced nothing, that US is trying to achieve economic domination of Africa by its present policies, and he would not be surprised if US were trying to bring about political change in Metropolitan Portugal. I rejected these statements emphatically and pointed to fact we had always expressed desire to be of help to Portugal in most difficult situation. Nogueira merely replied he could no longer give any credence to such assurances. I asked him if Portuguese Ambassador in Washington were being instructed to present these views to you. He replied in negative, saying this was personal conversation and should be considered off the record. He saw no particular reason to express these views officially, since views of Portuguese Government in past had made no impression on US Government.
Toward end of this long and highly disturbing conversation, I pleaded again with Nogueira to reconsider position re handling of Angola item in UNGA. I said I thought he should appear personally in New York and that he should not dismiss so casually need for some forthcoming statement from Portugal. As I had indicated in past, US Government most anxious for Portugal to do something in its own behalf which US could support. Nogueira said he did not believe such statement would cause US to change its attitude in any respect. US would, he thought, continue to vote for resolutions condemning Portugal’s practices overseas, regardless of facts as presented by Portugal. He understood we were already working with others on so-called “moderate” resolution re Angola and claimed he had already seen text (source unknown). [Page 919] He was caustic in upbraiding US for not having had courtesy discuss such resolution in advance with Portuguese Del in New York.
Before leaving, I again expressed hope Nogueira would attend UNGA and I presented as vigorously as possible arguments in favor of full and forthcoming statement re overseas territories. Nogueira said it might be possible for him to attend end of Angola debate, though thought obviously did not please him.
Nogueira has just telephoned me to say government has decided to make lengthy statement at outset of Angola debate. This statement would include, inter alia, chapter on overseas reforms, their significance and Portugal’s intentions for future. I said I was very glad to hear this. Apparently some of my arguments did not go unheeded. I can only hope that this effort will serve to close somewhat the gap between us.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.53/1–1262. Secret; Priority.↩
- Vasco Vieira Garin, Portuguese Representative to the United Nations.↩
- See Document 329.↩
- See Document 334.↩
- Not further identified.↩