334. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State0
Secto 44. Re Secto 37.1 Secretary had further talk with Nogueira today prior latter’s return to Lisbon.
Nogueira raised recent démarche by Ambassador Elbrick,2 clearly under instructions perhaps sent after Secretary’s departure, in which reaffirmation US support Portuguese against forceful aggression on overseas territories linked to “prompt and dramatic” declaration on Portuguese acceptance self-determination.
After Secretary confirmed his awareness démarche, Nogueira expressed surprise this action which negated assurances support against use of force. Secretary replied by repeating Portuguese depriving selves of best defense by withholding “Regerias.” Nogueira said he might accept this as respects Angola, but not Goa, where political life already advanced, elections having been held last month with nearly 80 percent participation. The only step left in Goa would be to turn it over to Indians. Secretary commented that if comparable vote proved Goans chose remain Portugal, this would be best defense, to which Nogueira responded along lines taken yesterday (reference telegram). Thus second half Elbrick démarche demolished first part. If Portuguese follow this advice, no question but that Goa down drain in three months. Secretary cited US approaches to Nehru and U Thant, and assured Nogueira we considered our views in Portugal’s own long-range self-interest in overseas possessions, to which Nogueira expressed appreciation. Secretary added no one but Portugal was going to fight India for Goa. This was fact of life which made political solution essential. He agreed with Nogueira India no more likely to pay attention UN action re Goa than re Kashmir. To Nogueira’s urging put teeth into warnings to Nehru against use force, Secretary commented no question Indian relations with US and others would suffer, even though not in sense specific sanctions, and Indian world position would be tarnished.
Nogueira argued if US believed in Portugal’s serious purpose, as he believed case, must give them confidence. Repeated if they followed our advice, would have several “Congos” in six months. Secretary insisted [Page 915] Portuguese not making their best case and case others could support. Nogueira replied Portuguese in fact taken many steps and under US insistence considering departure from their established principles. If they did so, what would US in fact do? Would US support Portugal as having made good case? He wondered.
Secretary responded Portuguese entitled to answer this question. He did not want to answer offhand, though we could say reform program should be given chance. However, he asked Nogueira to give Elbrick full outline so he could consider in detail our return Washington.
Nogueira agreed to this, but repeated Portuguese regarded last démarche as great step backward, offsetting previous assurances. This matter great concern to GOP. They had taken steps as urged but need something on other side. If Nehru takes Goa there will be grave repercussions in Portugal and Portuguese Government and possibility fundamental change in foreign policy.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12–1561. Secret. Also sent to Lisbon, New Delhi, and USUN.↩
- Secto 37, December 14, reported that Rusk, who was in Paris for the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting December 13–15, had discussed with Nogueira various possible courses of action on the question of Goa, including an approach to Nehru. He stated that the United States was doubtful that any of these steps would have any real restraining effect on India. (Ibid., 753.00/12–1461)↩
- Not further identified.↩