Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

337. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State⁰

Lisbon, February 13, 1962, 8 p.m.

825. For the Secretary. Reference: Department telegram 649 and Embassy telegram 822.¹ Following his reply to my démarche today (which he emphasized was all he could say to me officially), Nogueira proceeded to discuss overseas problems and Port-American relations at length. He was careful to label this discussion “personal and informal”. While some of his remarks, for this reason are far more extravagant than would normally be the case, I think they give a fair indication of problem we face here.

Nogueira’s mood was, if anything, even less encouraging than that reported in Embassy telegram 745 of January 12.² He made some charges against US as before. He even said he was aware high officials of State Department (not including Secretary Rusk for whom he has high regard) have adopted attitude that US can do anything it wants with Portugal inasmuch as latter has “no place to go”. He said he is aware that some seem to be counting on Portugal’s economic collapse but he said Portugal is stronger than we think.

He found it curious that US should be advising friendly governments not to lend money to Portugal. I asked him for explanation of this extraordinary remark, reminding him that you had already expressed interest in encouraging investment from various foreign sources in Portugal, but got no satisfaction.

Nogueira went to great lengths to impress me with his apparent conviction, despite my emphatic attempts at rebuttal, that US policy is motivated by desire for American “take over” of Portuguese African territories. In his opinion, US is responsible for organizing and leading attacks on Portugal. He pointed to moral and material aid and comfort which he says US is giving to Holden Roberto and UPA and commented on my previous statement re report of imminent and more massive rebel military action in Angola (numbered paragraph three of reference telegram) that US Government is obviously in a better position to know about this. He refuses to accept denial of US Government support for Roberto. Warming to this subject, Nogueira showed me correspondence between American and Portuguese Consulates in Salisbury re student visas for individuals from Mozambique. He cited one case in which Portugal has refused to validate prospective student’s passport for travel to US for reasons of national security. US Government has ignored this and had issued substitute travel document. Nogueira considered this not only unfriendly act but definitely “hostile”. He apparently links some of these students to Roberto’s subversive organization.

At one point, Nogueira (who was calm and dispassionate throughout) said US seems to be employing its great power to force Portugal to capitulate. He said only course open to Portugal, therefore, is to seek an alignment which would offer Portugal protection. When I asked him what this might be, he declined to answer.

I told Nogueira I could not agree in anyway with his assessment of situation. I said US Government wished to use its power to help and not oppose Portugal, but that Portugal must take some steps in its own defense in order to make this possible. I repeatedly reminded Nogueira of state of world opinion on issue of Portugal’s overseas territories as refleeted in UNGA vote. He did not seem concerned and merely said that “world opinion would change.” He ironically asked why US did not use some of its power to restrain excesses of some of countries in Africa such as Mali and Guinea, a rhetorical question which he answered by saying it was not expedient for US to do so.

Nogueira said at one time he had been encouraged to hope for American understanding and support, but that he is now disillusioned. When, at one point in our conversation, I reminded him of our offer to assist in economic and social fields, he dismissed it with remark that Portugal acquiescence in policies apparently envisaged by US Government could not be bought for a few million dollars.

While prepared for a cool reception at this time for US proposals of supplementary economic assistance, I am alarmed by this demonstration of Portugal’s intransigence. At one point during conversation Nogueira went so far as to say that US policy toward Portugal left no room for any cooperation between the two countries. He expressed this as considered view of Portuguese Government and said there would be no improvement in situation unless there were a change in US policy. I reminded him that US has always held firmly to policy of self-determination and it would be illusory to think any change such policy in UN is possible.

Ambassador Theotonio Pereira is due to return to Washington within next week or ten days. I recommend that you see him at an early date if possible and impress him with US concern. In my recent talks with him here he has been far more reasonable than Nogueira.³

Elbrick

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.53/2–1362. Secret; Limit Distribution.
1. Telegram 649, February 9, noted that the recent vote in the United Nations indicated that the opposition to Portuguese overseas policy was nearly unanimous and asked Elbrick to urge Nogueira to change it. (Ibid., 611.53/2–962) Telegram 822, February 13, reported that Elbrick had an appointment to see the Foreign Minister. (Ibid.)
2. Document 336.
3. In telegram 830 from Lisbon, February 15, Elbrick offered his comments on the conversation with Nogueira and concluded that it served again to emphasize the “profound lack of confidence in US policy on part of high Portuguese officials.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.53/2–1562)