Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

162. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany⁰

Washington, December 21, 1962, 5:32 p.m.

1436. For Ambassador. Info Paris USRO for Finletter. A central element in our approach to the Skybolt problem has been to see that the agreements reached gave full account to the interests of our other European allies and particularly to the Germans. It is therefore of the greatest importance that you see Schroeder and convey this message to him, covering the following points.

1. A major aspect of the Nassau agreement¹ is to commit both the US and UK to the development of a NATO multilateral force. While this does involve American assistance on the missile component of the British strategic force it does not involve the provision of warheads and it is dependent on the British construction of the submarines.

2. But the point to be stressed with the Germans is that a major new line of policy has been unfolded at Nassau with both Britain and America, quoting article 7 of the agreement, “Agreed that the purpose of their two governments with respect to the provision of the Polaris missiles must be the development of a multilateral NATO deterrent force in the closest consultation with other NATO allies and that they will use their best efforts to this end.”

3. You can tell Schroeder that we contemplate that participation in the proposed multilateral force may be available to non-nuclear member nations of NATO through the contribution of personnel and resources for the operation of nuclear facilities, including submarines, manned by units of mixed nationality. An early invitation will be extended to such countries to participate in the discussion and development of such units.

4. Schroeder will also be interested in the fact that we have offered the French Government an opportunity to engage in a similar undertaking to that which we have agreed at Nassau with the British. We do not, of course, have any French reaction, but in any event the US and the UK would not make their own interest contingent on France. But we will of course seek French participation.

Finally, advise Schroeder that we intend to keep in close touch with him for we would hope that Germany will be in the forefront in the discussions within NATO which will lead to the development of the multilateral force. We intend to pursue actively the multilateral approach ourselves and expect to initiate discussions of the subject in NATO in January.

For Reinhardt:

You should draw on the foregoing in briefing Piccioni.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5611/12–2162. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Schaetzel, cleared with Rostow, and initialed by Rusk. Also sent to Rome and repeated to Paris.
1. For documentation on the Nassau meeting, December 18–21, between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, see Documents 402–410. For text of the Nassau Agreement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 635–637.