Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

161. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Missions⁰

Washington, December 20, 1962, 12:47 p.m.

CA–6704. Subject: Summary of NATO Ministerial Meeting. NATO Ministerial Meeting, in Paris December 13–15, although without dramatic results, provided valuable opportunity for full political consultation on East-West problems in light Cuban crisis and for examination of military posture of Alliance. Highlights of meeting were: 1) Secretary Rusk’s political presentation¹ which analyzed Cuban crisis and current Cuban situation in terms of confrontation between East and West and prospects of negotiations with Soviets, together with fundamental questions raised by recent events; 2) on military side, statements by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara emphasizing importance of conventional buildup of NATO forces so that Alliance would have capacity for wide range of military responses in case of need; emphasis also placed on importance of equitable sharing defense burden among NATO countries; 3) deep satisfaction expressed over US handling of Cuban crisis; 4) careful optimism regarding current status of Alliance in view Soviet setback on Cuba, continued strength and confidence in West, and Soviet internal problems as well as further deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations. In view of NATO Secretary General Stikker’s continuing convalescence, meeting chaired by Acting SYG Colonna (Italian).

Political Questions

1. Cuba: In opening statement on political issues, Secretary provided Ministers with analysis of Cuban crisis, observing that unity of NATO and OAS at height of crisis was undoubtedly significant factor influencing USSR. Secretary stressed point that Soviet intention to establish at least 72 MRBM’s and IRBM’s in Cuba represented potentially significant shift in balance of power which US could not ignore. Cuban episode raised number significant questions, Secretary said, including: question of how Soviets’ inability to respond on the spot in Cuban situation except through nuclear action affected range of choice NATO Governments would have before them elsewhere; implications for NATO’s role in crisis management; whether there could be serious Communist-Free World confrontation anywhere which was not of vital interest to NATO. In terms present situation in Cuba, although missiles and IL 28 bombers have been removed, there remained substantial Soviet presence in Cuba, including military personnel estimated to number at least 12,000.

Other Foreign Ministers indicated strong approval of US handling of Cuban episode. Majority agreed that as result Western position was stronger than before in relation to Communist bloc, but Portugal emphasized that crisis was still dangerous because of Communist regime in Cuba.

2. East-West Negotiations: Secretary emphasized that peaceful negotiation other East-West issues must await resolution of Cuban conflict. Assured Ministers that in private conversations with Soviets, there was no elaboration of general language used in public exchanges about relations between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. We believed this was matter which could best be approached through practical steps in disarmament field. With regard Berlin, Secretary said that in limited recent references to Berlin by Soviets, there had simply been reaffirmation existing positions, with no indication urgent negotiations were either promising or desired. On disarmament, Secretary was not optimistic re prospects in immediate future but felt perhaps nuclear test ban represented most likely area of agreement.

Among other Ministers certain division of opinion about desirability of broad East-West negotiations in near future was evident, with Belgium and Canada advocating Western initiative toward such negotiations and UK and France urging West should wait for favorable opportunities. Unlike December 1961 NATO Meeting, however, question of stance of Alliance re future negotiations did not cause controversy over Communiqué² language. Ministers agreed in Communiqué to their “readiness to examine any reasonable possibility of reducing international tension”.

3. Longer Range Matters: In his statement, Secretary stressed intra Bloc problems contrasting them with opportunities for increased Western strength through economic integration, US Trade Expansion Act and outward looking Common Market perspective. Emphasized that Cuban crisis and other developments underlined importance of improved NATO consultative procedures particularly in field of contingency planning. Secretary’s views on need for improved political consultation supported by several countries, including Italy and Belgium. Luxembourg and Danish Foreign Ministers spoke in favor of economic cooperation and enlargement of EEC.

4. Other Areas: Discussion of situation in other areas covered Congo, Middle East and Latin America with Belgium leading off with review of recent history Congo developments. Said past efforts seemed to be showing results and to offer hope of avoiding grave dangers of alternatives to conciliation. Portugal said Communist penetration Africa far deeper than generally believed in West, praised stability and good government in Katanga and thought Congolese should be left alone to settle own problems. In only rebuttal UK said could not agree with Portugal’s outlook for somber future of Africa. Secretary paid tribute to diligence and courage of Spaak in working toward peaceful settlement in Congo.

Discussion of Middle East limited to recital by Turkey of developments during past year. Recommended against hasty recognition of Yemen revolutionary government, underlined improved relations between Syria and Turkey and took pride in Turkish role as conciliator in Indo-Pakistan dispute.

Re situation in Latin America, Italy pointed to OAS support for US in Cuban crisis. Emphasized serious economic problems Latin American countries and said Europe could help in making Alliance for Progress succeed. Was important to let Latin America know that Western Europe sympathetic with their problems and wished to help. Secretary associated himself with these comments and stated we wished be certain that NATO friends understood we supporting strengthening of LAWE ties.

Military Questions:

5. Commanders Briefings: In an innovation, prior to Ministerial consideration of military questions three major NATO commanders—SACLANT (Admiral Dennison), CINCHAN (Admiral Bingley), and SACEUR (General Norstad)—provided useful briefings of current military situation in their respective commands, each highlighting shortfalls between military requirements and forces actually in being. There was also military intelligence appreciation given by General Strother, Chairman of Standing Group and statements re NATO deficiencies by General De Cumont, Chairman of Military Committee.

6. Secretary’s Statement: Following commanders’ briefing, Secretary made opening statement under discussions of NATO Triennial Review, noting review had highlighted NATO shortfalls. Said NATO should undertake thoroughgoing re-examination of strategic doctrine and, on basis this re-examination, decide how best to meet military requirements. Regarding NATO strategic policy, Secretary said US believed Alliance must progress beyond automatic reliance on use of nuclear weapons from outset and toward capability of wide range of responses. Immediate objective should be attainment of current force goals. At minimum, governments cannot permit percentage of gross national product devoted to defense to decline.

With regard MRBM’s, Secretary said US thought sea-borne MRBM force multilaterally manned, owned and controlled, offered useful way to deploy MRBM’s. Would be normal expectation that such multilateral force would be NATO force with US participation. However, we would look with sympathy upon multilateral European force if our Allies preferred, but such force should be intimately coordinated with all NATO deterrent forces. US would bear cost its own participation such force but major burdens would be borne by other states. Expenditures for MRBM force would be an addition to Alliance military budget.

7. Secretary McNamara’s Statement: Secretary McNamara gave lengthy presentation on relationship between Alliance strategy, defense budgets, and military forces. Said NATO’s problems in 1960’s were radically different from late 1940’s and it was therefore necessary to discard solutions and strategies which were no longer in tune with current conditions.

McNamara said that Alliance expenditure in strategic nuclear field ($15 billion per year for US alone) remained adequate for contingencies of general nuclear war. On other hand, there was need for expansion of consultation for handling of strategic deterrent and exploration of means by which Alliance as whole could share more effectively in operations and support of deterrent. Emphasized that it was US intention to maintain and to increase tactical nuclear weapons in Europe although doubted such weapons could compensate for non-nuclear weaknesses.

McNamara said that in view of adequate nuclear power available to Alliance, basic need was to strengthen conventional NATO forces which would confer large political benefits on Alliance, especially its European members. It was essential to deploy and use non-nuclear strategy locally in forward defense of Europe particularly in view of possibility Soviets probably could deploy total of about 60 Soviet divisions on Central Front within 30 days. Consequently, US studies indicated that NATO forces should consist of about 60 divisions by M plus 30 days in addition to substantial strengthening of Alliance tactical air posture (Allied D-Day force would approximate MC 26/4 goal of 30 divisions).

McNamara said that to remedy most important weaknesses in present forces over 5-year period would cost about $1.7 billion per year, in addition to current Western European and Canadian expenditures of $18 billion per year. US believed it was doing more than its part for defense of Alliance but other NATO countries would be required make additional effort. Using GNP as rough measure of individual nation’s defense contribution, recent trend in NATO has been to spend declining percentage of GNP on defense although GNPs have been rising rapidly.

McNamara concluded that Alliance needed tools for extensive forward non-nuclear action to add to defense posture and resources to bring such defenses into existence. Proposed that Alliance examine these theses and, if found convincing, they should be carried out as highest priority. If Alliance did not find theses convincing or did not provide requisite resources, would be necessary to reconsider forces, budgets and strategy that were appropriate and formed consistent whole.

8. In general, other Defense Ministers did not reply directly to Secretary Rusk’s and McNamara’s presentations but their remarks indicated continuing basic divergencies within Alliance on military questions. While agreeing in principle to need for improved NATO military effectiveness, several other Ministers (including UK, Italy, Canada, and Turkey) stressed political and economic problems which made it difficult to increase level of defense expenditures. UK said either NATO must be content with gap between present forces and military requirements, or reconcile strategy with resources available. Italy supported multilateral MRBM force but noted that in view Italy’s low per capita GNP, its contribution to defense was reasonable. German representative endorsed all proposals for clarifying strategy but questioned whether forward strategy could be effected with conventional weapons alone. This connection, drew attention to General Norstad’s assertion that post-1964 plans cannot be carried out effectively without MRBM’s. Canadian representative said Canada had no firm position on MRBM question, while Belgian Defense Minister said that, although Belgium gave first priority to conventional forces, it was quite interested in multilateral MRBM force. France did not speak during discussion military questions.

At conclusion discussion, Council adopted resolution on Defense for 1962 drafted to include reservation by Greek Government. Greeks indicated that as soon as problem of aid to Greece settled, they would notify SHAPE of their firm force goals for 1963.

Other Issues

9. Research and Development: In separate meeting, Defense Ministers reviewed and approved report of working group created at Athens meeting to seek methods of improving cooperation among member NATO nations in research, development and production of military equipment.³ Defense Ministers reaffirmed their willingness to cooperate in translating report’s recommendations into positive action.

10. Aid to Greece: With regard to assistance to Greece to meet its defense goals, special working group achieved solution which involved additional finance effort from Greeks supplemented by aid from other countries.

For Addressees:

A. Foregoing, in conjunction with NATO final communiqué, may be used on selective basis in briefing governments as well as SEATO and CENTO (Ankara and Bangkok should coordinate CENTO and SEATO briefings with your NATO colleagues).

B. Final texts of Secretary Rusk’s two statements (on political and on military questions) and Secretary McNamara’s statement will be sent under cover of airgram to certain posts.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–2062. Secret. Drafted by Van Hollen; cleared by Popper, Swank (S), and the Department of Defense; and approved by Schaetzel. Sent to the other NATO capitals and Moscow, Stockholm, Madrid, New Delhi, Tokyo, Geneva, Bangkok, and Berlin.
1. A copy of this statement was transmitted as an enclosure to CA–6800, December 21. (Ibid., 396.1–PA/12–2162)
2. For text of the final communiqué, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 570–572.
3. A copy of this report, C–M(62)114, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 533, CF 2202.