Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

163. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany⁰

Washington, January 10, 1963, 9:05 p.m.

1569. Ref: Embtel 1686 and previous.¹

1. Dept has found most helpful your detailed reporting on German reactions to Nassau agreement and is taking it fully into account in preparing for Under Secretary’s presentation in NAC.

2. For your information we expect Under Secretary, while following same general line in Bonn as in Paris, to cast his special comment to German officials along lines indicated below.

3. We can understand German concern that Nassau may freeze FedRep in second-class position, fortifying distinction between present nuclear powers (including France) and non-nuclear states, prolonging far into missile era independent deterrent for former, and preventing equivalent status. We know, too, that Germans resent, as discriminating against non-nuclear participants in multilateral force, right of withdrawal from NATO nuclear force of assigned national contingents. Finally, we are aware of their sensitivity to the implication in the Nassau context that a US-UK-French directorate may come to assume a predominant position in NATO and in determining the fate of Europe.

4. To meet these concerns we are suggesting that Under Secretary urge Germans not to be unduly swayed by immediate press reactions in UK and France or by ex parte interpretations of general language of Nassau communiqué. Basic point we hope Germans will keep in mind is that Nassau blocks out general framework containing within itself greatest possibilities for evolution and growth. Opportunity exists for all interested NATO members to participate in shaping institutions envisaged at Nassau. What is required now is intensive study and consultation to ensure that action in NATO responds to long-term needs of Alliance and its members.

5. We hope FedRep will from outset play active role in deliberation and action on Nassau follow-up. We hope they will express their views on aspects of Nassau communiqué of interest to them, and that they will let us have their thinking on the creation and organization of the NATO nuclear force. In this connection, we draw attention to portion of Under Secretary’s NAC statement² relating to inclusion of tactical nuclear forces in NATO nuclear force.

6. FedRep will note that Nassau permits immediate start on multilateral mixed-manned component of nuclear force. This means that Germans and other countries most directly interested (notably US, Italy and Belgium) could promptly make a preliminary agreement permitting an early start on selection and training of manpower, ordering equipment and facilities, and creating the international agencies to administer and command the force. At the same time, participating countries could reach agreement on long-term arrangements for all aspects of this matter. Germans should bear in mind in this respect that rapidity with which they are ready to act, along with other expected participants, i.e., Italians and Belgians will in considerable measure determine how rapidly force will come into being. Ball speech will indicate U.S. willingness to begin work on concrete measures at once. Under these circumstances multilateral force might well come into existence within same time frame as UK and French forces.

7. Germans should also recognize that multilateral mixed-manned component could, if vigorously and imaginatively supported, come to be a principal element in NATO nuclear strength in longer term future. It can be no secret to Germans that British and French may one day conclude they simply do not have resources to maintain both nuclear and delivery components of an effective national deterrent system. While we can obviously give no assurances on this matter, we think it quite possible that in ten years or less, if European trend toward integration continues, British and French will be putting more and more of their nuclear eggs into multilateral mixed-manned basket. And in proportion as this occurs, any element discrimination against Germany will be correspondingly reduced.

8. In this respect we would urge Germans not to be mesmerized by notion that they are in second-class status. All of us must start from where we are; and fact is that UK has and France is obtaining nuclear weapons. What we are trying to do is to create a structure in which others can be dissuaded from doing likewise, and UK and France can be offered long-term alternative to national programs, so as to limit, national nuclear proliferation. Whether this structure comes into being will depend, in good measure, on how vigorously the FRG is now prepared to move on the multilateral mixed-manned force. If this is their disposition, we are prepared actively to join them and other interested countries.

9. Finally, we recognize that creation of a multilateral mixed-manned NATO force will in long run raise fundamental questions regarding political control of its use. In discussing control of a multilateral force last fall we indicated we would give consideration to proposals for control supported by Allied consensus even if they did not provide for a U.S. veto. This position remains unchanged. At same time, we are sure Germans would agree that questions of veto or no veto may prove a highly over-simplified approach to problem of preventing irresponsible use of NATO nuclear power while permitting its rapid employment when necessary; we are prepared actively to cooperate with them in studying necessary arrangements to this end.

10. FYI: Under Secretary will make clear, if Germans ask, that our policy of not facilitating MRBM procurement for nationally manned and owned forces remains unchanged outside of agreements concluded at Nassau. We realize it is of utmost importance to be clear on this point, if there is to be any interest by Germans and other non-nuclear powers in possibility of multilateral mixed-manned force. In this connection, we will refer to:

(a) Distinction, which we hope will be transitional, between arrangements for nuclear and non-nuclear powers.

(b) Importance of getting multilateral mixed-manned force under way quickly, as element of Alliance cohesion and viable alternative to national programs.

(c) Fact that only in case of multilateral mixed-manned force could we envisage possibility of U.S. considering control arrangements which might involve changes in U.S. law and which majority of Allies favored.

(d) Fact that need for mixed manning is relevant to all non-nuclear powers not just FRG.

We hope Germans will perceive, without explicit U.S. statement, that their national manning and ownership of MRBM’s, even with U.S. warhead custody, would involve us in serious problems, in terms of both Allied cohesion and East-West relations. We know Germans are aware of unsettling effect such a development would have. End FYI.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/1–363. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Popper; cleared with OSD/ISA, GER, Seymour Weiss, Schaetzel, and Owen; and approved by Tyler. Repeated to London, Paris Topol, Rome, and Brussels.
1. Telegram 1686, January 3, reported that the German reaction to the Nassau agreement was “one of considerable caution, bordering on downright reserve.” (Ibid.)
2. See Document 164.