Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

93. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy¹

Washington, February 20, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Report and Recommendations of Washington Assessment Team on Internal Security Situation in South America

I am enclosing a copy of the Report and Recommendations of the Washington Assessment Team (SAAT)² which visited South American countries, during the period November 15-December 21, 1961, to assess the communist threat, the local Government’s capability to meet and overcome it and U.S. Country Team capabilities for rendering internal security assistance. Also enclosed is a copy of a Staff Study of the Report prepared by this Department.

The following steps in implementation of the Report are being taken: (1) each concerned agency is being requested to review the nine recommendations in Part I and to state its views concerning them; (2) the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) is being provided a copy for such action as it may deem appropriate; (3) each concerned Ambassador is being provided a copy for his use and comment.

In the meantime, the following actions consistent with the recommendations in the Report already have been initiated:

1. The Defense Department has taken steps to unify the Service Missions in each South American country into a single MAAG under the command of the Commander-in-Chief Caribbean Command;

2. AID is engaged in reviewing the current Public Safety Program for Latin America to insure that it is responsive to the critical needs of Latin American countries for police assistance;

3. Pursuant to NSAM 119, AID and the Defense Department are acting jointly in the development of civic action projects, additional to those now underway, that might usefully be undertaken in Latin America;

4. Pursuant to NSAM 118, an expanded program of collaboration between the U.S. and Latin American military is underway.

Dean Rusk³

Enclosure

Department of State Staff Study

SUBJECT

• Report and Recommendations of Washington Assessment Team (SAAT) on the Internal Security Situation in South America

The Report is the product of an inter-agency team, which visited each of the ten South American countries during the period November 15-December 21, 1961, to assess the communist threat, the local Government’s capability to meet and overcome it and U.S. Country Team capabilities for rendering internal security assistance. The Report is based on interviews and briefings by Country Team and other U.S. personnel only; there were no contacts with local nationals.

The first seven pages (Part I) summarize the Team’s general findings and recommendations. These are followed by detailed country reports (Part II). Part III, the sensitive intelligence annex which reviews local government and U.S. intelligence capabilities, is in the custody of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

I. Team’s Basic Findings

(a) The Threat. The primary threat is posed by the growing capacity of a communist minority in each country to exploit others, particularly extremist factions of the right and left, for the promotion of communist programs and goals. In order to reduce the deterrent capability of security forces, communists are placing emphasis on the discrediting, outflanking and outmaneuvering of such forces. These tactics include the policy of fomenting violence in rural areas, where security forces are weak, and of promoting disorders over issues on which security forces are vulnerable.

(b) Security Force Capabilities. Although each country maintains substantial military and police forces supposedly capable of maintaining internal security, these are deficient in the quality, orientation, organization, training and equipment they require to meet and overcome the threats that reasonably may be anticipated. Police forces, in particular, require strengthening.

(c) Country Team Capabilities. U.S. efforts to furnish governments the guidance and assistance they require to maintain effective security are hampered by inadequate coordination of the total U.S. internal security effort at the Country Team, CINCARIB and Washington levels. In particular, the entire U.S. program and overseas representation require review and revision. Reorientation of the program is necessary if it is to become a fully effective instrumentality for improving the internal security capabilities of South American countries.

II. Team’s Recommendations and Analysis of Security Situation

(a) Part I of the Report contains nine recommendations, which are set forth in enclosure 1 of this memorandum.⁴ These should be endorsed, in principle, except recommendations numbered 1 and 8.

(1) The revisions of U.S. programs proposed in recommendation 1 should be limited to those determined, in consultation with concerned Ambassadors, to be politically practicable. For example, bilateral military assistance (MAAG) and military training mission agreements are not now wholly in conformity with the concept that the primary role we envisage for Latin American armed forces in hemisphere defense is the maintenance of internal security. In some cases, it may not be possible to persuade the local government to adopt this concept and to agree to the revisions necessary to bring existing bilateral agreements into conformity. Moreover, in some cases it may be juridically necessary for revised agreements to obtain local Congressional ratification or approval. Extreme leftists and nationalist opposition elements might prevent, and would delay, such approval in certain countries. This would place in jeopardy not only the revised or new agreements, but also our existing military agreements and defense arrangements.

(2) In recommendation 8, the Team has too severely restricted conditions under which South American military forces should be encouraged to participate in civic action. The participation of South American military forces in civic action and in economic and social development programs should be encouraged, whenever such participation does not detract from, or interfere with, the reorganization and urgently needed training of internal security forces.

(b) Additional recommendations appear in each country report (Part II). These represent, for the most part, the Team’s judgment on how the nine recommendations in Part I should be translated into specific U.S. actions at the country level. While most have some merit, they should not be endorsed prior to the receipt and review of each concerned Ambassador’s comment.

(c) The Team’s analysis in each country report (Part II) of the internal security situation is as comprehensive and accurate as might reasonably be expected, in view of the limited time spent by the Team in each country. On the basis of information available to the Department, the country analyses are not wholly accurate, nor are the conclusions in the country reports entirely valid. However, these discrepancies do not, by themselves, necessarily nullify the recommendations included in the country reports, the majority of which are consistent with the Department’s appraisal of the local security situation.

III. Implementation

(a) Each concerned agency (Defense, AID, CIA, USIS) should be requested to review the nine recommendations in Part I which affect its policies, programs and activities, and to state its views concerning them.

(b) The Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) should be provided a copy of the Report for such action as it may deem appropriate.

(c) Each concerned Ambassador, in consultation with other members of the Country Team, is in the best position to assess the merit of the Team’s recommendations set forth in Part II, inasmuch as they relate to matters largely in his jurisdiction. Accordingly, each Ambassador should be sent a copy of the Report for his own use and requested, in consultation with other members of the Country Team, to transmit his comments.

In the meantime, the following actions consistent with the recommendations in the Report are already in process of implementation:

(1) The Defense Department has taken steps to unify the Service Missions in each South American country into a single MAAG under the command of the Commander-in-Chief Caribbean Command (recommendation 4);

(2) AID is engaged in reviewing the current Public Safety Program for Latin America to insure that it is responsive to the critical requirements of Latin American countries for police assistance (recommendation 5);

(3) Pursuant to NSAM 119, AID and the Defense Department are acting jointly in the development of civic action projects, additional to those now underway, that might usefully be undertaken in Latin America (recommendation 9);

(4) Pursuant to NSAM 118, on which a report was forwarded to the President on February 5, an expanded program of collaboration between the U.S. and Latin American military is underway.⁵

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 134. Secret.
2. Document 90.
3. Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
4. Not printed.
5. NSAM 134, from Bundy to Rusk, dated March 12, stated that the President had noted his “interim report” enclosing a copy of the SAAT report and requested that the Department of State coordinate the report with the departments and agencies concerned and recommend a governmental position based on its recommendations in a paper to be forwarded no later than May 1. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 134) A July 16 memorandum from Taylor to U. Alexis Johnson indicates that no paper was sent. (Ibid.)