53. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin)1

SUBJECT

  • Trouble Spots in Latin America

As of possible interest in connection with your briefing of the Special Group (CI) on December 20, our Latin American office has prepared a rundown on probable trouble spots in the area during 1963.

We expect a number of the many potential trouble spots in Latin America to flare up during 1963. Communists may instigate or benefit from violence in several countries. Violence or developments unfavorable to the US can occur in connection with scheduled elections or changes of government in nine countries. Abrupt change can also bring trouble in almost any one of these countries and in several others as well. Without attempting to predict the exact form these crises will take, we would identify the likely focus of trouble in each country as follows:

The Caribbean

In the Dominican Republic there is a strong possibility that the transition to representative government will break down, even if the regime emerging from the upcoming elections is installed. The Duvalier dictatorship in Haiti could go during the next year, and give way to political chaos.

Central America

Guatemala will be extremely sensitive throughout 1963. The prospect of Arevalo’s victory in the December presidential election may cause new coup attempts and one could prove successful. In Nicaragua a non-violent termination of the Somoza political dynasty through “free” elections will be hard to achieve. As the lid is loosened, a real explosion may develop.

East Coast

The problem of communist-inspired violence is still more significant in Venezuela than in any other country and will continue to threaten serious political instability.

Brazil’s problems will be difficult at best. A continuation of leftward slippage under Goulart could lead some elements to seek his ouster. The [Page 127] prospect for a successful coup of the classic Brazilian bloodless pattern is remote, and widespread civil strife would probably accompany the overthrow of the Goulart regime. Although there is still a good chance that Brazil will follow a relatively moderate political course, the potential for internal violence is at a new high.

Even if Argentina returns to representative civilian government, the country will probably still have to deal with recurrent crises, such as those which have marked its political life in recent years. Assimilation of the Peronists could prove too tough a nut to crack and lead to another military solution.

West Coast

In Chile there is little danger of violence, but the municipal elections and opening stages of the 1964 presidential campaign will make the political pot boil. The procommunist Popular Action Front in Chile stands a fair chance of coming out ahead.

The deepening divisions within the ruling MNR in chronically troubled Bolivia will be aggravated as the question of presidential succession comes to the fore; the possibility of fairly widespread violence is enhanced in the short run.

Communists have made alarming progress in labor during the tenure of the military junta in Peru, and the junta’s failure to permit APRA to take power if it proves victorious in the promised elections could lead to violence.

Opposition to the Arosamena regime in Ecuador is likely to increase, and its overthrow may come during the year.

Summing up, we find that serious threats to domestic social order or to good relations with the US may appear in perhaps eight countries (Bolivia, Venezuela, Chile, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Haiti) in the coming year. In another three (Argentina, Peru, Nicaragua), the problems of government succession may bring a violent or at least unconstitutional response from the security forces of the country.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 720.00/12-1962. Secret.