Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

44. Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Morales-Carrion)¹

Washington, April 9, 1962.

This memo aims to focus attention on the Alliance for Progress as essentially a political and ideological force in the Hemisphere. It summarizes some of the difficulties the Alliance is facing in the ideological field and sets forth some operational guidelines.

A. The Ideological Gap

1. Ideologically, the Alliance is facing stormy weather. Its avowed aim is to bring about in Latin America a free, open, prosperous society, democratically oriented and capable of great cultural creativeness. Its instrument is an intense developmental effort in the social and economic field.

2. To many a Latin American eye, the Alliance is simply a money-lending operation in the fiscal or financial fields. The publicity which surrounds each loan or grant helps to underscore the “money-lender” image. And no money-lender in history has ever evoked great enthusiasm. We have yet to see a charismatic banker.

3. The Alliance presupposes certain basic notions of economic development and national planning. These are sophisticated notions with no mass-appeal, unless they are given a heavily political flavor. The present lingo of economic technocracy simply does not reach the average Latin American. His slogans come from the world of nationalism, not the world of technocracy. Hence, the ideological gap.

4. The Alliance is increasingly seen in Latin America as a U.S. policy. It is basically linked with the United States and not with its Latin American background or, indeed, with its Latin American origins. It does not seem to have an autochthonous flavor, in spite of the fact that most of its conceptual framework is derived from recent Latin American economic and social thinking. It still looks “foreign” and “imported”, it still looks as a “Made in U.S.A.” product.

5. The biggest psychological obstacle the Alliance is facing is that it has not been wedded to Latin American nationalism. The single, most powerful, psychological force now operating in Latin America is nationalism. It provides the emotions and slogans for political action through the ideological spectrum. It animates the military and the extreme left. It dominates the universities and the labor unions. Unless the Alliance is able to ally itself with nationalism, to influence it in a constructive direction, to translate the abstract terminology of economic development into familiar concepts related to nation-building, the Alliance will be pouring money into a psychological void.

6. Washington thinking about the Alliance has mainly centered on the urgency of its economic and administrative problems. Immediate action in streamlining aid has been the goal, as witnessed by the White House meetings. The professional economists have been summoned to do a job. But there is lack of a similar effort to think through the political and ideological problems. Furthermore, an impressive array of top Latin American economists (Prebisch, Herrera, Sol, etc.) has been available for constant consultations on the economic phase. But no equivalent group has steadily worked on the political and ideological aspects. And yet the Alliance can only be wholly successful if it is politically and ideologically successful. Again, this is the present ideological gap.

B. Some Operational Guidelines

A warning is in order: It is easier to devise an economic development program than a political or ideological offensive. Statistical facts are easier to understand than human emotions. A great psychological gulf has separated the U.S. from Latin America. Its magnitude is greater than the economic gulf to which it is, nevertheless, closely related. No easy formula is available. What follows are just a few pointers of urgent priority, with due recognition to the fact that the action proposed will probably involve action outside the usual government channels.

1. Help to progressive, democratically-oriented political parties

This is an order of the first magnitude. We have committed ourselves to a $20 billion effort in economic development. Have we asked ourselves how much are we willing to invest in political development? Fifty thousand dollars to help a party like the APRA might go a longer way than a $100 million loan to an Odria-type government in Peru.

2. Need to Create a Political Apparatus

We have a seminal experiment in the Costa Rican Political Institute. This could be expanded into four centers: the present one in Costa Rica; an Institute for the Andean region, geared to the Indian heritage; an Institute for the River Plate; an Institute for Brazil. These Institutes, besides developing young cadres of political leadership, could become active centers in the distribution of the ideological literature so badly needed at present. Furthermore, the Institutes could establish close cooperation with progressive parties and help in providing economic support.

3. Need of an Offensive on the Intellectual Front

We can have no ideological breakthrough unless we fully understand the role of the intellectual in Latin American society and his influence on public opinion. A cultural or literary society in Latin America could have, sometimes, more of a revolutionary impact than a political party. A well written article might destroy the initial impact of a hundred million loan. We need a special program geared to the intellectuals wherever they are—a program that would support their magazines and their newspapers, that would publish their books and would grant them due recognition through awards, travel grants, etc. Here we will have to face up to the communists who are doing, in many places, a terrific job. While we concentrate on the loans, they concentrate on the minds. Some of the top Latin American writers, poets, and artists have been converted to Marxism. They are now the prestige symbols of the Red putsch.

4. Need of a Massive Book Program

We need a paperback breakthrough in Latin America. We have to challenge the communists in the popular bookstands, in the “barracas del estudiante,” now swamped by Marxist literature in all fields. The problem is not simply to translate American books. Latin America is part of the Western world, of the Atlantic community. We have to marshal the best thought of the West to engage in this offensive, and this effort has to be undertaken with full Latin American participation; indeed, under Latin American direction, wherever possible.

5. Need of Participation by Private Institutions

We have to help develop a new type of institution, more flexible than the present foundations and institutions, which could deal with parties, political institutes, publishing firms, student groups, literary and cultural societies, etc., and do things beyond the scope of government.

1. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, American Republics, 1962. No classification marking. Sent to Rostow by Teodoro Moscoso, U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, under cover of a May 1 memorandum. Rostow sent copies to McGhee, Johnson, Nitze, William Bundy, Rowan, Parker, Fowler, Helms, Cline, McGeorge Bundy, and Kaysen under cover of a May 3 memorandum. According to Rostow’s covering memorandum, Moscoso referred to this paper in a meeting with this group on May 1. No record of the meeting was found.