Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

429. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 97-63

Washington, May 1, 1963.

POLITICAL PROSPECTS IN PERU

The Problem

To estimate the prospect for the establishment of an elected civil government and the basic problems which would confront such a government.

Conclusions

A. Peru’s present political difficulties are the result of pressures for political and social change generated in a long static society undergoing industrialization and urbanization. These pressures have been building up for a generation. A resolution of the consequent political tensions is not likely to be accomplished for many years. (Paras. 1-6)

B. The present Military Junta seized power in July 1962 in order to prevent direct or indirect accession to power by APRA² as the result of the 1962 presidential and congressional election. It has failed in its efforts to develop a political coalition which would ensure the defeat of APRA in the new election which it is committed to hold in June 1963. An election with the candidates now running could be as close and inconclusive as that of 1962. (Paras. 7-11, 20-24)

C. Inasmuch as the military are in a position to control the outcome of the election, they will probably carry out the Junta’s commitment to hold it. If, contrary to expectation, Haya should win a undeniable victory, they could still intervene to prevent his inauguration and to establish a military government which would retain power for an unspecified period. There is no doubt that the military have this capability or that they would exercise it if convinced that it was necessary to do so in order to prevent APRA from coming to power. (Paras. 25, 28-29)

D. The Peruvian Communist and pro-Castro groups have little prospect of achieving power in the near future. The Peruvian armed forces and security services are capable of controlling subversive activities short of a well-organized guerrilla movement or a revolutionary uprising on a national scale. (Paras. 16-19)

E. In the past, Peruvian Governments have been unwilling to make the sacrifices or to risk the political liabilities of programs aimed at bringing about fundamental social and economic change. Now, however, Peru faces a situation in which political stability is becoming more and more dependent on the ability and disposition of governments to respond effectively to popular demands for economic well-being and security. This situation augurs a breakup of the existing structure of the Peruvian society and economy. Unless the forces of moderation are able to bring about orderly change, radical leadership will probably get the chance to try its methods. (Para. 34)

[Here follow 9 pages of the “Discussion” section of this estimate.]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry. Secret. According to a covering sheet, this estimate was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Joint Staff. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted the estimate to the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 1, and all members of the Board concurred except the representatives of the AEC and FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
2. Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, a radical leftist but anti-Communist party established in 1924. In its earlier days, APRA was violently revolutionary and was repeatedly suppressed by the conservative military. However, in more recent times its program has been considerably moderated and it has sought to achieve power by political action. [Footnote in the source text.]