425. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Venezuelan Initiative for Meeting of Foreign Ministers on Peruvian Situation
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- His Excellency Marcos Falcón Briceno, Foreign Minister of Venezuela
- Dr. Carlos Perez de la Cova, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of Venezuela
- Mr. Martin—ARA
- Anthony J. Hervas, State Department Interpreter
After the exchange of greetings the Foreign Minister handed to the President a letter from President Betancourt. After reading the letter the President said that he had discussed the matter of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers with Assistant Secretary Martin and that there was agreement that the influence of the nations of the hemisphere should be brought to bear upon the situation in Peru. However, such a meeting might not be successful and he was concerned about the discouragement that might result. He therefore considered that it would be better to wait until August 82 and see what measures the Junta adopted in Peru towards the re-establishment of Constitutional Government. In any case there would always be an option to convene the meeting.
The Foreign Minister replied that there were two main problems to consider. Peru had created a very difficult situation and he considered that the United States was doing a wonderful thing by exerting pressure on the Junta so that they would adopt a decent form of Government and call for free elections. However, the Peruvian situation was one that affected the stability of other countries. He had talked with the President-Elect of Colombia, Guillermo León Valencia, in New York recently and the latter had expressed his entire agreement with President Betancourt. He then quoted President León Valencia as having said that “if we do not do something about such a Meeting, how many more days can I remain President of Colombia?”
The Foreign Minister added that the situation in Venezuela was not one of great danger at this moment. A few days ago the Chief of the Navy had publicly stated that he considered that his first duty was to back the Constitutional Government of President Betancourt, and that he was [Page 873] therefore confident that Betancourt would remain in the Presidency through 1964. However, in his opinion the problem at hand was not one to be considered on a two, three or four year basis, because its consequences would affect the solidarity of the Americas. He added that some years ago military coups were a customary and habitual event in the national life of many countries. However, this was no longer true because now the communist parties are backing these movements, as was the case in Venezuela, in both Carúpano and Puerto Cabello, where known communists were found in uniform during the revolts.
The Foreign Minister further noted that when he was visiting Peru last April he was told that since the beginning of the year there were rumors that if APRA were to win the elections, the Government would be overthrown. The military were aware of the fact that if they did overthrow the Government, the United States would not cooperate, through the Alliance for Progress and other programs, with the new Government of Peru. In spite of this they carried out their coup. This coup was not aimed against APRA or Belaúnde or any political party. Nor was its purpose to correct a fraudulent election, based on the charge that many persons had voted twice. The coup was carried out only to satisfy the Army’s appetite for power. If the Organization of American States would do nothing about this situation it would greatly affect public opinion in this hemisphere.
The President noted that there was great concern about the situation because of two main reasons: the confusion that had surrounded the vote (the results did not imply a clear mandate, and it had taken a long time to count the votes); and there had been a very small public reaction to the military takeover. According to information received through the press and through the business community there seemed to be a certain acquiescence, which made it difficult for the United States to adopt an attitude of outrage. In view of these events, it became very difficult for the United States to discourage other countries from recognizing the military Junta, especially in the cases of countries such as Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Bolivia.
In response to the President’s question about Bolivia’s position, Mr. Martin said that the Government of Bolivia was rather nervous about the whole situation but that it had not, as yet, recognized the Peruvian Junta.
The President then indicated that, considering the prevailing circumstances in Peru, it would not be a very appropriate moment to hold a Foreign Ministers’ Conference, especially if other Latin American countries move to recognize the Peruvian Junta. Furthermore if the Meeting were unsuccessful, this would greatly strengthen the military. For these reasons the United States prefers to approach the problem through bilateral means, rather than through the OAS.
The Foreign Minister indicated that for years the principles of solidarity and democracy had been expounded in the Americas. That an [Page 874] organization had been created on the basis of member countries with a democratic form of government. If the Organization’s Foreign Ministers could meet, the purpose would be different from the one that was pursued at the Punta del pidEste meeting. In this case the purpose would not be to seek a direct action, because it would not be possible. In the present circumstances the Foreign Ministers could meet to discuss the situation. No specific mention of Peru need be made in convening the meeting. This would allow other countries to attend, such as Colombia, who have indicated that Peru should not be dealt with pointedly. The holding of the meeting would have a moral and practical effect on the Government of Peru. He added that 11 Governments would vote for the meeting and that recommendations had been presented to prepare an instrument that would consider the adoption of necessary measures in the event of any future military coups in the Americas. Also a study or working group could be formed to consider the situation. He then noted that four countries had requested the meeting and that Venezuela also expected the support of Colombia as had been indicated to him by Foreign Minister Caicedo. Should the meeting take place, the Ministers need not openly condemn the situation in Peru, but could make a general statement of principle condemning military coups as opposed to the principles of the Charter of the OAS.
The Minister further noted, if the U.S. supported the meeting, even in the case of defeat, the United States would lose nothing and on the contrary would have gained a great deal in the eyes of Latin American public opinion.
The President at this point asked the Foreign Minister what were the specific points that he would propose for the agenda of the meeting. Would it be that the OAS would go on record as being against military coups because they constituted a denial of the constitutional practices? Was it a matter of stating a general policy?
The Foreign Minister replied that the United States was the only international power in the Hemisphere and that he understood the world wide implications of any move made by the United States. However, in the case of Latin America this was an action that was expected from the United States.
The President asked the Foreign Minister for his opinion about the situation in Brazil where there was not a direct threat from the military but rather from the radical left as the government is disintegrating. There seemed to be a race between the influence of the military and that of the communists and the mobs in the streets.
The Foreign Minister noted that there are coups from the right and coups from the left. In Venezuela the left had enlisted army support for a coup.
President Kennedy then noted that in Ecuador there seemed to be a conflict between the Army and the Air Force on the one hand and the [Page 875] man in the street on the other, and inquired about the Minister’s opinion as to the situation there.
The Foreign Minister stated that there might be some danger in Ecuador. However, it should always be borne in mind that nothing pleases the communist forces more than a military coup from the right especially if it is carried out with the support of the United States.
The President replied that he understood this to mean that the result could be a superficial feeling of stability but that in the end it actually served the purposes of the communist forces. He added that the United States would have to study the final language of the Venezuelan proposal. He clearly understood that it would not be a question of non-recognition.
In response to the President’s question regarding the position of the various Latin American countries on recognition of the Peruvian Junta, Mr. Martin replied that Argentina and Chile would probably recognize the Junta early next week. On the other hand Venezuela, the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica would never recognize the Junta.
The Foreign Minister then noted that in matters of politics it is very difficult to use the word never, but that the present position of his country was that recognition would not be extended as long as the Junta remained in power. He further believed that the United States could exert substantial pressure at a Meeting of Foreign Ministers, especially through the lever of the Alliance for Progress and military aid programs.
The President stated that the United States does not wish to appear isolated in its efforts and must be supported by other countries. The United States wants to avoid the labels of intervention and aggression. It would not like to hear the Junta charge that the United States was attempting to dominate the Hemisphere through intervention.
The Foreign Minister indicated that, as was mentioned to him by the Ambassador of Nicaragua, it is important to the success of the Venezuelan proposal that it be supported by the resonant voice of the United States. He added that President Betancourt was deeply concerned not only by his own internal situation but also about the future role of the OAS. He considered it important to go on record against the type of situation the Peruvian coup represents.
The President then requested the Foreign Minister to prepare a written statement of the specific measures that the Venezuelan Government proposes for the Meeting of Foreign Ministers so that the United States Government might study it.3 He reiterated his understanding that it would not deal with non-recognition but with general principles.
- Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Confidential. Drafted by Department of State interpreter Anthony J. Hervas and approved by the White House on August 15. The meeting took place at the White House. The time and place of the meeting are from the President’s Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library)↩
- The Council of the OAS was scheduled to meet August 8; see Document 426.↩
- Projected draft statement not found.↩