Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

421. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy¹

Washington, July 27, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Relations with Peru

Problem:

1. What actions should we propose to representatives of the junta as necessary to permit us to resume relations and to recommend such resumption to other countries and what should be our timing in conducting such discussions?

2. What should be our response to the Venezuelan proposal—supported by several of the Latin American countries—that there be an OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers to condemn the military takeover in Peru?²

Background:

As of today several Latin American countries have broken diplomatic relations with Peru and all the others, except Haiti, have suspended relations, as the United States has. Most of the other western world countries, including Canada, France, Germany and Japan, are also in a state of suspended relations. The Argentines have indicated they may resume relations next week. Haiti has recognized the junta.

The press commentary in all the important Latin American countries has been overwhelmingly critical of the junta action in Peru. Press reaction in the United States is beginning to be more mixed, with most United States business interests, particularly the mining interests, pressing for prompt reversal of the United States stand. The Congressional reaction has thus far been entirely favorable to the United States action.

While there is clearly widespread criticism and opposition to the junta action, within Peru, including some public criticism, efforts to create an organized opposition have failed. There has been no significant violence. The attempted general strike was a failure and the major political parties have abandoned attempts to create a common front from which to negotiate with the junta. Parties and leading personalities seem to be rapidly moving toward concentration on jockeying for position in the elections promised for next June.

It seems clear that the sharp reaction of the United States and other Latin American countries has led the junta to take a position with respect to new elections, with respect to current civil rights, with respect to leaders of the previous government and of APRA, and with respect to the private business community and the Alliance for Progress more liberal and more in accordance with United States views than would otherwise have been the case.

While there is also the probability that this prompt and strong reaction has been a warning sign to potential military plotters in other Latin American countries—such as Venezuela and the Dominican Republic—of the difficulties they may face if they act, the Governments of these countries remain deeply concerned about the impact on their situation of premature recognition of the junta and resumption of United States aid. They undoubtedly have some cause for concern.

With respect to the proposal for a Meeting of Foreign Ministers on the Peruvian situation, which is being pressed by Betancourt with varying degrees of support from the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Colombia, Panama and Honduras, it seems open to some question whether the necessary eleven votes could be secured to call such a meeting. Even if they could, there would undoubtedly be a major public debate over the desirability of a resolution condemning the junta action, reflecting in part special situations, but largely the nonintervention philosophy of such leading countries as Mexico, Brazil and Chile which was so much in evidence during the recent Punta del Este discussions on Cuba. It seems wholly unlikely that, in the absence of any real resistance to the junta in Peru, OAS action could affect the position of the junta, though it might be a mild warning to future plotters.

On the other hand, the junta and its friends would certainly interpret any difficulty in securing the eleven votes for calling such a meeting and, even more emphatically, a noisy public dispute about a condemnatory resolution, as indication of sympathy and support for their position, support which has heretofore been wholly lacking in the hemisphere. It would therefore be counterproductive.

Without OAS Council action, it would be within the terms of reference of the Inter-American Peace Committee (IAPC) to meet quietly to consider the Peruvian situation in the context of the general Latin American situation and to discuss effective measures which might be taken, including the question of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers. Such a group might be a useful forum to consider on an inter-American basis, rather than on a strictly United States basis, what measures it would be useful to get the junta to take in order to permit resumption of relations with it during the hiatus before new elections take place. It would also enable Venezuela and others concerned to say that their initiative had resulted in some OAS action. The present membership of the IAPC is good for this purpose, inasmuch as it consists of United States, Venezuela, Colombia, Uruguay, and El Salvador, with El Salvador to be replaced by the Dominican Republic on August 6.

Conclusions:

It would seem quite possible that the junta might be persuaded to move up the date of elections from June to February or March. They have stated that timing was dictated by the need to complete a reregistration of all voters to avoid possible fraud. There is no reason why this should not be accelerated.

It is of great importance to have the junta reaffirm, publicly and with emphasis, its intention to hold free elections so that any temptation to continue to enjoy the fruits of power may be discouraged.

It would also be desirable to secure privately a clear indication that the junta will not take actions which would assist the Communists in Peru to extend their influence, particularly over the APRA unions.

Since this is a temporary government and since it is not desirable to make their position too attractive and easy for them, it would seem desirable to resume most economic aid programs, but not to undertake new commitments or to participate in long term planning activities or new project development. It would seem quite incompatible with our condemnation of the action of the Peruvian military, an action which was taken without any serious dissent within the military to resume military assistance until civilian authority has been reestablished.

It would be highly desirable if the present military cabinet could be replaced by a civilian cabinet either representing all parties or of a technical character. It may be quite difficult to persuade the junta to accept this government and it should be sought without becoming a sine qua non of resumption of relations.

In order to conduct an effective negotiation, it is desirable that the junta continue to feel uncertain about its position in international circles, that resumption of relations be kept to a minimum, and that current stories in some segments of the United States press about a reversal of United States position be refuted insofar as possible, perhaps by some small action such as withdrawing the deputy chief of the AID mission and, perhaps, the heads of the military mission.

In opening discussions with the junta, we should not give evidence that we are under pressure for a hasty action. During the course of next week our Charge should be authorized to initiate discussions with Peruvian civilians who are known to be friendly to the junta, indicating our willingness to consider suggestions of what the junta proposes to do in the direction of restoring civilian control, our policy being guided in these exploratory conversations by the principles outlined above.

In order to persuade the Venezuelans to accept the Inter-American Peace Committee proposal it would be desirable that the President see the Venezuelan Foreign Minister, Marcos Falcón Briceno, who is here with a letter from President Betancourt, and discuss the situation with him. We think all other Latin American countries would accept our view on this if the Venezuelans can be persuaded to do so.

Recommendations:³

1. That you authorize an instruction to the United States Embassy to Peru along the lines described above.

2. That you authorize the taking of minor measures of the sort mentioned above to indicate our continued desire to see further moves toward civilian constitutional government in Peru.

3. That you agree to see Marcos Falcón Briceno, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister, on Monday, July 30, and that, subject to the results of that conversation, you approve our arranging the calling of the Inter-American Peace Committee for the purposes described above.

George W. Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.23/7-2762. Confidential.
2. On July 18 the Venezuelan Charge in Washington presented an aide-memoire to the Department of State expressing the intent of his government to call a special meeting of Foreign Ministers of the OAS to condemn the coup in Peru. Venezuela’s Foreign Minister, Dr. Marcos Falcon Bricenos, arrived in Washington on July 24 to ask for U.S. support in this endeavor. He met with Assistant Secretary of State Martin the same day. (Memorandum of conversation, July 24; ibid., 723.00/7-2462) On July 27 he met with Secretary Rusk. (Memorandum of conversation, July 27; ibid., 723.00/7-2762)
3. Presumably the President approved all these recommendations although no indication of approval or disapproval appears on the source text.