Office of the Historian

417. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Peru1

Washington, June 7, 1962, 8:16 p.m.

883. Embtel 951.2 Request cable summary action suggestions in despatch reftel.

Department now considering proposals for US response to most likely contingencies as follows:

1.
Military nullification or postponement elections leaving Prado government in office for remainder term: Continue present recognition GOP; seek convince military of need schedule new election; foster compromise between APRA and military.
2.
APRA victory followed by military imposition of new government: Publicly announce we withholding recognition of imposed government; publicly announce suspension aid programs; recall Ambassador for consultation; withdraw at least top aid officials; seek take these steps in concert with LA states; attempt persuade APRA to make deal with military offering military face-saving formula; attempt persuade Belaúnde maintain united front with APRA against military intervention.
3.
APRA victory followed by disqualification APRA on charges fraud: Urge Prado to request OAS electoral commission investigation; consider all measures under (2) above recognizing that in confused situation we probably best advised work for Belaúnde-APRA coalition government to avoid civil strife.
4.
APRA victory without immediate military intervention: Immediately offer APRA expert assistance in developing its economic program; encourage APRA and Belaúnde to cooperate for social reform; suggest Haya request military support and offer appropriate guarantees security, etc.
5.
Belaúnde victory: Increase contact with Belaúnde and make clear we consider his objectives consistent with Alliance for Progress and glad work with him on development of Peru; offer Belaúnde expert assistance in developing his economic program; encourage alliance between APRA and Belaúnde based on trading APRA Congressional support for few key ministries.

We recognize proposals for action would have to be implemented or rejected in light appraisal their effect at time given contingency becomes [Page 862] reality. Interpretation of constitutionality of various procedures for solution which Peruvians might adopt likely be important factor our response to various developments under contingencies 1, 2 and 3. We shall be relying heavily on Embassy for these interpretations.

Re contingency 2 above we believe it unrealistic to expect we can bring sufficient pressure to bear to force military to abdicate once they have taken such blatant action. Accordingly object of actions proposed is attempt to influence military acceptance some compromise leading to return to constitutional government.

Request comments.3

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 723.00/6-762. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Thompson of ARA/WST, cleared by Jamison of ARA/RPA and Robinson of AID/LA-WC, and approved by E.M. Martin.↩
  2. Dated June 6. (Ibid., 723.00/6-662)↩
  3. The Embassy commented in telegrams 956 and 958 from Lima, June 7 and 8, respectively. (Ibid., 723.00/6-762 and 6-862)↩